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I. INTRODUCTION TO AUDITED FINANCIAL INFORMATION
AND RELATED LITIGATION
Financial information for a "public company"' is comprised of a set
of four financial statements 2 and "Management's Discussion & Analy-
sis of Financial Condition and Results of Operation" ("MD&A").3 The
unreliability of financial information for hundreds of companies be-
came evident after major "financial fraud"4 was uncovered in the early
2000s,5 and significant stock market losses followed.6 To restore in-
1. Most public companies consist of hundreds of subsidiary entities and complicated
joint venture arrangements. The U.S. has about 15,000 public companies, which
comprise more than ninety-five percent of the U.S. market capitalization. Impact
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Hearing Before House Financial Services Comm., 109th
Cong. 109-21 (Apr. 21, 2005) (Statement of Hon. William H. Donaldson, Chair-
man of SEC) [hereinafter The Impact of SOX].
2. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1010(a)(2) (2006); cf. Financial Accounting Standards Board,
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 117: Financial Statements of
Not-for-Profit Organizations (June 1993), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/
fasll7.pdf.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2006); Commission Guidance Regarding Management's Dis-
cussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operation, Exchange
Act Release No. 48960 [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. Law Rep. (CCH) 1
87,127, at 88,887 (Dec. 19, 2003). Since 1980, public companies must provide the
MD&A. See Amendments to Annual Report Forms, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630 (Sept. 25,
1980) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 231, 239, 240, 241, and 249).
4. Financial fraud consists of asset misappropriations, corruption, and fraudulent
financial statements. See ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, 2002 RE-
PORT TO THE NATION: OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE 6, available at http:ll
www.securitymanagement.comlibrary/AFCEFraudll02news.pdf. Various types
of financial fraud exist. For example, financial fraud through inventory valua-
tion can occur by increasing asset values, such as inventory, and reducing related
expenses, such as cost of goods sold. This may happen to meet corporate earnings
expectations by security analysts, avoid violating debt covenants, earn profit-re-
lated bonuses, increase the value of employee stock options, or meet internal
budgets. See Craig L. Greene, When Employees Count Too Much: Spotting Over-
stated Inventory, FRAUD MAG., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 2, available at httpJAvww.
acfe.com.
5. The SEC regularly issues various releases, such as "Accounting & Auditing En-
forcement Releases" ("AAER"), which summarize enforcement actions against
companies, auditors, and individuals found violating the securities law. For ex-
ample, in 2002, the SEC originally charged WorldCom with a $3.8 billion fraud
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vestor confidence in the capital market, Congress quickly reacted by
overwhelmingly voting to enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
("SOX").7 SOX was the most significant expansion of. securities laws
since the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.8
To encourage investor confidence in companies and their financial
information, SOX attempted to achieve four major goals. The first
goal was to improve corporate governance and "the tone at the top" of
a public company. This objective stemmed from the fact that a com-
pany's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO")9 or Chief Financial Officer
("CFO")1O is usually involved in any significant financial fraud."l The
second goal was to strengthen financial reporting and disclosure.
by capitalizing and deferring the recognition of expenses. See Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n Lit. Rel. 17588, AAER 1585, SEC v. WorldCom (June 27, 2002). The
SEC subsequently alleged that WorldCom overstated its net income by over $9
billion. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Lit. Rel. 17866, AAER 1678 (Nov. 26, 2002);
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Lit. Rel. 18277, AAER 1834; The Honorable Arthur J. Gon-
zales Approves Settlement of the SEC's Claim for a Civil Penalty Against
WorldCom (July 23, 2004). WorldCom's former CEO was convicted of accounting
fraud and sent to prison. See Steve Burkholder, Accounting Fraud: Ebbers Sen-
tenced to 25 years for Fraud, 20 CORP. CouNs. WKLY. 218 (BNA) (July 20, 2005).
6. An examination of twenty companies shows a stock market loss of over $300 bil-
lion. About half of these companies ended up in bankruptcy. See GLASS LEWIS &
Co., YELLOW CARD INTERIM ALERT: INTERNAL CONTROL DEFICIENCY DISCLOSURES,
at 13, Table A2: Market Cap Declines from Date of Last Unquestioned Filing Date
Prior to Disclosure Through Resolution, reprinted in Letter from Lynn E. Turner,
Managing Director of Glass Lewis & Co., LLC, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Apr. 12, 2005, available at www.sec.gov/news/press/4-497/
leturner041205.pdf.
7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). Congress enacted SOX in July
2002 by an overwhelming vote (Senate: 99-0 and House: 423-3), "during a media
frenzy involving several high-profile corporate fraud and insolvency cases."
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Governance,
114 YALE L. J. 1521, 1528 (2005).
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78kk (Supp. IV
2004).
9. SOX refers to "principal executive officer." Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a),
15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (Supp. IV 2004). Usually, this position is that of a CEO. As
the top person in corporate management, the CEO is responsible for overseeing
the company's senior management and ensuring that the company operates in an
effective and legal manner. See generally THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7-10 (2002), available at www.brtable.orgpdf/704.
pdf.
10. SOX refers to a "principal financial officer." Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a),
15 U.S.C. § 7241(a). Usually, this position is that of CFO. The CFO reports to
the CEO on the company's finances. Areas of the CFO's responsibilities can in-
clude strategic alliances, budgeting, financial reporting, treasury, and manage-
ment of cash and fixed assets. PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., ANNUAL
REPORT (2005).
11. In the SEC's study of 227 enforcement actions involving financial fraud, 111 in-
volved the CEO and 105 involved the CFO. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT
PURSUANT TO SECTION 704 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 2 (2002), availa-
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Complex reports and inadequate professional accounting and auditing
standards enabled critical financial information to be hidden, rather
than transparent. The third goal was to improve corporate internal
controls and auditor performance. Widespread audit failures were
negatively impacting pension plans and other stock investors.12 A
fourth goal was to create a tougher enforcement environment for the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")13 to oversee. 14 En-
hanced penalties were needed to deter wrong-doing, as were addi-
tional investigatory staff having accounting and auditing expertise. 15
The four financial statements that public companies must provide
in their annual and quarterly reports filed with the SEC are: (1) bal-
ance sheets;16 (2) income statements; 17 (3) cash flow statements;' 8
ble at www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox704report.pdf [hereinafter SOX SEC. 704
REPORT].
12. About half of all U.S. households own stock, often through a pension fund or mu-
tual fund. INV. Co. INST. AND SEC. INDUS. Asso., EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA,
2 (2005). Accord Paul S. Atkins, Sec. & Exch. Commissioner: "The SEC's Evolv-
ing Regulatory Role in an Increasingly Integrated World Economy" (May 15,
2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch05l506psa.htm.
13. The SEC's strategic goals are (1) to "leinforce ic]ompliance [w]ith [flederal
[slecurities []aws," (2) "[p]romote [h]ealthy [clapital [miarkets [t]hrough an
[elffective and [filexible [r]egulatory [e]nvironment," (3) "[floster [i]nformed
[i]nvestment [d]ecision [miaking," and (4) "[m]aximize the [ulse of SEC
[riesources." Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, IN BRIEF: FISCAL 2007 CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET REQUEST 6 (Feb. 2006), available at www.sec.gov/about/secfy07budget
req.pdf. The SEC has a limited staff of about 3,700 employees to meet these
goals. Id. at 4.
14. The SEC regulates and enforces federal securities laws to protect investors and to
maintain fair, honest, and efficient securities markets. The SEC is authorized to
determine the accounting principles for the financial reporting by public compa-
nies, such as 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01 (2006). However, the SEC usually defers to the
Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") to create accounting standards.
See Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a
Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,333 (May 1, 2003).
15. Cynthia A. Glassman, Commissioner of Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before
the European Corporate Governance Summit: An SEC Commissioner's View:
The Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Environment for Foreign Issuers (Mar. 2, 2005), availa-
ble at www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch03O2O5cag.htm.
16. Balance sheets show what a company owns (assets) and what it owes (liabilities
and owner's equity) at a fixed point in time. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, BEGINNER'S
GUIDE TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (Feb. 5, 2007), available at www.sec.gov/inves-
tor/pubs/begfinstmtguide.htm. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.6-04 (2006).
17. Income statements show how much money a company made and spent over a
period of time. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 16; 17 U.S.C. § 210.9-04 (2006).
18. Cash flow statements show the exchange of money between a company and the
outside world over a period of time. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 16. The
cash flow statement reports the cash acquired and used in business operations,
capital investments, and financing transactions. See FASB, Statement of Finan-
cial Accounting Standards No. 95: Statement of Cash Flows (Nov. 1987), available
at httpJ/www.fasb.org/pdf/fas95.pdf. However, statutes and regulations some-
times use outdated accounting terminology. See DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATHEW J.
BARRETr, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 114-15 (3d ed. 2001).
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and (4) statements of shareholders' equity. 19 The integrity of these
financial statements is critical. There are many reasons why firms
might misrepresent their financial condition.20 However, the capital
markets depend upon reliable financial information. When the integ-
rity of financial statements is in doubt, the economy suffers. Also, bor-
rowing costs increase, and the equity capital available for new
investments is reduced.
Disclosures of a company's financial information occur not only in
the footnotes to the financial statements, 2 1 but also in SEC filings for
a public company's material events (Form 8-K),22 in media releases 2 3
which are subject to the SEC's "Fair Disclosure" ("FD") regulation,2 4
19. The "statement of shareholders' equity" shows changes over time in the owner-
ship book-value for the company's shareholders. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra
note 16.
20. See Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observa-
tions Regarding Proposals for its Future, 51 DUKE L. J. 1397, 1422 (2002).
21. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-08 (2006).
22. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2006); See Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements
and Accelerated Filing Date, Exchange Act. Release No. 49,424 [2003-2004
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 87,493 (Mar. 15, 2004). Several fi-
nancial events trigger the need to file Forms 8-K. These include material impair-
ments of assets and the creation of a material financial obligation, even if it is an
off-balance sheet arrangement. Id.; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 409, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m (Supp. IV 2004).
23. For example, the SEC concluded that private briefings were materially different
from a company's earlier public disclosures because a private statement was de-
finitive, rather than contingent. See SEC Files Settled Regulation FD Charges
Against Schering-Plough Corporation and Its Former Chief Executive; Company
Agrees to Pay $1 Million Penalty, Former Chief Executive Agrees to $50,000 Pen-
alty, and Both Agree to Commission Cease-and-Desist Order, Litigation Release
No. 18,330 81 SEC Docket 220 (Sept. 9, 2003). See generally Todd R. David & Oni
A. Holley, Regulation FD: What the SEC's Recent Enforcement Actions Teach
About Avoiding Liability, J. INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 29, 29 (Winter 2003).
24. 17 C.F.R. Part 243 (2006); See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Ex-
change Act Release No. 43,154 [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
86,319, at 83,676 (Aug. 15, 2000). Regulation FD sought "to eliminate selective
disclosure of material information by public companies" to favored security ana-
lysts. Whenever a public company, or any of its senior officials or agents who
communicate with investors and analysts, discloses material non-public informa-
tion to securities analysts or institutional investors, the issuer must either (a)
simultaneously (for intentional disclosures) or (b) promptly (for non-intentional
disclosures) publicly disclose that same information. See HERBERT S. WANDER,
SECURITIES LAW DISCLOSURE AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY (June 2005), available at
http://realcorporatelawyer.com/programs/cleveland-chicago-2005/WanderHerb_
02.pdf.
An unintended effect of Regulation FD is that it gives many companies an
excuse to provide less information. See Lynn Cowan, Disclosure Rule is Receiving
Mixed Review, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2001, at BllF. Also, the SEC's interpreta-
tion of Reg. FD is not always the final word. The SEC recently lost a Regulation
FD case in SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The
court concluded that the SEC's enforcement division misinterpreted Reg. FD, not-
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and in the MD&A.25 The MD&A is intended as a "dynamic disclosure
vehicle" to help both business and personal investors better under-
stand the company. 26 The SEC emphasizes the importance of senior
corporate management involvement in preparing MD&A disclo-
sures. 27 The SEC believes that MD&As are adequate only if they do
not mislead investors28 and are understandable, rather than too
lengthy and complex. 29
The MD&A has three basic purposes. First, the MD&A is intended
to give the investor an opportunity to look at the company "through
the eyes of management."30 Second, the MD&A enhances financial
disclosure and provides a clearer context for analyzing financial infor-
mation. 3 1 Third, the MD&A provides information about the quality of
ing the regulation should not place "an unreasonable burden on a company's
management and spokespersons to become linguistic experts." Id. at 704.
25. The SEC requires a company to file a MD&A in its annual and quarterly reports.
17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2006).
26. See Commission Guidance Regarding Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Exchange Act Release No. 48960,
[2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 87,127, at 88,887 (Dec. 19,
2003). The MD&A combines big-picture overviews with greater detail necessary
for understanding material information. To enhance readability of the MD&A,
companies often use layering of information, headings and tables. See Stanley
Keller, Preparing the New Media, in 24TH ANNUAL INST. ON FEDERAL SECURITIES
578, 579 (2006).
27. Cursory review of the MD&A by top management is not enough. See Commission
Statement About Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition
and Results of Operation, Exchange Act Release No. 45,321 [2001-2002 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,617, at 85,152 (Jan. 22, 2002). The SEC
also advocates that a company's Audit Committee review MD&A disclosures. See
generally Alston & Bird, SEC Issues New MD&A Guidance, SECURITIES LAW AD-
VISORY (Feb. 2002), available at www.alston.com.
28. See, e.g., GAP Securities Lit., No. 89-16098, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1990, at *8
(9th Cir. Feb. 8, 1991). See also, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Rel. 34-40305, In the Mat-
ter of Sony Corp. and Sumio Sano (Aug. 5, 1998), at 6; Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Rel.
34-36887, Bank of Boston (Feb. 26, 1996); and Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Rel. 34-
30532, In the Matter of Caterpillar, Inc. (Mar. 31, 1992), at 7-8.
29. Commission Guidance Regarding Management's Discussion and Analysis of Fi-
nancial Condition and Results of Operations, Exchange Act Release No. 48960,
[2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 87,127, at 88,887 (Dec. 19,
2003). The SEC has encouraged companies to take a fresh look in producing
more effective MD&As. See generally OTTILIE L. JARMEL & ABIGAIL ARMS, MD&A
2005: LINCHPIN OF SEC POST-ENRON DISCLOSURE REFORM, presented at the SEC
"Hot Topics" Institute (May 19, 2005), available at http://www.realcorporatelaw-
yer.com/programs/sec-spring-ht_2005/Arms-l.pdf.
30. Information related to "the eyes of management" includes an analysis of the rea-
sons for material changes and identification of key risks. See Amendments to
Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, Regulations and Guides, 45 Fed.
Reg. 63630 (Sept. 25, 1980).
31. The MD&A disclosure should not repeat the financial statement footnote describ-
ing accounting policies or other topics. Instead, the MD&A should analyze the
policies that involve the estimates, assumptions that are highly subjective, and
whose potential size could have a material impact on the financial statements.
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a company's earnings, cash flow, and the potential variability of those
numbers, so that investors can ascertain whether past performance is
indicative of future performance. 3 2
Certified Public Accountants ("CPAs")33 who remain "indepen-
dent"3 4 are hired by a company's Board of Directors 35 or its Audit
Committee36 to audit the company's financial statements. 3 7 The pur-
pose of the audit is to obtain "reasonable assurance"38 that the finan-
cial statements are free from material error.3 9  A diligent audit
Similarly, off-balance sheet arrangements and contingent liabilities need more
analytical discussion in the MD&A to give an accurate picture of the company's
financial position. See Keller, supra note 26, at 581.
32. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, INTERNATIONAL REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ISSUES IN THE
DIVISION OF CORPORATE FINANCE 6 (Nov. 1, 2004), available at www.sec.gov. The
MD&A should provide "executive level overviews, an emphasis on analysis of fi-
nancial information, known material trends and uncertainties, key performance
indicators, liquidity and capital resources, and critical accounting estimates." Id.
The MD&A should help the investing public understand that critical entries in
the company's financial statements are based on highly subjective judgments.
See Elliott J. Weiss, Some Thoughts on an Agenda for the Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board, 53 DUKE L. J. 491, 495 (2003).
33. CPAs are professionals licensed under state law by state boards of accountancy.
State licensing of a CPA generally requires meeting educational (normally 150
hours of college education), examination (the two day Uniform CPA examina-
tion), ethics, and experience (normally one or two years) requirements. See gen-
erally National Ass'n of State Boards of Accountancy, http://www.nasba.org (last
visited Jun. 14, 2007).
34. "Independence" refers "to a mental state of objectivity and lack of bias." See Revi-
sion of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 46,602 [2000-2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,406,
at 83,989 (Nov. 21, 2000).
35. Boards of Directors select a company's CEO, delegate authority to the CEO, and
provide governance guidance. Board members have fiduciary duties to the com-
pany's shareholders and other responsibilities under federal and state laws. See
generally THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 5, at 2-7.
36. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 7201(3) (Supp. IV 2004). The
Audit Committee oversees the accounting and financial reporting process of the
company. Id. The Audit Committee is also responsible for the appointment, com-
pensation, and oversight of the company's external auditors. Sarbanes-Oxley Act
§ 204, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(k) (Supp. IV 2004). Audit Committees typically have
three to five members who are otherwise independent of the company. See gener-
ally THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 5, at 16-20.
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (Supp. IV 2004);15 U.S.C. § 781 (Supp. V 2004); 15 U.S.C.
§ 72m(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2004).
38. "Reasonable assurance" means such level of detail and degree of assurance that
would satisfy prudent officials in conducting their own affairs. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7) (Supp. 2002). Reasonable assurance
is a high level of assurance, but it is not absolute assurance. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Division of Corporation Finance, Staff Statement on Management's Re-
port on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting, 4-5 (May 16, 2005), available
at http:l/www.sec.gov/info/accountantslstafficreporting.pdf.
39. An "audit" is the examination of an organization's financial statements by a CPA
using appropriate auditing standards for the purpose of expressing an opinion on
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"remains the best way to identify that the financial statements pre-
pared by management do represent-as fairly and fully as possible-
the financial condition and performance of the company in ques-
tion."4o However, CPAs merely "review"41 the MD&A and its disclo-
sures for inconsistencies with the audited financial statements. 4 2
Litigation against accountants and auditors is another means of
enhancing professional responsibility for reliable financial informa-
tion.43 However, "the threat of class action securities fraud litigation
creates great financial risk for the profession,"4 4 much of which is un-
insurable.45 Even before SOX, the accounting industry sought relief
those financial statements. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 2(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 7201(2) (Supp. IV 2004). The audit process requires audit planning, assessing
internal controls, and executing an audit program to obtain sufficient competent
evidence to form an opinion. See Professional Standards, Rule 3200T, (Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd. 2003). Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Rel. 34-50688, Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board; Order Approving Proposed Conforming
Amendments to PCAOB Interim Standards Resulting from the Adoption of
PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2 (Nov. 17, 2004). The auditors must discuss
with the Audit Committee such topics as the company's critical accounting poli-
cies. Id. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 204, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(k) (Supp. IV 2004). See also
17 C.F.R. § 210.2-07 (2006).
40. THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, THE FUTURE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 8 (2003),
http://www.americanassembly.org/programs.dir/report-file.dir/accounting-report
-report file future%20of%20the%20accounting%20profession%20report%20fi-
nal.pdf. Audits are required for public companies because corporate management
is not always objective in its financial reporting. Id.
41. A "review" consists of selective procedures for expressing limited assurance that
the auditor is not aware of any material modifications to the financial state-
ments. A review is substantially less rigorous than an audit. A review is gener-
ally limited to analytical procedures and inquiries, rather than substantive
testing used in an audit. See generally JAGAN KRISHNAN & YINQI ZHANG, AUDITOR
LITIGATION RISK AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE OF QUARTERLY REVIEW REPORT 4
(2004), http://aaahq.org/midyear/05midyear/papers/Krishnan%20&%20Zhang%
2025th.doc.
42. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Statement on Standards for
Attestation Engagements (SSAE) No. 10, at § 701, Management's Discussion and
Analysis. A review of the MD&A requires the CPA to read it for inconsistencies
with the financial statements. See generally JANE M. MANCINO, AICPA, New
Guidance for Performing MD&A Engagements (April 1998), http://www.aicpa.
org/members/div/auditstd/opinion/apr98_l.htm.
43. Shareholder lawsuits sometimes seek improved corporate governance remedies,
such as greater board independence and restrictions on employee stock options
that motivate the creation of fraudulent financial statements. See generally
Phyllis Plitch, Government at Gunpoint, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R6.
44. A 2006 study found that the total costs ofjudgments, settlements, legal fees, and
related expenses for the U.S. audit practices of the Big Four accounting firms
rose to 14.2% of revenues in 2004, up from 7.7% in 1999. David Reilly, Booming
Audit Firms Seek Shield From Suits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2005, at C1.
45. Joseph A. Grundfest, Fixing 404, 12 (The Rock Center for Corporate Governance
at Stanford, Working Paper 06-01, 2006). Some argue that legal exposure is im-
perfect in addressing the distribution of risks and merely leads to higher audit
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from Congress from litigation targeting deep pocket defendants.46
Auditors are a favored target of trial lawyers4 7 because any faulty
judgment on the part of auditors may result in large monetary settle-
ments. 48 Accountants were also concerned about abusive discovery
practices that imposed such burdensome costs that expensive settle-
ments often were necessary. 49
In 1995, Congress reacted to widespread litigation concerns by en-
acting the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA).50 The PSLRA was primarily an effort to prevent meritless
"strike suits,"51 and it succeeded in part by altering the nature of se-
curities litigation against companies and their auditors.5 2 Large insti-
tutional shareholders became more involved in securities class actions
because the PSLRA ceded control of such actions to the largest inves-
tor.53 The PSLRA minimized the exposure of external auditors by es-
costs. See Joshua Ronen, Is Financial Statement Insurance a Viable Alternative
to the Not-So-Independent Audit?, SEC. LITIG. REP., Dec.- Jan. 2006, 13, 16.
46. On occasion, auditors bore little responsibility for the financial losses suffered by
shareholder, but juries handling complex sets of facts still made large awards to
the injured shareholders. See American Assembly, supra note 40, at 6.
47. Class action settlement costs increased from $150 million in 1995 to $3.5 billion
in 2005 (excluding the $6.1 billion settlement in WorldCom). COMMITTEE ON CAP-
ITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 5 (Nov. 30, 2006) [hereinafter CAP.
MKT. REG. REP.].
48. Lawsuits against accountants are often motivated by a volatile business climate,
auditors' mistakes (such as lapses in due professional care), the perception of
CPA firms as a deep pocket to cover financial losses, and high public expectations
from accountants and auditors. For an expression of the concern of accountants
about litigation, see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2004 GLOBAL ANNUAL REVIEW:
WHAT MATTERS MOST, 5 (2004), available at http://www.pwc.com/Extweb/
pwcpublications.nsf/docid/3699ED1817COEAFA8525720B004D9BF6/$file/2004-
gar.pdf (statement of Samuel A. DiPiazza Jr., CEO, PricewaterhouseCoopers,
Int'l: "The public's interest is not well served when excessive litigation and unrea-
sonable costs of resolving lawsuits chill risk taking and investment and discour-
age entry by the best people into our profession.").
49. See generally Joel Seligman, Rethinking Private Securities Litigation, 73 U. CIN.
L. REV. 95 (2004).
50. PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 ("PSLRA"), PUB. L. No. 104-
67 (1995) (CODIFIED AS AMENDED IN SCATTERED SECTIONS OF 15 U.S.C.).
51. To combat meritless "strike suits," the PSLRA imposed a heightened pleading
standard for scienter in securities fraud cases under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5. PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 § 101(B), SECURITIES Ex-
CHANGE ACT OF 1934 § 21D, 15 U.S.C. 78U-4(A)(3)(B) (SUPP. IV 2004); PRIVATE
SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 § 101(A), SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1933 § 27, 15 U.S.C. 77z-1(A)(3)(B) (SuPP. IV 2004). See generally Gideon
Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the PSLRA, 39
CONN. L. REV. 1097 (2007).
52. See Heather Fox, D&O Insurance in 2003/2004 Briefing Paper, in CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE INST. 431, 439 (Karen S. Guarino, et al., 2004).
53. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 101(b), Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 21D, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(a)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 2004); Private Securities
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tablishing a system of proportional liability that reduced the
potentially devastating consequences of joint and several liability.5 4
The PSLRA deterred both nuisance litigation and some meritori-
ous cases. 55 Further, the Act served as a precursor to SOX by ex-
panding the legal reporting responsibilities of auditors. 56 For the first
time, statutory law required some specific "audit procedures,"5 7 in-
cluding procedures reasonably designed to detect material illegal acts
related to the financial statements of public companies.
58
Specific results of SOX are discussed in Part II of this Article. SOX
provided many benefits, but it did so at an increased cost.59 Some of
these extra costs arise from the additional statutory and regulatory
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 101(a), Securities Exchange Act of 1933 § 27, 15
U.S.C. 77z-l(a)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 2004).
54. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 301(b), Securities Exchange
Act § 10A, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b) (Supp. IV 2004).
55. See Steven J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After PSLRA?, NYU Law and Eco-
nomics Research Working Paper No. 03-04, 2006) (abstract available at ssrn.com/
abstracts=558285). To correct an unintended effect of the PSLRA, legislation in
1998 made federal courts the exclusive venue for most securities class actions.
The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353
(1998) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Congress sought to prevent
plaintiffs from using state courts to circumvent the PSLRA's restrictions on filing
class action lawsuits. The problem was that post-PSLRA, about one-quarter of
private securities litigation had moved to state courts. See JOSEPH A.
GRUNDEFEST & MICHAEL A. PERIN, SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM: THE FIRST
YEAR'S EXPERIENCE (1997), available at http://securities.standford.edu/research/
studies/19970227firstyr-firstyr.html.
56. The auditors must notify the board of directors of illegal acts. If after notifying
corporate management, no remedial action is taken, then the auditor must also
notify the SEC. Securities Exchange Act § 10A, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(a) (Supp. IV
2004). See Thomas L. Riesenberg, Trying to Hear the Whistle Blowing: The
Widely Misunderstood 'Illegal Act' Reporting Requirements of the Exchange Act
Section 10A, 56 Bus. LAw. 1417 (2001). It took five years before the SEC started
to enforce this whistleblowing provision. See Paul Huey-Burns & Liza M. Ray,
The SEC's Enforcement Program and Sec. IOA, 29 SEC. REG. L.J. 199, 200 (2001).
57. "Audit Procedures" provide instructions for the collection of a specific type of au-
dit evidence. Audit procedures are more specific than auditing principles. See
ALVIN A. ARENS, ET AL., AUDITING AND ASSURANCE SERVICES: AN INTEGRATED AP-
PROACH 165 (9th ed. 2003).
58. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 301(b), Securities Exchange
Act § 10A, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b) (Supp. IV 2004). Other legally required audit pro-
cedures were to identify material related party transactions and determine if the
audited company has the ability to continue as a "going concern." Cf Statement
on Auditing Standards 45, AU § 334, Related Parties; Statement of Auditng Stan-
dards 59, AU § 341, The Auditors' Consideration of an Entity's Ability to Continue
as a Going Concern. Between five to ten percent of U.S. public companies receive
a going concern report. See Jere R. Francis, What Do We Know About Audit
Quality, 36 BRITISH ACC. REV. 345, 349 (2004).
59. Accounting, audit, legal, and directors' fees have almost doubled after SOX, with
audit fees and board compensation increasing the most. See Thomas E. Hart-
man, The Cost of Being Public in the Era of Sarbanes-Oxley, at 2 (June 15, 2006),
available at http://www.fei.org/download/foley 6-16-2005.pdf.
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requirements for corporate governance and reporting reliable finan-
cial information. For instance, SOX § 404 has prompted companies to
make substantial investments to improve and document their internal
controls.60 Additional costs have stemmed from various internal in-
vestigations of accounting and auditing practices that have prolifer-
ated after SOX. Expensive internal investigations are often required
to prepare for potential external investigations by the SEC and other
regulatory bodies and to avoid substantial penalties and other adverse
consequences.61
Part III explores common investigations, inspections, and audits of
financial information. Companies now spend substantial resources to
comply with SOX and produce reliable financial information. These
costs include both financial reporting costs and the costs of internal
investigations, when needed. Such costs are incurred to protect the
company from even more expensive consequences arising from govern-
ment investigations and subsequent litigation, if the company fails to
take remedial action.
Part IV analyzes recommended changes in the preparation, audits,
and investigations of financial information. While SOX has achieved
many desirable results, the statute and its implementing regulations
need fine-tuning, so that more reliable financial information is pro-
vided, but at a lower overall cost to corporations, shareholders, and
society. Using the four goals of SOX as a framework, this Article pro-
poses certain statutory revisions for SOX and related regulatory inter-
pretations that can yield enhanced assurances of reliable financial
information, while minimizing costs.
II. THE IMPACT OF SOX ON FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND
ITS RELIABILITY
"Regulators, public companies, audit firms, and investors generally
agree that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has had a positive and sig-
nificant impact on investor protection and confidence."62 SOX has mo-
60. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. IV 2004). "Internal
Controls" are a process designed by management and overseen by the board to
provide reasonable assurance about the (1) reliability of the financial reporting,
(2) compliance with applicable laws and regulations, (3) the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of operations, and (4) the safeguarding of assets. See COSO, INTERNAL
CONTROL - INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK, at 1, available at www.coso.org/publica-
tions/executive-summary integrated-framework.htm.
61. See, e.g., Tyco, Form 8-K (Dec. 30, 2002) (the internal investigation of Tyco was
conducted by an outside law firm using 25 lawyers and 100 accountants over a
five month period).
62. GAO, Release No. 06-361, Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Consideration of Key Principles
Needed in Addressing Implementation for Smaller Public Companies (2006). Ac-
cord CA". MKT. REG. REP., supra note 47, at xiii (recommending "no statutory
changes in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, including section 404" on internal control).
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tivated greater compliance by all corporate governance parties with
their respective financial reporting or auditing responsibilities. SOX
has made significant progress in accomplishing its four major goals to
improve: (1) corporate governance 63 and the "tone at the top," (2) fi-
nancial reporting and disclosure, (3) internal controls and the per-
formance of auditors, and (4) the government's enforcement tools.64
A. Significant Improvements in Accountability from SOX
Corporate boards of directors and their audit committees became
more informed,6 5 more independent of management, 66 and more in-
volved in the companies they manage after SOX.67 Directors had a
duty to act in good faith in fulfilling their fiduciary duties to company
shareholders. 68 Audit Committees have become more professional,69
63. Corporate governance concerns after SOX, however, are still growing and spread-
ing globally, according to a study of 300 institutional investors conducted by In-
stitutional Shareholder Services. See Alan Murray, Corporate Governance
Concerns Are Spreading and Companies Should Take Heed, WAL ST. J., Apr. 12,
2006, at A2.
64. Glassman, supra note 15.
65. The board is more informed in part because SOX encouraged companies to iden-
tify a financial expert in the Audit Committee. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 407,
15 U.S.C. § 7265 (Supp. IV 2004). If a company lacks an "Audit Committee finan-
cial expert," under SOX the company must disclose why it lacks such a member.
Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h) (2006) (the SEC relaxed parts of the standard for a
financial expert).
66. An example of greater independence is that SOX generally prohibited personal
loans to members of the board of directors, as well as company officers.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 402(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (Supp. IV 2004).
Charles Breeden suggested a more appropriate approach is requiring disclosure
of loans and shareholder approval of loans exceeding a specified value. See Ro-
mano, supra note 7, at 1571. Prohibiting loans to officers and directors is not
desired by some companies. See id. at 1538-40; Lynn Stephens & Robert G.
Schwartz, The Chilling Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley: Myth or Reality, CPA J., June
2006, available at http://www.nysscpa.orglprintversioncpaj/2006606/p14.htm.
67. An example of increased involvement by boards of directors in overseeing their
company is that after SOX, for the first time, a company's board, in the process of
adding new directors, specifically looked for what skill sets were missing and as-
sessed what was needed. Sarbanes-Oxley: Two Years of Market and Investor Re-
covery: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. (July 22,
2004) (Mitchell H. Caplan, CEO, E*Trade Financial) [hereinafter SOX: Two
Years]. Another example of increased involvement is shown by Bristol Meyers
immediately terminating its CEO and general counsel after a recommendation
from a court appointed monitor under a "deferred prosecution agreement" stem-
ming from the discovery of accounting irregularities. See John Carreyrou and
Barbara Martinez, Board Members At Bristol-Myers Told to Fire CEO; Monitor
Says Dolan Broke Deferred-Prosecution Deal; Directors Will Meet Today, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 12, 2006, at Al.
68. In Re Caremark Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). Deriva-
tive litigation can occur when a shareholder brings a lawsuit on behalf of the
corporation, believing that improper influence on the board of directors prevented
the board from investigating. See Orrin Harrison, III, Conducting Corporate In-
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in part because SOX required corporate boards of directors to have an
Audit Committee comprised of all independent members. 70 The Audit
Committee's responsibilities 71 and deliberations 7 2 have substantially
increased. 73
Corporate management wants more reliable financial state-
ments, 7 4 in part because the company is required to restate the finan-
cial statements if a material misstatement is discovered. 75 Accounting
restatements 76 became much more common after SOX,77 with about
eight percent of public companies making a financial restatement in
vestigations Under the Scrutiny of Sarbanes-Oxley, 31 SEC. REG. L.J. 299, 302
(Fall 2003).
69. Previously, corporate boards' Audit Committees were routinely passive in meet-
ings. The Audit Committees failed to take charge of their companies' audits.
Also, too often, auditors did not explain to the Audit Committee the alternatives
that management had in constructing financial statements. See SOX: Two Years,
supra note 67, at 6 (Statement of Hon. Roderick M. Hills, Former SEC Chairman
and White House Counsel). In many cases, Audit Committee members were not
even notified that negotiations between company management and the auditors
had taken place on material issues. See Michael Gibbins, Susan McCracken, and
Steve Salterio, Negotiations Over Accounting Issues: The Congruency of Audit
Partner and Chief Financial Officer Recalls, presented at the Auditing: A Journal
of Practice and Theory Conference (Nov. 23, 2004), at 17 (on file with author).
70. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (Supp. IV 2004).
71. Another responsibility of the Audit Committee is to oversee the process by which
whistleblower complaints about accounting or auditing matters are addressed.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 204, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(k) (Supp. IV 2004). Prior to
SOX, even a company's "internal auditors" were often legitimately afraid of
whistleblowing on financial wrong-doing. See Thomas C. Pearson, Terry Greg-
son, & John Wendell, A Primer for Internal Auditors Considering Whistleblowing,
13 INTERNAL AUDITING 9 (May/June 1998).
72. As a result of SOX, the number of Audit Committee meetings has increased fifty
percent. The number of meetings has also increased. See SOX: Two Years, supra
note 67 (Statement of James H. Quigley, CEO, Deloitte & Touche). The incidence
of longer and more frequent meetings suggests that Audit Committees are taking
their responsibilities more seriously.
73. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.306 (2006).
74. Most financial executives believe that SOX § 404 has created some benefits in
"business process improvements." See Kate O'Sullivan, CFO.com, The Case for
Clarity (Sept. 1, 2006), http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm78517411/c7873404?f=
magazine-featured.
75. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 229.304 (2006).
76. Financial restatements for public companies must follow the method announced
in Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 108 (Sept. 13, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sabl08.pdf.
77. Prior to the emergence of the financial scandals preceding SOX, only one percent
of public companies restated their financial statements. Prior to SOX, as the fi-
nancial scandals occurred, about two percent of public companies restated their
financial statements. Immediately after SOX, about four percent of public com-
panies restated their financial statements. See CAP. MKT. REG. REP., supra note
45, at 120 (figure V.1: GAO Analysis: Frequency of Restating Companies).
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2005.78 Some restatements have occurred because Generally Ac-
cepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") 79 are so complex, especially for
intricate financial products like derivatives.SO A few restatements
have stemmed from the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board's ("PCAOB") inspections of CPA firms.8 1 Restatements have
proliferated, in part because of greater SEC oversight,82 even though
SOX potentially penalizes executives of restating public companies.8 3
Another reason is that SOX required certifications of financial state-
ments by the CEO and CFO.84 The sheer volume of restatements
78. In 2005, a record 1,295 public companies announced financial restatements, of
which 100 were foreign companies. Accounting Study Shows Record Restate-
ments in 2005, 21 CORP. COUNSEL 78 (Mar. 8, 2006). Financial restatements in
2006 were expected to continue the record high trend. Restatements by large
companies, however, peaked in 2005. See Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., Release
No. 2006-007, Proposed Auditing Standard on an Audit of Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting that is Integrated with an Audit of Financial Statements
(Dec. 19, 2006).
79. Generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") are the accounting standards
and authorities that define acceptable accounting practices. The immense vol-
ume of standards with over 2,000 individual pronouncements, issued in many
different forms, makes it difficult for accountants to know all that is necessary for
accurate financial reporting. See Remarks of Robert H. Hertz, Chairman FASB,
2004 AICPA National Conference (Dec. 7, 2004) at 6, available at http://www.
fasb.org/herzaicpa_12-07-04.pdf. U.S. GAAP is primarily determined by the
FASB, because the SEC has recognized the FASB's role in setting accounting
standards. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Rel. 33-8221, 34-47743, FR-70, Commission
Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-
Sector Standard Setter (Apr. 25, 2003).
80. See Steven Marcy, Accounting: SEC Accountant Warns Derivatives Likely to
Cause More Restatements, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (Nov. 8, 2005). Derivatives are
financial instruments that derive their value from hedging the risk of ownership
of assets subject to unexpected price fluctuations. The complexity of business
transactions, as in the case of derivatives, increases the likelihood that errors will
occur.
81. See, e.g., David Reilly, Oversight Board Criticizes Deloitte Over Audits, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 5, 2006, at C3.
82. The SEC's Chief Accountant has stated that companies must restate their finan-
cial statements any time a transaction has no business purpose, and was done in
order to smooth earnings. Rachel McTague, Accounting: SEC Will Require Re-
statements When It Finds Any Transactions With No Business Purpose, 20 CORP.
COUNS. WKLY. 145, 145, (BNA) (May 11, 2005).
83. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (Supp. IV 2004). The
penalty is having the company recapture any bonus or equity based compensa-
tion paid to the CEO and CFO within twelve months. The penalty applies if
there was material non-compliance with the financial disclosure rules. The re-
capture also includes any profits from the stock sales during this period. Id.
84. The CEO/CFO certification requirement under § 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 mandates that the financial statement "fairly present in all material re-
spects the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer . . . ." 15
U.S.C. § 7241. Accord Stephen Taub, Ex-CEO Pleads to Sarbox 302 Violation,
TODAY IN FIN., June 21, 2006, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7080749?f=search.
The certification pressure may have led to an increase in the turnover of CFOs,
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from public companies, however, may have reduced the market impact
of a company making a restatement.8 5
Financial information of public companies has improved8 6 and be-
come more transparent after SOX, largely because of increased re-
quired disclosures.8 7 A prime example is the required disclosure of
material off-balance sheet arrangements.8 8 SOX has also helped to
make financial information more timely by requiring public compa-
nies to make quicker disclosures of key transactions.8 9
Internal controls in public companies have significantly improved
after SOX,90 as SOX requires corporate management to assess the
with almost half of the CFOs of Fortune 500 companies leaving in the three years
after the 2001 corporate scandals. See Claudia H. Deutsch, Where Have All the
Chief Financial Officers Gone?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2004, at C5. Some critics
have argued that the certification is not sound public policy. See, e.g., Romano,
supra note 7, at 1540-43.
85. Some observers believe that investors may have grown less sensitive to compa-
nies making financial restatements. Others believe that investors have more dif-
ficulty in determining whether the restatement represents aggressive
accounting, complex accounting standards, inept accountants, or highly technical
concerns. U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, No. 06-678, FINANCIAL RESTATE-
MENTS: UPDATE OF COMPANY TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, AND REGULATORY EN-
FORCEMENT ACTIVITIES: WHAT GAO FOUND 1 (2006).
86. One survey showed that "a slim majority of CPAs said that management is more
accountable because of Sarbanes-Oxley, but less than a quarter said shareholders
are getting better information." SOX: Two Years, supra note 67, at 18.
87. Each public company must disclose whether it has a code of ethics for senior fi-
nancial officers. 15 U.S.C. § 7264. See Disclosure Required by Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Securities Act Release No. 8177, Exchange Act Release No. 47,235,
[2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 86,818 at 86,883 (Jan. 23,
2003); 17 C.F.R. § 229.406 (2006).
88. Historically, off-balance sheet arrangements were not reported in financial state-
ments. SOX required disclosure of material off-balance sheet arrangements. See
15 U.S.C. § 7261; Disclosure of Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, Securities Re-
lease Act. No. 86, 821, Exchange Act Release No. 47,264, [2002-2003 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,821 at 86,969 (Jan. 28, 2003); OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, AND DIVISION OF CORPORATE
FINANCE, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO
SECTION 401(c) OF SOX ON ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET IMPLICA-
TIONS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES, AND TRANSPARENCY OF FILINGS BY ISSUERS
(2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/soxoffbalancerpt.pdf. See
generally Peter Jeffrey, International Harmonization of Accounting Standards
and the Question of Off-Balance Sheet Treatment, 12 DUKE J. COMp. & INT'L L.
341 (2002).
89. One example of the production of more timely financial information is the re-
quirement of real-time company disclosures of key transactions that are poten-
tially important to investors. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 409, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78(m) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). The annual filing deadline was shortened by
fifteen days and the quarterly filing period was shortened by ten days.
90. The PCAOB notes that the SOX § 404 process for improving internal controls has
produced significant benefits. See PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., BRIEF-
ING PAPER, PROPOSED STANDARD ON AUDITING INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINAN-
CIAL REPORTING AND RELATED PROPOSALS 2 (Dec. 19, 2006).
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company's internal control9l and the CEO/CFO to certify manage-
ment's report on internal controls. 92 SOX also enhanced the quality,
independence, and reporting relationship of "internal audit"93 within
the company. 94 After SOX, management must also provide more fi-
nancial disclosure, particularly in the MD&A.95 After SOX, external
auditors have an expanded role because they must assess manage-
ment's assertions of a company's internal controls.96 While large mul-
tinational accounting firms continue to dominate audits of large public
companies, 9 7 in general these firms have slightly reduced their client
91. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. IV 2004); 17 C.F.R.
§§ 210.1-01 to 210.1-02. Internal controls are "a firm's policies, practices, sys-
tems, and procedures to prevent abuse, protect against fraud, and ensure proper
accounting." The Impact of SOX, supra note 1, at 6.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (discussed infra in section IV.C.). The CEO/CFO certifications
have created a ripple effect in companies, so that lower level managers often
must also certify their work. See Brett H. McDonnell, SOX Appeals, 2004 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 505, 531 (2004).
93. An internal audit "helps an organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a
systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk
management, control, and governance processes." INST. OF INTERNAL AUDITORS,
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR THE PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE OF INTERNAL AUDIT-
ING, (2007), http://www.theiia.org/guidance/standards-and-practices/professional-
practices-framework/standards/. A majority of large public companies devote
more than half of their internal audit resources to compliance with § 404 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See ERNST & YOUNG, EMERGING TRENDS IN INTER-
NAL CONTROLS: FOURTH SURVEY AND INDUSTRY INSIGHTS 29 (2005), available at
http://www.sarbanes-oxley.be/aabs-emerging-trends-survey4.pdf.
94. The internal auditor does not always administratively report to the Board of Di-
rectors' Audit Committee. See generally Letter from Donna J. Fisher, Am. Bank-
ers Ass'n., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 6-7 (Apr. 1,
2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/4-497/djfisher040105.pdf [here-
inafter Letter from Donna J. Fisher].
95. There is increased disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions and certain con-
tractual obligations and contingent liabilities and commitments. See Disclosure
of Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, Securities Act Release No. 8182, Exchange
Act Release No. 47,264, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T
86,821 at 86,969 (Jan. 28, 2003).
96. See AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED IN
CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, Auditing Standard No. 2
(Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2004). For purposes of reporting on internal
controls by management and the related attestations by auditors, the require-
ments of SOX and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
of 1991 (FDIC Act) are virtually identical, as are the related regulations. See
FDIC: Annual Independent Audits and Reporting Requirements, 12 C.F.R. § 363
(2006); Letter from Donna J. Fisher, supra note 94, at 6; PuB. Co. ACCOUNTING
OVERSIGHT BD., REL. No. 2005-023, REPORT ON THE INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
AUDITING STANDARD No. 2, An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting
Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements, Nov. 30, 2005.
97. Multinational CPA firms audit ninety-eight percent of U.S. public company sales
or revenues. U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, No. 06-361, SARBANEs-OXLEY
ACT: CONSIDERATION OF KEY PRINCIPLES NEEDED IN ADDRESSING IMPLEMENTA-
TION FOR SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES: WHAT GAO FOUND 1 (2006).
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base, dropping smaller and riskier clients98 and focusing on larger
companies with significant internal control work.
External auditors have refocused and expended more efforts to
conduct high quality audits,9 9 in part because after SOX, accounting
firms lost the right to provide various non-audit services' 0 0 to audit
clients. 10 1 The legislative concern was that the firms' financial inter-
est in providing other services created a lack of independence in the
firms' audit performance.10 2 "Audit failures"10 3 were suspected. 10 4
Post-SOX, the performance of tax services for an audit client requires
approval from the company's board of directors. 0 5 Previously,106 au-
98. Public company audits conducted by small and mid-sized accounting firms in-
creased to thirty percent of total public company audits in 2004-up from twenty-
two percent in 2002. Id.
99. See The Impact of SOX, supra note 1, at 10, 12 (Statement of William J. McDon-
ough, Chairman PCAOB).
100. CPA firms continue to perform some non-audit services, besides tax. For exam-
ple, PricewaterhouseCoopers has a "Dispute Analysis & Investigation" practice.
See PricewaterhouseCoopers, http://www.pwc.com/us/dai (last visited Mar. 21,
2007). Some critics contend that the prohibition against non-audit services was
unnecessary. See Ramano, supra note 7, at 1533-37.
101. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
SOX prohibits the provision of eight specified services to audit clients, such as
information technology consulting, valuation services, and internal audit. Fur-
thermore, SOX gave the PCAOB the authority to prohibit additional services.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 201(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g)(9) (Supp. 2004).
The PCAOB has used this authority in a few situations, such as prohibiting CPA
firms from providing tax services to financial executives of public company audit
clients. See Professional Standards, Rule 3523 (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight
Board 2006); PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD REL. No. 2005-014, ETHICS
AND INDEPENDENCE RULES CONCERNING INDEPENDENCE, TAX SERVICES, AND CON-
TINGENT FEES (2005).
102. Lack of "independence" fundamentally exists if the auditor acts as company man-
agement. Independence is also violated if the CPA firm advocates for the audit
client, audits the CPA firm's own work, or has a relationship of mutual or con-
flicting interest. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2006) (preliminary note).
103. "Audit failures" can arise where auditors failed to "exercise professional skepti-
cism" of a transaction. Problematic transactions more often arise when the trans-
action is unusual, last minute, or conducted with a related party. See SOX SEC.
704 REPORT, supra note 11, at 38. Other audit failures include situations where
the CPA firm has placed undue reliance on management representations, ac-
cepting management explanations that would unravel with just a little more in-
quiry by the auditors. See Rachel McTague, Auditing: SEC Enforcement Official
Tells Auditors to Design Procedures to Detect Illegal Acts, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA)
(Dec. 7, 2005). Another major cause of audit failure is where auditors fail to ob-
tain sufficient competent evidence to support the auditor's opinion. See SOX SEC.
704 REPORT, supra note 11, at 38. Other common audit failures stem from inade-
quate testing of internal controls or an improper confirmation process. See
McTague, supra.
104. There were 57 SEC enforcement actions against auditors between 1997 and 2002.
One-quarter of these actions involved the large multinational CPA firms. SOX
SEC. 704 REPORT, supra note 11, at 37.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(i).
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dit services were often priced artificially low,' 0 7 in order to acquire the
inside expertise that could sell other "non-audit services" to the com-
pany.l0 8 SOX reinforced the need for truly independent audits of fi-
nancial statements' 0 9 and required periodic, mandatory rotation of
the lead and concurring audit partners (but not of the firm itself)."l 0
Post-SOX, some auditors seek to avoid litigation by writing
mandatory arbitration clauses 11 1 and other limits on the client's abil-
106. In 1999, the SEC began a public discussion that warned companies about the
quality of their financial reporting. See Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Address at the New York University Center for Law and Business: The
Numbers Game (Sept. 28, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt. CPA firms' share of revenues from auditing had
dramatically fallen to about thirty percent of the firms' revenues, roughly half the
share of revenues received 14 years earlier. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
No. 03-864, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: MANDATED STUDY ON CONSOLIDATION AND
COMPETITION 9 ( 2003).
107. An example of suspiciously low audit fees was the $1.4 million paid in 2001 for an
audit of Fannie Mae, when this quasi-governmental organization had over one
trillion dollars of assets. See Jonathan Weil, Fannie Paid Little for Its Audits,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2004, at C1.
108. "Non-audit services" are professional services provided, other than an audit. 15
U.S.C. § 7201(8). During the 1980s and 1990s audit services arguably became
"loss leaders" in price. The price declined so that CPA firms could gain entry into
more lucrative consulting and other non-audit services. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, supra note 106, at 24. Companies often retained their CPA firms for non-
audit services, believing that their CPA audit firm knew the company's business
better than any other auditor. Companies hoped that economies of scale would
arise from using the same CPA firm for a wide variety of services. James D. Cox,
Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and the Metrics for
Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301, 310-11 (2003).
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 7213. For an example of the independence problem, see Letter
from Andrew D. Bailey, Jr., Deputy Chief Accountant, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, to
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, LLP (June 7, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/
info/accountants/staffietters/dtt060705.htm.
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(j). Another example is that a CPA firm may not provide
audit services for a company if a senior management official was employed by the
CPA firm within the year preceding the audit. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1().
111. A major concern with CPA firm engagement contracts is the lack of disclosure of
mandatory arbitration clauses when shareholders must vote to ratify the auditor.
Furthermore, courts do not always uphold "limitation of liability clauses." See
generally Linda Friedman, Tax Shelter Cases Provide Lessons on Agreements to
Limit SOX Liability, FIN. REPORTING WATCH (Jan. 1, 2006) (on file with author),
available at http://www.taxanalysts.com. The PCAOB has begun to discuss these
issues. See PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., OFFICE OF THE CHIEF AUDITOR,
STANDING ADVISORY GROUP MEETING, EMERGING ISSUE- THE EFFECTS ON INDE-
PENDENCE OF INDEMNIFICATION, LIMITATION OF LIABILITY, AND OTHER LITIGATION-
RELATED CLAUSES IN AUDITOR ENGAGEMENT LETTERS (Feb. 9, 2006). In an analo-
gous situation, the Federal Financial Institution Examination Council has pro-
hibited financial institutions from entering audit contracts "that incorporate
unsafe and unsound limitation of liability provisions." See John R. Rieger, Your
Auditor and Indemnification Agreements, 26 AFP EXCHANGE 20 (Apr. 2006) (on
file with author), available at http://www.afponline.org.
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ity to pursue legal action against the auditing firm1 2 into their en-
gagement contracts. Soaring litigation,113 settlement costs, 1 14 and
insurance costs 1 5 have reinforced the need for greater quality in cor-
porate governance, financial reporting, external audits, and govern-
ment enforcement of the securities laws.116
112. See David Reilly, A Generally Accepted Accounting Principle?: Auditor Pacts With
Companies That Prevent Suits, Limit Awards Draw Scrutiny as Disclosure
Grows, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2006, at Cl. For example, CPA firm KPMG reached
a proposed settlement with Targus, one of its audit clients. The settlement would
have prohibited the company and its attorneys from ever discussing the case
against KPMG. Furthermore, KPMG wanted the client as part of the proposed
settlement to ask the state judge to vacate the judge's order which sanctioned
KPMG for obstruction of justice in failing to produce requested documents in a
full and timely manner. David Reilly, KPMG Aims to Cloak Details of Client's
Case, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2006, at C3.
113. Over the last decade, nearly 2,400 securities fraud class action lawsuits were
filed against U.S. public companies. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION CASE FILINGS, 2005: A YEAR IN REVIEW 1 (2006), available at http://www.
cornerstone.com/pdfs/YIR2005.pdf. However, partly because a more stable stock
market is associated with a lower number of lawsuit filings, the 176 securities
class action lawsuits filed in 2005 represent a seventeen percent decrease from
the 213 lawsuits filed in 2004. Id. at 2. Similarly, class action securities fraud
filings plunged in 2006. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
CASE FILINGS, 2006: MID-YEAR ASSESSMENT 1 (2006), available at http://www.cor-
nerstone.com (follow "Research" hyperlink; then follow "2006 FILINGS: Mid-
Year Assessment" hyperlink).
114. In 2004, seven settlements exceeded $100 million, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
POST-REFORM ACT SECURITIES SETTLEMENTS, UPDATED THROUGH DECEMBER 2004
3 (2005), http://www.cornerstone.com (follow "Research" hyperlink; then follow
"Post-Reform Act Securities Lawsuits: Settlements Reported Through December
2004" hyperlink); while twenty-two settlements exceeded $20 million. PRICE-
WATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2004 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 9 (2005) (on file with
author). Settlement costs have increased because economic damage assertions
are higher, pension funds are often the lead plaintiff, lawsuits allege that the
financial restatements are attributable to accounting irregularities, and recent
scandals have been severe. Id. at 7-8.
115. Director and Officer (D&O) liability insurance premiums increased thirty-three
percent on average from 2002 to 2003. National Association of Corporate Direc-
tors, SOX is Still on a Roll, DM EXTRA, July 30, 2004, at 3, available at http://
www.nacdonline.orgtdm/NACD-DMIXJuly2004.pdf.
116. In 2006, ninety-two percent of lawsuits filed against CPA firms alleged misrepre-
sentations in the financial documents; while eighty-eight percent did so in 2005.
Thus, lawsuits are now more focused on the validity of financial results. See COR-
NERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS, 2005: A YEAR IN
REVIEW 1 (2006), available at http://www.cornerstone.com (follow "Research"
hyperlink; then follow "2005 FILINGS: A YEAR IN REVIEW" hyperlink). A ma-
jor concern of the accounting industry is that a litigation time-bomb will explode
in the next economic down-turn. This could expose CPA firms to ruinous litiga-
tion from hindsight evaluation of their disclosures in response to SOX. See
HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANEs-OxLEY DEBACLE: WHAT
WE'VE LEARNED AND HOW TO Fix IT 101 (2006).
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Besides auditors, SOX has impacted lawyers,117 securities ana-
lysts,s1 8 and other gatekeepers.'1 9 The standards of professional con-
duct for lawyers were significantly raised by SOX12o to mirror the
obligation auditors have had since 1995 to report wrongdoing up the
ladder.12 1 As a result, voluntary disclosures by companies have dra-
matically increased. 12 2 Also, post-SOX, the role of investment bank
analysts watching public companies has diminished.12 3
117. See generally Lewis D. Lowenfels, Alan R. Broomberg, & Michael J. Sullivan,
Attorneys as Gatekeepers: SEC Actions Against Lawyers in the Age of Sarbanes-
Oxley (The Berkeley Electronic Press, Paper No. 991, 2006), available at http:l!
www.law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4753&content=expresso.
118. See SEC. & EXcH. COMM'N, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMIS-
SION: SECTION 703 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, STUDY AND REPORT ON
VIOLATIONS BY SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS (2002), available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/studies/sox703report.pdf.
119. Gatekeepers assess or vouch for the corporation's statements. Other gatekeepers
affected by SOX include investment banks and credit ratings agencies. See
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 705, 116 Stat. 799 (2002). See
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT AGENCIES,
IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS (Jan. 2003), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf (report required by
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 702(b), 116 Stat. 798 (2002)).
The concern is that gatekeepers have "a built-in incentive to lie." David Milton,
Who Caused the Enron Debacle?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 309, 312-15 (2003).
120. SOX mimicked the auditors' reporting duty and applied it to lawyers. See
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. IV 2004). An attorney
must report evidence of a material violation of securities law to the company's
chief legal officer or CEO. See generally HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-
OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE § 4.1 (2005-2006 ed.). If the corporate management
response is not adequate, the attorney has the obligation to report wrong-doing
up the ladder to the board. The SEC had proposed "noisy withdrawal rules"
which provide that if the board's response is inadequate, the attorney must with-
draw from representing the company and report the withdrawal to the SEC. See
Retention of Records Relevant to Audits and Reviews, Securities Act Release No.
8180, Exchange Act Release No. 47241, Investment Company Act Release No.
25911, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,819, at 86,917
(Jan. 24, 2003). Given arguments about the attorney-client privilege, the SEC
subsequently withdrew the "noisy withdrawal rules." See Bloomenthal, supra, at
4.25.
121. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b). However, attorneys are sometimes permitted but not
required to report to the SEC. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2006); Attorneys: Lawyers
May Disclose Wrongdoing to SEC Despite Stricter State Confidentiality Rules, 21
CORP. COUNS. WKLY. 73 (BNA) (Mar. 8, 2006).
122. Bob Dole & Tom Daschle, Editorial, Let's Reform the Reforms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3,
2005. The authors of this editorial are former U.S. Senate Majority and Minority
leaders.
123. See 15 U.S.C. § 78a. Research analysts have increasingly shifted to providing
information for private capital venture funds and hedge funds because of in-
creased pressure to supply short term trading ideas to these clients. Kelly Bogda-
nor, Hedge Fund Headwinds and Tailwinds: Examining the Impact of Hedge
Funds on the U.S. Stock Market, DAIN RAUSCHER PRIVATE CLIENT EQUITY RE-
SEARCH 3 (Nov. 17, 2006) (on file with author), available at http://www.rbcdain.
com.
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A more stringent enforcement environment 124 arose post-SOX as a
result of enhanced penalties for corporate boards of directors, 12 5 cor-
porate management, 126 and auditors. Under SOX, penalties were es-
tablished for financial fraud,127 white collar crime, 128 and improper
certification of financial statements by the CEO and CFO.129 Crimi-
nal penalties are available, including a penalty for improper influence
on the conduct of audits. 130 A "records retention" provision made it a
crime to alter, conceal, falsify, or destroy any document to prevent its
use in an official proceeding. 131 Whistleblowing on financial fraud
was supported by SOX by establishing legal protections for such em-
124. ' Tough enforcement is essential for a strong securities market since it ensures
that wrongdoers are punished and relinquish any benefits obtained by viola-
tions." CAP. MKT. REG. REP., supra note 47, at 72.
125. For example, the standard the SEC used to bar corporate directors or manage-
ment was relaxed to "unfitness," rather than "substantial unfitness" pre-SOX.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2).
126. For example, during SEC investigations, the SEC can freeze extraordinary pay-
ments to corporate officials. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1103, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-3(c) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). Cf. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 305, 15
U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (Supp. IV 2004) (freezing of other extraordinary payments is
possible).
127. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 §§ 801-807, 116 Stat. 800 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28 U.S.C.). Most impor-
tantly, SOX provides for a maximum 25 years in prison and/or a fine. Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 § 807, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (Supp. IV 2004).
128. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 §§ 901-906, 116 Stat. 804 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.)
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1350. The criminal penalty applies if the executive knowingly and
materially misrepresented financial information. Normally, the maximum fine
is limited to $1 million, while prison time has a ten year maximum. However, a
willful violation has a maximum fine of $5 million and twenty years in prison. 18
U.S.C. § 1350.
130. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 303(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7242(a) (Supp. IV 2004). See
Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, Exchange Act Release No. 47,890, 68
Fed. Reg. 31,820 (proposed May 20, 2003).
131. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Supp. IV 2004). In 2005, a
former Ernst & Young partner was sentenced to a year in prison after he pled
guilty to falsifying audit documents to impede an SEC investigation. See Ac-
counting: Ernst Partner Sentenced for Altering Audit Papers, 20 CORP. CouNs.
WKLY., 78, 78 (BNA) (Mar. 9, 2005); SEC: Morgan Stanley to Pay $15 Million In
SEC Case Over E-mail Production, 21 CoRP. CouNs. WKLY. 153, 153 (BNA) (May
17, 2006).
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ployees. 132 According to some critics, civil penalties have become dis-
proportionately large, relative to their deterrent benefit.133
B. SOX' Significant Ripple Effects
SOX has had substantial ripple effects on corporate activity, gov-
ernment oversight, private companies,134 and non-profit organiza-
tions.13 5 Some of these ripple effects have come through either federal
or state legislation or the tougher regulatory environment. Other
changes occurred through voluntary adoption. SOX has even had a
significant effect on other countries. 136
Corporate activity has changed after SOX, but the reason for the
change is sometimes disputed. 13 7 For example, the number of public
132. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1107, 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004);
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. IV 2004). But see
Jill L. Rosenberg, Preventing Sarbanes-Oxley and Other Whistleblower Claims, J.
INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE, at 15, 20 n.26 (Dec. 22, 2004) (stating that as of Octo-
ber 2004, whistleblowers who have gone to court have succeeded in only twelve
percent of the lawsuits). However, whistleblowers sometimes receive favorable
settlements, such as the whistleblower against Walt Disney who alleged she was
fired after refusing to help the company cheat the government of taxes. Accord
Mark R. Attwood, When the Whistle Blows: Renewed Enthusiasm Among Em-
ployee Watchdogs, in PLI, ADVANCED CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 1157, 1160 n.4
(2003).
133. "In 2004, civil penalties amounted to approximately $4.7 billion. This compares
with penalties in the United Kingdom for all financial sectors of approximately
$40.05 million in the same year." CAP. MKT. REG. REP., supra note 47, at 11.
134. "Private companies" are non-public companies. The biggest financial accounting
and reporting change in private companies was in the accounting processes for
payroll, benefits, expenditures, and purchasing. Christine Pardi, Private Compa-
nies Revise Financial Procedures Due to Regulation (June 14, 2004), available at
http://www.fei.org/news/pcRHMR_6 16_04.cfm.
135. Approximately 3,000,000 tax-exempt entities exist. These include about
1,000,000 charitable organizations, 1,000,000 employee plans, and 1,000,000
other entities including labor organizations. See Charity Oversight and Reform:
Keeping Bad Things From Happening to Good Charities: Hearing Before the S.
Finance Comm., 108th Cong. 1 (June 22, 2004) (written statement of Mark W.
Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue). Although the number of tax ex-
empt organizations has increased, tax audits have declined from 12,589 tax re-
turns in 1993 to 5,754 tax returns in 2003. See Staff of the Joint Comm. on
Taxation, Description of Present Law Relating to Charitable and Other Exempt
Organizations and Statistical Information Relating to Growth and Oversight of
the Tax Exempt Sector 37 (JCX-44-04) (June 22, 2004) [hereinafter Joint Comm.
on Taxation, Oversight of the Tax Exempt Sector].
136. See Ethiopis Tafara, A Race to the Top: International Regulatory Reform Post
Sarbanes-Oxley, 25 INr'L FIN. L. REV. 12 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/speech/2006/spch09llO6et.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
137. "The Committee [on Capital Markets Regulation] believes that four factors are
responsible for loss of U.S. competitiveness to foreign and private markets:" (1)
improvements in foreign public markets, (2) an increase in liquidity in foreign
and private markets making it less necessary to go to the U.S. capital markets,
(3) "improvements in technology that make it easier for U.S. investors to invest in
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companies returning to private status has almost doubled,13s while
the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) for new companies has
dropped substantially.13 9 After SOX, corporate mergers and acquisi-
tions activity was reduced, in part because due diligence activity be-
came more expensive. 14 0 The nature of corporate risk management
was broadened after SOX to cover the entire business environment.141
Greater compliance support within companies created new internal
units, such as a "Qualified Legal Compliance Committee," 142 as well
as a new compliance supporting industry.14 3
Emboldened after SOX, various government agencies began to mir-
ror the tougher enforcement environment. 144 The IRS created a more
stringent regulatory environment after SOX,145 which forced attor-
neys and accounting firms to disclose the details of tax shelter plans
foreign markets," and (4) "differences in regulation between the U.S. public mar-
kets and the foreign and private alternatives." CAP. MKT. REG. REP., supra note
47, at 39.
138. See U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 97, at 21.
139. See id. at 7. A seventy percent decline in IPOs after the high-tech bubble of the
late 1990s burst was probably higher than expected. Kara Sissell, GAO Report
Finds Smaller Companies Spend More on Sarbanes Oxley, CHEMICAL WEEK (May
17, 2006) (on file with author). Smaller companies "found that many of the per-
ceived advantages of public status were more illusory than real." Gregory C.
Yadley, Going Private: Eliminating Public Company Status Through a Reverse
Stock Split, in 24TH ANNUAL INST. ON FEDERAL SECURITIES (2006), at 609, 611.
"Some argue that the United States is well served by losing some foreign IPOs, at
least those that pose unacceptable risks to U.S. investors . . . ," such as Chinese
and Russian IPOs. CAP. MKr. REG. REP., supra note 47, at 3. The U.S. lost part
of the global IPO market. "In the late 1990s, the U.S. exchange listed capital
markets were attracting forty-eight percent of all global IPOs." After that, the
U.S. market share dropped to a low of six percent in 2005 and is estimated as
eight percent in 2006. CAP. MKT. REG. REP., supra note 47, at 2.
140. See Jo Lynne Koehn & Stephen C. DelVecchio, Revisiting the Ripple Effects of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 THE CPA J. 32 (May 2006); Judith Burns, Sarbanes-Oxley
on Agenda for Sept. 19th House Hearing, Dow Jones News Service (Sept. 13,
2006).
141. Thus, risk management now includes "legal risk, compliance risk, financial risk,
technology risk, operational risk, and reputational risk." Thomas A. Russo, Be-
yond SOX 404, 9 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 281, 281-82 (2003-2004).
142. See generally Jeffrey I. Snyder, Regulation of Lawyer Conduct Under Sarbanes-
Oxley: Minimizing Law-Firm Liability by Encouraging Adoption of Qualified Le-
gal Compliance Committees, 24 REV. LITIG. 223 (2005).
143. See Koehn & DelVecchio, supra note 140, at 36 (discussing how the specialized
software industry developed to support compliance).
144. For example, the IRS raised the required level of professional conduct in Treas.
Dep't Circular No. 203 (June 20, 2005), 31 C.F.R. § 10 (2006).
145. SOX included a suggestion to have CEOs sign the company's tax return. This
concept of executive responsibility for the company's material tax positions was
raised again in the Care Act of 2003, § 722. However the proposed provision for
CEO signing tax returns did not become law. See generally Kenneth J. Kies, CEO
Tax Return Signing - Worst Idea of the Decade?, FIN. REPORTING WATCH, (Jan.
27, 2005) (on file with author), available at http://www.taxanalysts.com.
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offered by them.14 6 The stricter enforcement environment also al-
tered the focus of SEC investigations to include greater scrutiny of
large multinational accounting firms.14 7
Other organizations were influenced to make changes after SOX.
"Liability insurers are starting to demand evidence [from companies]
that SOX practices are in place."148 The credit agency handling
health care providers has urged such tax-exempt organizations to
adopt nine specified SOX provisions to improve the accuracy and cred-
ibility of financial statements. 1 49 Some private companies,150 espe-
cially larger private businesses,15 1 have voluntarily improved their
146. See I.R.C. § 6011 (2000). The Code requires taxpayers participating in a "report-
able transaction," such as a tax shelter, to disclose certain information on the
taxpayer's return. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-4 (2005). In 2004, Congress added a
monetary penalty for failure to disclose reportable transactions. I.R.C. § 6707A
(West Supp. 2006). This reporting and penalties requirement stemmed from
KPMG's sale of abusive tax shelters. KPMG collected roughly $125 million in
fees from selling such shelters during the period 1997 to 2001, and the sales may
have cost the federal government more than $2.5 billion in tax revenue. See S.
PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY: THE
ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS, AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS, S. Doc. No.
108-34, at 4 (1st Sess. 2003); Floyd Norris, When Auditors Go Astray, What Direc-
tor Dares Say So?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 2005. In August 2005, KPMG entered
into a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA), pursuant to which it admitted to
wrongdoing, agreed to pay $456 million, and agreed to continue cooperating in
the government's investigation. The DPA was widely viewed as the only way the
firm could avoid a criminal indictment, which proved fatal to accounting rival
Arthur Andersen just three years earlier. See Molly McDonough, Justice Memo
Stirs Up Another Storm (Apr. 28, 2006), http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecol-
lar/WCnews033; Joseph Nocera, Auditors: Too Few to Fail, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
2005, at C1 (DOJ failed to indict KPMG in connection with its sales of illegal tax
shelters in part because DOJ feared an indictment would cause KPMG to fold).
147. See Alison Bennett, Accounting: Official Anticipates Numerous Investigation of
Financial Fraud in 2005, Reflecting Trend, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (Oct. 26, 2005).
148. Sarbanes-Oxley Invades Nonprofit World; Mesh SOX Best Practices, OIG Compli-
ance, (on file with author), available at http://www.aishealth.com (reprinted from
Report on Medicare Compliance, Sept. 12, 2005).
149. See Foley & Lardner LLP, NonProfit Governance Reform; The Fitch Report and
Other Updates, LAw WATCH, Sept. 27, 2005, at 1, available at http'J/www.foley.
com/files/tbls3lPublications/FileUploadl37/2911/706438_1.pdf.
150. See Paul D. Broude & Richard L. Prebil from Foley & Lardner LLP, The Impact of
Sarbanes-Oxley on Private & Nonprofit Companies 2 (Mar. 10, 2005) (on file with
author), http://www.taxanalysts.com.
151. See PricewaterhouseCoopers, Though Opposed to New Regulations, Fast-Growing
Private Companies Voluntarily Adopt Sarbanes-Oxley Principles, Price-
waterhouseCoopers Finds, TRENDSETTER BAROMETER, Jan. 10, 2006, available at
http://www.pwc.com (follow "Press Releases" hyperlink; then follow "News Re-
leases" hyperlink).
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accounting practices 15 2 because SOX generally represents best prac-
tices to follow. 1 53
Some states have adopted laws and regulations with provisions
similar to those of SOX in other organizational contexts and created a
stricter regulatory environment. 15 4 Post-SOX, the federal regulatory
environment for financial information has become more complicated
with numerous new regulations, a greater enforcement orientation,
and more resources devoted to enforcement. 155 Some of these develop-
ments are directed toward non-profit organizations.156
Non-governmental organizations have also responded to the
tougher enforcement environment. For example, stock exchanges en-
hanced their listing requirements for member firms, reflecting inde-
pendence concerns in three areas. First, the exchanges required
independence from the majority of a corporate board's directors. 15 7
Second, they required non-management directors to meet at regularly
scheduled executive sessions without management present, so that
boards could conduct genuinely independent discussions. Third, in
152. See Financial Executives International, Private Companies Revise Financial Pro-
cedures Due to Regulations (June 14, 2004), available at http://www2.fei.org/
news/pcRHMR 6_16_04.cfm. Over one-third of private companies surveyed
made improvements in their accounting systems relating to employee benefits
and expenditures. Id.
153. Broude & Prebil, supra note 150, at 7 (the most common aspects of corporate
governance reform implemented by private companies are generally the reforms
that are the least expensive to adopt).
154. See, e.g., CAL. GOVT CODE § 12586 (West 2005). An example of SOX-like provi-
sions under California law is that the CEO or President of a private company
must acknowledge if the company's CPA firm is performing both auditing and
non-auditing services; U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 97, at 40.
155. The enforcement emphasis in SOX was also shown by the increase in funding for
additional SEC enforcement staff and the passage of the Accountant, Compliance
and Enforcement Staffing Act of 2003, § 2, 5 U.S.C. § 3114 (Supp. IV 2004). A
tougher enforcement atmosphere occurred at the IRS and the DOJ. The DOJ
brought a number of cases against accounting firms in connection with the firm's
marketing of tax shelter products and failure to register their tax shelter prod-
ucts. IRS Commissioner Everson stated: "We believe a new climate under SOX,
together with the tougher independence standards for auditors" will make this
problem less likely in the future. PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., REL No.
2005-014, ETHICS AND INDEPENDENCE RULES COVERING INDEPENDENCE, TAX SER.
VICES, AND CONTINGENT FEES, July 26, 2005, at 5 n.8.
156. A Congressional staff paper on nonprofits suggested changes to increase non-
profit board transparency and accountability. See Joint Comm. on Taxation,
Oversight of the Tax Exempt Sector, supra note 135.
157. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3) (Supp. V 2004). After
the NYSE and NASD issued its report, Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committee on Feb. 8, 1999, U.S. stock exchanges
required that their member companies have audit committees comprised of at
least three independent directors. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-42233, 64 Fed. Reg. 71523 (Dec. 14, 1999) (approving the re-
vised NASDAQ and AMEX listing requirements).
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addition to the audit committee, the stock exchanges required the
compensation committee, 158 which determines the pay of senior man-
agement, 159 and the nominations committee, 16 0 which proposes new
corporate board members, to consist of all independent directors.
Other countries have adopted various provisions analogous to
those in SOX in order to achieve an effective regulatory environment
in the increasingly globalized financial markets.161 For example,
many nations have abolished self-regulation of auditors 16 2 and cre-
ated new auditor oversight bodies and taken other legal action often
imitating SOX. 163 The overseas changes occurred in part because em-
158. "Compensation Committees" arose to provide a check and independent voice on
decisions over CEO compensation. See Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great
Boards Great, 80 HARV. Bus. REV. 106, 109 (Sept. 2002).
159. The executive compensation problem is reflected in the increase in pay levels
from 1993 to 2005. During this period, the total compensation paid to the top five
executives of public companies more than doubled, from less than five percent of
company profits to more than ten percent of company profits. The Impact of SOX,
supra note 1, at 40 (statement of Darlene Hooley, Congresswoman). Increased
corporate use of stock options as compensation provided a stronger motive for
engaging in accounting manipulation. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Government Fail-
ures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order of Sarbanes Oxley, 35
CONN. L. REV. 1125 (2002).
160. "Nominations Committees" generally arose from the need to diversify boards and
identify outside directors not beholden to CEOs. The Breeden Report uses the
term "Governance Committee" to refer to committees handling board nomina-
tions and reviewing other governance concerns. RICHARD C. BREEDEN, RESTORING
TRUST: REPORT TO THE HON. JED S. RAKOF, THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE FUTURE
OF MCI, INc., 84 (2003), available at http://www.thedirectorscollege.com/images/
downloads/Breeden%20Report%20Restoring%20Trust.pdf [hereinafter BREEDEN
REPORT].
161. Twenty-eight countries have signed a Multilateral Memorandum of Understand-
ing of Enforcement Cooperation and Information Sharing and eighty more coun-
tries are expected to sign within the next five years. See 2005 SEC PERF. &
ACCOUNTABILITY REP., at 40.
162. See Stavros B. Thomadakis, Chairman of the Pub. Interest Oversight Bd., Speech
at seminar hosted by the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants: The
Regulation of Audit: National Responses and the International Public Interest
(Nov. 16, 2005), available at http://www.ipiob.org/speeches.php. The Public In-
terest Oversight Board ("PIOB") oversees auditing and assurance, ethics, and ed-
ucation standard-setting activities within the International Federation of
Accounting. PIOB was established in February 2005. PIOB's eight members are
nominated by the International Organization of Securities Commissions, the Ba-
sel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Association of Insur-
ance Supervisors, and the World Bank. See http://www.ipiob.org (last visited 3/
21/07).
163. For example, in 2000 the United Kingdom established the "Financial Services
Authority" (FSA), which is similar to the SEC in the United States. See Emily
Davis, Major Provisions of U.K Law, Similar to SOX, Go Into Effect, FIN. RE-
PORTING WATCH, Apr. 7, 2005, at 3. PCAOB inspectors work with FSA inspectors
and other similar oversight board personnel in Canada, Australia, France, and
Japan. See The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Hearing Before H. Financial Ser-
[Vol. 86:43
2007] INVESTIGATIONS, INSPECTIONS, AND AUDITS 69
bedded in SOX is a provision providing for extra-territorial reach.164
A series of high-profile accounting scandals in Europe 16 5 and a
greater awareness of the globalization of the world's capital markets
led that continent to implement reform similar to SOX. 166 Global ini-
tiatives through the International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions also have encouraged high quality standards for auditing.167
The direct and indirect impact of SOX has spurred substantial pro-
gress toward the legislation's four goals. A greatly enhanced "tone at
the top" of public companies is evident by the impact of SOX on gov-
ernance activities by boards of directors, their Audit Committees, and
the companies' senior financial management. However, as argued be-
low, additional corporate governance reforms are desirable to improve
the tone at the top.
Improved financial reporting is evident as companies are adopting
stronger internal controls and producing more reliable financial state-
ments, while enhanced disclosures are most noticeable in a company's
MD&A. However, it is widely recognized that financial reporting re-
quires substantial additional changes to make information more un-
derstandable and relevant for investors, regulators, and the reporting
organization itself.
While audit performance was enhanced after SOX and the legal
obligations of auditors and other gatekeepers was expanded, the
PCAOB inspections discussed below reveal that auditor performance
is still lacking. Further education is essential for auditors to become
more effective and efficient, particularly in their SOX § 404 internal
control work. Post-SOX, the SEC, the PCAOB, and other government
agencies have created a significantly more rigorous enforcement envi-
ronment to deter and combat corporate financial fraud. SOX has indi-
rectly encouraged other countries to exercise stronger oversight of
auditors, but more enforcement is needed to ensure reliable financial
vices Comm., 109th Cong., 13 (2005) (statement of William J. McDonough, Chair-
man, PCAOB).
164. Foreign responses arose in part to eliminate the need for foreign CPA firms to
register with the PCAOB and the reconciliation of foreign financial statements
with U.S. GAAP. See generally Minodara D. Vancea, Exporting U.S. Corporate
Governance Standards Through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Unilateralism or Coop-
eration?, 53 DuKE L.J. 833 (2003).
165. David A. Brown, Presented to the American Accounting Association, Public Inter-
est Oversight of Global Standards Setting (Jan.13, 2006), available at http://www.
ipiop.org/downloads/speeches/SpeechtoAAA,Jan. 13.2006.pdf.
166. A proposed transatlantic merger of stock exchanges has highlighted the global-
ization of the world capital markets. See Anuj Gangahan, NYSE and Euronext
Recast an International Dynamic, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2006, at 31.
167. See TECHNICAL COMMITTEE AND EMERGING MARKETS COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, SURVEY REPORT ON REGULA-
TION AND OVERSIGHT OF AUDITORS 4 (2005), available at http://www.iosco.org/
library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD199.pdf.
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statements for all major organizations engaging in business
transactions.
III. INVESTIGATIONS, INSPECTIONS, AND AUDITS OF
FINANCIAL INFORMATION
Investigations of financial information are conducted by various
government agencies and entities. Part A explores internal investiga-
tions. Part B explains SEC investigations of public companies and in-
dustries. Part C discusses the PCAOB's inspections and enforcement
process. Part D addresses parallel investigations of financial informa-
tion by Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") audits, Department of Jus-
tice ("DOJ") investigations, the stock exchanges, and state authorities.
Part E examines corporate cooperation with regulatory agencies, with
a focus on protection from subsequent disclosure to private litigants of
materials protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or attorney
work product doctrine.
A. Internal Investigations of Financial Reporting and
Disclosure
Internal investigations168 usually arise when a company must in-
vestigate potential wrong-doing by senior management 16 9 or when fi-
nancial misrepresentation is alleged.17 0 Conducting a comprehensive
internal investigation enables the company to better formulate de-
fenses against possible regulatory and criminal inquiry and probable
civil litigation.171
An external event often triggers a company's internal investiga-
tion. The external event may include service of a subpoena, discovery
of a prior incorrect financial statement, discovery of material miscon-
duct, receipt of government inquiries, or a complaint. 1 72 Boards of
directors often properly use an internal investigation as the first step
to inform themselves of material facts regarding any alleged wrongdo-
168. "Internal investigation," as the term is used in this Article, adopts the legal per-
spective of the board's fiduciary duties. Sometimes the phrase is used in a
broader context, such as performing a "risk audit" within the company.
169. Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil, Overview: Initiating an Internal Investigation
and Assembling the Investigative Team, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS,
1, 2 (Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2003).
170. In 89% of recent financial statement misrepresentation cases, companies under-
took an internal investigation. However, management sometimes arranged the
investigation and did not always inform the audit committee. See Steven Marcy,
Accounting: PricewaterhouseCoopers Survey Finds Corporate Fraud Instances on
the Rise, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (Dec. 2, 2005).
171. See David M. Brodsky, Strategies for Conducting Internal Investigations, in 2
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSTITUTE 2004, at 948.
172. Id. at 945.
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ing, oversee senior management, and demonstrate due care in fulfil-
ling their fiduciary duties.173
Some corporate boards in the post-SOX environment establish re-
lationships with outside legal counsel to anticipate and deal with
problems expeditiously before they become serious. The arrange-
ments enable outside counsel to proceed more quickly with required
internal investigations. Corporate boards sometimes have a "Special
Committee,"174 which is independent of management and is charged
with overseeing the company's internal investigations. Independent
directors are generally unsatisfied with management assurances that
everything is in order.175
Increasingly, outside legal counsel, sometimes referred to as "spe-
cial counsel," are used to conduct a company's internal investiga-
tions.17 6 Special counsel are generally separate from the outside legal
counsel used by the company for other purposes. 177 It is widely per-
ceived that SEC staff generally prefers working with special counsel
for two major reasons. First, special counsel are viewed as more relia-
ble than in-house counsel, particularly if they formerly worked at the
SEC. Second, the use of special counsel enhances the perception of
fairness. This perception can smooth the working relationship with
SEC staff, which may lead to quicker or more favorable
settlements.17s
Historically, in-house corporate counsel, with assistance from the
corporation's internal auditor,' 7 9 often conducted internal investiga-
tions. However, such an arrangement is unsatisfactory because the
SEC appropriately views in-house counsel as an extension of manage-
ment. In-house counsel often provide business advice, rather than le-
gal advice. Moreover, the investigative materials produced by in-
173. Id.
174. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786 (Del. 1981) (first recognized
use of "Special Litigation Comm.").
175. SOX: Two Years, supra note 67, at 10 (statement of Joseph Del V. Raso, Partner,
Pepper Hamilton LLP).
176. In 2006, almost two-thirds of corporate legal departments surveyed commenced
an internal investigation that utilized outside counsel in the past year. See Ste-
phen C. Dillard, Litigation Nation, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2006, at A9.
177. Cf. Andy Peters, Companies Find Attorney Advisers for Special Committees
Worth the Cost, FULTON CouNTY DAILY REP., Dec. 7, 2006.
178. Derek M. Meisner, Internal Investigations: An Essential Component to Coopera-
tion in an SEC Inquiry, 32 SEC. REG. L.J. 310, 311 (2004).
179. "Internal auditors" are company employees who examine and evaluate their or-
ganization's financial and information systems, management procedures, and in-
ternal controls to ensure that records are accurate and controls are adequate to
protect against fraud and waste. Internal auditors also review company opera-
tions, evaluating its efficiency, effectiveness, and compliance with laws, govern-
ment regulations, and company policies and procedures. See generally RICHARD
L. RATLIFF, ET AL., INTERNAL AUDITING: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES (2d ed.
1996).
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house counsel are less likely to receive protection by the attorney work
product doctrine.18 o
The appropriate scope of an internal investigation is often deter-
mined by legal counsel's discussion with the board of directors' Special
Committee. Other issues to resolve in planning the investigation in-
clude determining the extent to which employees of the company may
require separate legal representation and what the investigation is
likely to reveal.'18
Documents are generally considered the most important evidence
in an investigation.' 8 2 Near the start of an investigation, legal coun-
sel typically informs employees not to destroy any materials, including
electronic documents and their attachments, without explicit approval
of counsel.' 8 3 SOX has imposed new document retention require-
ments,1 8 4 and destruction of audit evidence is a crime.1s Companies
undergoing an investigation of financial information must endure an
exhaustive search through a massive amount of documents and data,
including electronic files. 186
The integrity of corporate internal investigations has improved as
a result of SOX. For example, SOX prohibits a company's officer or
director from fraudulently inducing, coercing, manipulating, or mis-
leading an accounting firm engaged in an audit of or review of the
public company's financial statements. 8 7
180. Meisner, supra note 178, at 311. "Disclosure of the internal investigative report
to government agencies presents the further problem of waiving the privilege for
the report's underlying documentation." Edwin G. & Natalie R. Williams, Report
of the Investigation, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 335, 369 (Brad D.
Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2003).
181. See Brodsky, supra note 171, at 949.
182. Dan K. Webb, Robert W. Tarun, and Steven F. Molo, Supervising the Gathering,
Organization and Control of Documents, in CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGA-
TIONS, at [ 8.03 (2005).
183. See Brodsky, supra note 171, at 941, 950. Counsel should also inform the em-
ployee of the general nature of the alleged misconduct under investigation.
Derek M. Meisner, Living Through an SEC Investigation: A Primer for Chief
Compliance Officers, J. INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 59, AT 59 (Winter 2004).
184. See Retention of Records Relevant to Audits and Reviews, Securities Act Release
No. 33-8180, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47241, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,819, at 86,916 (Jan. 24, 2003).
185. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 1520 (Supp. IV 2004).
186. The SEC broadly defines documents. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Rules of Practice,
17 C.F.R. § 201.230 (2006).
187. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 303, 18 U.S.C. § 1520 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); Im-
proper Influence of Conduct of Audits, Securities Act Release No. 34-47890, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 26,050, 68 Fed. Reg. 31820 (May 20, 2003).
Penalties also can be imposed under "Obstruction of Justice." See Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 § 1102, 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (Supp. IV 2004). The SEC includes
attorneys and advisors within the scope of persons acting under the direction of
.an officer or director." See Securities Act Regulations 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2
(2005).
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A written report is the end-product of most internal investiga-
tions.l8 8 In general, an internal investigative report discusses the
steps taken in the investigation, the underlying facts, the legal conse-
quences of such facts, and, sometimes, possible steps to avoid the
problem's recurrence.i8 9 An internal investigation must preserve the
company's credibility with the investigating agency.190 A primary
concern associated with preparation of a written report is the possibil-
ity that the report will be discoverable in possible subsequent civil or
criminal litigation, with adverse consequences. 19 1 Enhancing the pro-
tection afforded to such reports could increase their utility and en-
courage corporations to engage in more rigorous investigations. If the
investigation leads to a restatement of financial statements, external
auditors must review the written report to express an opinion on the
restatement.192
B. SEC's Informal Inquiries and Enforcement Division
Investigations
The SEC has broad authority to investigate potential violations of
federal securities laws. 193 One of the most common types of investiga-
tions by the SEC's enforcement division194 concerns financial state-
ments. 195 "Financial statement fraud" often arises from the recording
188. Dan K. Webb, Robert W. Tarun, & Steven F. Molo, Reports of Investigations:
Their Contents and Their Confidentiality, in CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGA-
TIONS § 11.03. In writing the internal investigation report, a description of the
facts is usually most easily understood if told chronologically in a neutral, narra-
tive fashion. Id. at § 11.04[1][v]. Copies of key documents are usually bound,
indexed, and appended to the internal investigation report as exhibits. Id. at
§ 11.04[1] [x].
189. Id. at § 11.04.
190. Piecemeal disclosure of the information to the SEC is usually not recommended.
Sloppy disclosure practices may further destroy the company's credibility and
antagonize the government. See Thomas E. Holliday & Charles J. Stevens, supra
notel69, at 279, 296.
191. Given the concern, some advisers advocate making only an oral report to select
corporate officers, the Board of Directors, or its special committee. Edwin G.
Schallert and Natalie R. Williams, supra note 169, at 335, 339.
192. See, e.g., Press Release: MSC.Software Announces a Summary of the Results of the
Audit Committee's Independent Review, MSC SOFTWARE, Feb. 16, 2005, available
at http://www.mscsoftware.com/press/press.cfm?pid=857&DivID=6.
193. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000 & Supp. IV
2004).
194. The Enforcement Division of the SEC investigates possible violations of securities
laws. It is one of four major divisions. The other three SEC divisions are the
'corporation finance" division, the "investment management" division, and the
"market regulation" division. 2005 SEC PERF. AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., at 6.
195. Financial fraud represents about one-quarter of the SEC's cases. See Kip Betz,
SEC Enforcement: SEC's Market Reviews 2004 Enforcement Activities, SEC. L.
DAILY (BNA) (Sept. 14, 2005). Three other major types of cases are the focus of
SEC investigations: (1) insider trading, (2) regulated entities and "failure to su-
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of fraudulent transactions. 196 Investigations of financial information
are important to protect the public interest in having companies pro-
duce reliable financial statements.197 An investigation by the SEC's
enforcement division is the primary way that the government informs
itself of the material facts, oversees the private sector, and helps to
safeguard the capital markets.198
SEC investigations of public companies often begin with an infor-
mal or preliminary investigation.] 99 If during this process the SEC
believes that securities law violations may have occurred, the SEC
will normally monitor the internal investigations conducted by outside
counsel. Although the SEC investigation process often disrupts day-
to-day business operations, companies usually understand that an
SEC investigation needs full attention because the stakes in the out-
come are often high.200
An SEC informal investigation often arises from either self-report-
ing by the company or media publicity about a transaction. SEC in-
pervise investigation," and (3) various types of fraud. See William R. McLucas, J.
Lynn Taylor, and Susan A. Mathews, A Practitioner's Guide to the SEC's Investi-
gative and Enforcement Process, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 53, 62 (1997). Roughly 50% of
financial fraud cases involve improper revenue recognition. Other fraud cases
involve abusive related parties, undisclosed compensation, false financial state-
ment certifications, and manipulation of financial products. How to Handle Re-
statements for Material Errors & Trouble During PCAOB Inspections, FIN.
ANALYSIS, PLAN. & REPORTING 3, 5 (Jan. 2005) (citing Susan Markel, Chief Ac-
countant to the SEC Division of Enforcement).
196. Concealment of the fraud may occur through falsified documents, missing docu-
ments, related party transactions, and various other means. See Douglas War-
ren, Presentation to The Assoc. of Certified Fraud Examiners 15th Annual
Conference: Preventing and Detecting Financial Statement Fraud: Identifying
Fraudulent Transactions, (July 2004).
197. The SEC Division of Corporate Finance must "review" financial information of
each public company at least every three years. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
§ 408, 15 U.S.C. § 7266 (Supp. IV 2004). The SEC Division of Corporate Finance
also provides guidance on SEC rules. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 2005 SEC PERF.
& ACCOUNTABILITY REP., at 11. The guidance by the Division of Corporate Fi-
nance may adversely affect the efficiency of CPA firm practices.
198. See Brodsky, supra note 171, at 945. The SEC's Office of Compliance and Inspec-
tion and Examination ("OCIE") is one of 19 specialized offices within the SEC.
2005 SEC PERF. & ACCOUNTABILITY REP., at 6. OCIE "examines" broker-dealers,
who are regulated by the SEC's investment management division. In 2005, OCIE
discovered compliance or operational deficiencies in over 80% of its examinations.
See id. at 9.
199. See COLLEEN R. MAHONEY, ET AL, THE SEC ENFORCEMENT PROCESS: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE IN HANDLING A SEC INVESTIGATION AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY, A-25-A-
32 (Corporate Practice Series Portfolio No. 77, 2d ed. 2005) (discussing the inter-
nal investigation).
200. Usually a company's desired goal is to try to settle with the SEC as soon as possi-
ble. This can help minimize enforcement penalties and negative publicity.
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vestigations are generally confidential and not public information. 20 1
If the SEC informal investigation is revealed, shareholder confidence
may erode, and stock prices may fall.
During the course of its informal investigation, the SEC relies on
the cooperation of the company, its affiliates, and company employees
to obtain information, documents, and testimony.2O2 The informal in-
vestigation seeks underlying financial data and, often, internal inves-
tigative reports. Other topics of interest in the SEC informal
investigation include the role of the Audit Committee, document re-
tention, and communications with government agencies. During an
informal investigation, the SEC examines the conduct of internal in-
vestigations 20 3 by independent counsel. 2O4
The SEC has several options at the conclusion of its informal inves-
tigation. These include: (1) conclude the investigation without recom-
mending an enforcement proceeding; (2) seek to conduct a formal
investigation;2 05 (3) authorize an administrative proceeding206 seek-
ing remedial sanctions;207 (4) seek injunctive relief in court;20 8 or (5)
refer the matter to the DOJ for criminal prosecution. 20 9
If the SEC's process turns into a formal investigation, a "Wells No-
tice"2 10 is usually sent to the company under investigation. A formal
201. See SEC Rules Relating to Investigations, 17 C.F.R. § 203.2 (2006). SEC investi-
gations are confidential. Confidentiality helps to ensure a more effective investi-
gation and to protect reputations. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Investigations by
the SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/investg.htm (last visited 3/21/07).
202. See SEC Informal and Other Procedures, 17 C.F.R. § 202.5 (2006) (noting that
the SEC staff cannot issue subpoenas in an informal investigation).
203. Companies and their legal counsel need to "'take the government's suggestions
under advisement,'" but should not become agents of the government. Rachel
McTague, SEC Enforcement: Former SEC Enforcement Chief McLucas Says SEC
Scrutinizes Independent Probes, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA), Nov. 16, 2004 (quoting Wil-
liam McLucas).
204. Id.
205. In 2005, the SEC conducted 947 investigations. 2005 SEC PERF. & AcCOUNTABIL-
ITY REP., 7.
206. In 2005, the SEC initiated 294 administrative proceedings. 2005 SEC PERF. &
ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 7. Administrative proceedings are handled in the SEC's
Office of Administrative Law Judge, one of the 19 specialized offices of the SEC.
See generally MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 199, at A-69-A-77 (discussing SEC
administrative proceedings). A decision by an Administrative Law Judge is ap-
pealable before the SEC Commission.
207. See MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 199, at A-85-A-95 (discussing remedial sanctions
available to the SEC).
208. In 2005, the SEC initiated 335 civil proceedings. 2005 SEC PERF. & ACCOUNTA-
BILITY REP., 7. See MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 199, at A-79-A-84a (discussing
court injunctive proceeding).
209. McLucas, Taylor, & Mathews, supra note 195, at 57.
210. The "Wells Notice" is named after John Wells who chaired the 1972 SEC commit-
tee which reviewed and evaluated the SEC's enforcement policies. Among the
Wells committee's recommendations was that companies be provided an opportu-
nity to submit a written statement to the SEC in conjunction with the SEC staff
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SEC investigation arises only if the SEC staff obtains a "formal order
of investigation" 2 11 from the Commission. 21 2 This order of investiga-
tion is issued if there is a likelihood that a violation of the securities
law is occurring or has occurred. The order of investigation has three
parts: (1) a description of the basic facts, (2) the staff report providing
general information that tends to show a securities law violation may
have occurred, and (3) a discussion of the purpose for the formal order
citing the potential violations. The formal order delegates broad in-
vestigative authority to the SEC staff. This authority includes the
power for the SEC staff to subpoena documents2 13 and testimony. 214
Formal investigations of financial reporting often focus on fraudu-
lent financial information and the failure to disclose material facts re-
lating to a public company's financial condition. 2 1 5 Financial fraud
investigations are usually document intensive. 216 Traditionally, more
than half of financial fraud cases include improper revenue recogni-
tion.2 17 Other common concerns encountered in financial fraud and
financial statement cases are valuation of assets or loss reserves, in-
adequate disclosure in the MD&A, improper accounting, and the fail-
memorandum. See Joshua A. Naftalis, Note, "Wells Submissions" to the SEC as
Offers of Settlement Under Federal Rules of Evidence 408 and Their Protection
from Third-Party Discovery, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1912, 1912-13 (2002).
211. See generally MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 199, at A-15-A-17 (discussing the
SEC's formal order of investigation).
212. See, e.g., Securities Act § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(a) (2000).
213. See generally MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 199, at A-59-A-64 (challenging SEC
subpoenas). The SEC generally tries to avoid subpoenaing the media and instead
seeks to negotiate access to the information. Policy Statement Concerning Sub-
poena to Members of the News Media, Exchange Act. Release No. 53,638 [2005-
2006 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 87,528, at 83,118 (Apr. 12,
2006).
214. The SEC "Rules Relating to Investigations" provide witnesses with certain pro-
tections. 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(a)-(c) (2006).
215. See Kip Betz, SEC Enforcement: SEC Market Review 2004:2004 Enforcement Ac-
tivities, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (Sep. 14, 2005).
216. McLucas, Taylor & Mathews, supra note 195, at 64. "Often, those who commit
financial fraud also engage in insider trading during the same period that the
company's financial statement is misrepresented in [SEC] public filings." Id.
217. Richard Hill, Accounting: SEC Enforcement's Chief Accounting Officer Outlines
New Fraud Issues, 19 CORP. COUNSEL WEEKLY 380 (Dec. 15, 2004). However,
after SOX, improper revenue recognition has accounted for only about 20% of
financial restatements. See U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL RE-
STATEMENTS: UPDATE OF COMPANY TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, AND REGULATORY
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 17 (July 2006). The financial account categories with
the most restatements are: accounting for reserves and contingencies (17%), reve-
nue recognition (16.2%), and equity revisions (15.7%). HURON CONSULTING, 2003
ANNUAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL REPORTING MATTERS 4, available at http://www.
iasplus.com/resource/huron2003.pdf.
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ure of auditors to apply generally accepted auditing standards
("GAAS").218
During its formal investigation, the SEC typically seeks all rele-
vant workpapers from the company's auditors, as well as relevant doc-
uments from the issuer. Frequently, documents are subpoenaed from
third parties which have a business relationship with the company
under investigation, such as banks, creditors, and customers. 2 19
Often the SEC staff also interviews the company's officers and inter-
nal accountants. 2 20
An opportunity for a company to make a Wells Submission is usu-
ally provided by the SEC if the staff notifies the company that the
staff has decided to recommend an enforcement action against the
company for violation of securities laws.22 1 A Wells Submission is an
opportunity for the company to persuade the SEC, both legally and
factually, that no securities violation has occurred. The document
often underscores weaknesses in the SEC's case. 222 In practice, few
Wells Submissions succeed in convincing the SEC staff to alter its ba-
sic recommendations. 2 23 After reviewing the Wells Submission, the
SEC staff will forward to the Commission both the company's Wells
Submission and the proposed SEC enforcement memorandum. 22 4
Settlements usually arise from SEC investigations. 22 5 "Most par-
ties, in settling SEC charges neither admit nor deny the allegations in
agreeing to the entry of the injunctive order or other relief."22 6 An
investigation becomes public when the SEC files an action in court or
as part of its administrative process. 22 7 Administrative proceedings
218. McLucas, Taylor & Mathews, supra note 195, at 64-65. Recent emerging catego-
ries of financial fraud include abusive related party transactions, undisclosed ex-
ecutive compensation, false financial statement certification, and financial
products geared toward managing earnings.
219. Id. at 65.
220. Id.
221. See Securities Act. Release No. 33-5310, Exchange Act. Release No. 9796
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,010, at 82 (Sept. 27,
1972).
222. Derek M. Meisner, The ABCs of an SEC Investigation: 20 Essential Questions
and Answers, CORPORATE COUNSEL FORuM 2005 987.
223. Id. at 987.
224. See MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 199, at A-65-A-68.
225. See generally id., at A-103-A-106 (settlement discussions). Litigating to override
an SEC decision is a course of action taken by relatively few companies.
226. Phyllis Diamond, SEC Enforcement: SEC Outlines New Enforcement Policy
Based on Use of Facts of Settled Cases, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) Aug. 5, 2003. Private
securities litigation against a settling company, usually in the form of a class
action, is common after a formal SEC investigation concludes. The U.S. Supreme
Court reinforced the prohibition of state securities fraud class action lawsuits in
Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 126 S.Ct. 1503 (2006).
227. After SOX, many companies choose to disclose a formal SEC investigation. Derek
M. Meisner, The ABCs of an SEC Investigation: 20 Essential Questions and An-
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can include stop orders, revocation or suspension of practice, or
censure.
2 28
SEC enforcement actions increased after SOX,229 partly because
SEC funding increased in the aftermath of the legislation. 23 0 Finan-
cial disclosure concerns represent almost one-third of SEC enforce-
ment cases. 23 1 Usually, the SEC's paramount objective in an
enforcement action is to do what best protects the investors. 23 2 Civil
penalties against public companies in SEC enforcement proceedings
have also grown dramatically-in amount and frequency-in recent
years.2 33 Before SOX, the largest penalty against a public company
(excluding financial institutions) was $10 million paid by Xerox Corpo-
ration in April 2002.234 After SOX, penalties have included $750 mil-
lion against WorldCom, $300 million against Time Warner, 23 5 and
$250 million against Qwest Communications. 2 36 Similarly, after
swers, CORPORATE COUNSEL FORUM 2005, at 987. The rationale for disclosure is
that Reg. S-K, item 103, requires disclosing any pending legal proceedings. This
disclosure should include similar information as to any proceedings contemplated
by governmental authorities. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2006).
228. The SEC's other major enforcement action is a civil injunction, which orders pro-
spective compliance with the securities laws.
229. In fiscal year 2006, the SEC brought 574 enforcement actions. There were 630
actions in 2005 and 639 in 2004. The high-water mark for enforcement actions
was 679 in 2003. See Judith Burns, Enforcement Cases by SEC Fall Again; Focus
on Late Filers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2006, at C3. Before SOX, the SEC generally
brought 400 to 500 enforcement actions per year. McLucas, Taylor & Mathews,
supra note 195, at 53 n.1.
230. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 601, 15 U.S.C. § 78kk (Supp. IV 2004).
231. 2005 SEC PERF. & AccOUNTABILITY REP., 8.
232. See Gisela de Leon-Meredith, Sec. & Exch. Comm. AAER Release 1470 (Oct. 23,
2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-44970.htm.
233. "[Dlisciplinary actions brought against smaller firms are more often for incompe-
tence, while the actions brought against the large firms are for lapses of integ-
rity." John M. Holcomb, Corporate Governance: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Related
Legal Issues, and Global Comparisons, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 175; 202
(2003).
234. "Xerox's senior management orchestrated a four-year scheme to disguise the com-
pany's true operating performance," and Xerox failed to provide full cooperation
in the SEC investigation. See Carlson v. Xerox Corp., 392 F. Supp. 2d 267,
278-79 (D. Conn. 2005).
235. See Time Warner, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 67 (Feb. 27, 2006). The penalty
paid in 2005 was used to establish a "fair fund," pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 § 308(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (Supp. IV 2004) for the benefit of investors
who were harmed by the violation. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.1100 (2006). In settle-
ment with the DOJ, Time Warner also paid a $60 million penalty and established
a $150 million fund to settle related securities litigation. Time Warner, Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 66.
236. William R. Baker and Dane A. Holbrook, SEC Statement Clarifies Corporate Pen-
alties-Somewhat, THE NAT'L L. J., Mar. 20, 2006. See Qwest Corporation, An-
nual Report (Form 10-K), at 21 (Mar. 1, 2005).
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SOX, the SEC has imposed the largest fines ever against an account-
ing firm 23 7 and individual CPAs.238
In 2006, the SEC issued a policy statement, the SEC penalty state-
ment, guiding the imposition of civil penalties on corporations. 23 9 The
goal of the SEC penalty statement was to provide more "clarity, con-
sistency, and predictability"2 40 in explaining how the SEC will exer-
cise its authority to penalize a company. 24 1 The SEC is empowered to
designate whether a penalty will represent disgorgement,24 2 or will be
earmarked for the "Fair Funds" created by SOX that help compensate
injured shareholders. 243 The SEC penalty statement confirms that
the most important factors in making this decision are whether the
securities violation benefited the corporation and the degree to which
a penalty will recompense or further harm shareholders.
2 44
237. KPMG agreed to pay $10 million to settle the charges that it engaged in unpro-
fessional conduct in the audit of Gem-Star-TV Guide International Inc. Phyllis
Diamond, SEC Enforcement: KPMG to Pay Record $10M Fine Over its Role in
Flawed Gemstar Audits, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (Oct. 21, 2004); see KPMG LLP,
Sec. & Exch. Comm. AAER Release 2234 (April 15, 2005), available at http:/l
www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-51574.pdf.
238. Two of the KPMG auditors of Xerox agreed to pay $150,000 each. "The SEC al-
leged that KPMG and its partners overseeing the Xerox audit knew or should
have known about the improper adjustment made to Xerox's books." David
Reilly, Moving the Market: SEC Obtains Record Penalties from KPMG Auditors of
Xerox, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2006, at C3.
239. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm [hereinafter Statement Concerning
Penalties]; Applix, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8651, Exchange Act Release
53049 (Jan. 4, 2006).
240. See Statement Concerning Penalties, supra note 239. The SEC penalty statement
was prompted by two enforcement actions: McAfee and Applix. McAfee paid $50
million to settle, after it benefited from improper inflated revenues. Applix did
not pay any penalty, even though it also improperly recognized revenues. The
reason for the different treatment was that Applix did not benefit from the action
when the additional revenues merely understated a net loss. Id.
241. The policy statement is based on the 1990 Securities Enforcement Remedies and
Penny Stock Act, Pub. L. 101-429, 104 Stat. 94, as well as the Fair Funds provi-
sion of SOX, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 7246(b) (Supp. IV
2004).
242. Disgorgement orders require violators to surrender money obtained through se-
curities violations. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. 02-771, SEC EN-
FORCEMENT: MORE ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF DISGORGEMENT
COLLECTIONS, 1 (July 2002). Courts sometimes describe disgorgement as restitu-
tion to the investors, but the concepts differ. See SEC. & Exert. COMM'N, SEC
REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(c) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 3
n.2.
243. 15 U.S.C. § 7246(b).
244. The SEC penalty statement confirms that the following factors are examined:
deterrence, the extent of injury, complicity with the company, the perpetrator's
intent, the difficulty in detecting the problem, the company's remedial steps, and
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Issuance of the SEC penalty statement was a step in the right di-
rection for clarifying the government's penalty policy. But, further re-
form is necessary to ensure that the SEC maximizes use of its
regulatory influence to improve the accuracy and transparency of fi-
nancial reporting. Enforcement measures should become less impor-
tant in implementing SEC policies.
C. PCAOB's Inspections and Investigations of CPAs
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB")245
was created by SOX.246 The PCAOB is composed of five Board mem-
bers appointed by the SEC,247 which oversees the PCAOB.248 In turn,
the PCAOB oversees the audit of public companies "in order to protect
the interests of investors and further the public interest in the prepa-
ration of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports .... "249
The four major roles of the PCAOB are: (1) standard making in
auditing25 0 and related areas, 25 1 (2) registration of public accounting
its cooperation with the SEC. See Statement Concerning Penalties, supra note
239.
245. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §101(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
246. The PCAOB is funded through an annual "accounting support" fee imposed on
public companies. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 109(d), 15 U.S.C. § 7219(d). The
size of the fee is based on the size of the company. See Christopher M. Netram,
PCAOB Adopts 2006 Budget, Technical Corrections to Tax Service Rules, 2005
Fin. Reporting Watch 224-1 (2005).
247. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101(e), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e) (Supp. IV 2004). The
PCAOB has a professional staff exceeding 400. See The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley
Act: Hearing Before H. Financial Services Comm., 109th Cong., 10 (2005) (state-
ment of William J. McDonough, Chairman PCAOB). About half of the PCAOB
staff members are full-time inspectors of CPA firms.
248. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 107, 15 U.S.C. § 7217 (Supp. IV 2004).
249. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (Supp. IV 2004). The
PCAOB replaced industry self-regulation overseen by different committees of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). For example, the
"Public Oversight Board" oversaw the AICPA's "SEC Practice Section," the "Au-
diting Standards Board," and the "Independence Standards Board." See Public
Oversight Board/About the PCAOB, http://www.publicoversightboard.orglabout.
htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2007). The AICPA continues to issue audit standards
for non-public companies. See Auditing Standards: AICPA Audit Standards
Board Adopts Rules for Assessing Misstatement Risk, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (Feb.
27, 2006).
250. See REFERENCES IN AUDITORS REPORTS TO THE STANDARDS OF THE PUBLIC COM-
PANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD, Auditing Standard No. 1 (Pub. Co. Account-
ing Oversight Bd. 2004) (references to "generally accepted auditing standards"
("GAAS") were changed to "Standards of the PCAOB (U.S.)" for the audits of pub-
lic companies); Conforming Amendments to Auditing Standard No. 2, supra note
39.
251. Besides auditing standards, the PCAOB also creates standards for attestation,
quality control, ethics, and independence for CPA firms. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 § 103, 15 U.S.C. § 7213 (Supp. IV 2004); PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, Rules
3200T-3500T, (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2003).
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firms,2 5 2 (3) inspections of financial audits and attestation work on
internal controls, 253 and (4) enforcement actions against accounting
firms and individual accountants. 2 54 SOX directed the PCAOB to es-
tablish standards on some specific topics, such as preparing and main-
taining audit workpapers. 25 5 Accounting firms, even those located
abroad,256 must register with the PCAOB if they audit public compa-
nies. Inspections are primarily conducted for remedial and educa-
tional purposes. The PCAOB has a separate division that is
responsible for enforcement.
1. PCAOB's Inspections of CPA Firms
The PCAOB inspects accounting firms and their clients' audited
financial statements. Inspections are done mainly for remedial and
educational purposes. The true goal is to help ensure that accounting
firms uphold their professional responsibilities. 257 Compared to the
predecessor accounting firm peer reviews conducted under the aus-
pices of the American Institute of CPAs, PCAOB's inspections are
more rigorous,258 more technical, and more intense. 25 9
252. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 102(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (Supp. IV 2004). By
2005, almost 1,600 CPA firms had registered with the PCAOB. PUB. Co. Ac-
COUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, 6-7 (2005). Over 40% of the
registrants were non-U.S. firms from eighty countries. Id. See also Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 § 106, 15 U.S.C. § 7216 (Supp. IV 2004) (making it clear that
foreign public accounting firms are also subject to the Act). State regulators are
permitted to determine the proper standards applicable in supervising account-
ing firms that are not registered with the PCAOB. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
§ 209, 15 U.S.C. § 7234 (Supp. IV 2004).
253. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c)(2) (Supp. IV 2004). "Attes-
tation" follows the standards on attestation engagements. See Attestation Report
on Management's Assessment of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting, 17
C.F.R. § 210.1-02(2) (2006).
254. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c)(4) (Supp. TV 2004).
255. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 103(a)(2)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(2)(A)(i) (Supp.
IV 2004).
256. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 106(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7216(a) (Supp. IV 2004); PUB.
Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE No. 2004-005, FINAL RULES RELATING
TO THE OVERSIGHT OF NON-U.S. PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS 3 (2004).
257. PCAOB Board member Dan Goelzer believes that the PCAOB can best deal with
negligent violations by CPA firms through the Board's inspection program. SEC
Accounting Rules, Letter 435 (CCH), Nov. 30, 2005, at 5 (PCAOB has the "ability
to require [CPA] firms to strengthen their quality control and other internal
procedures.").
258. PCAOB inspection reports provide some insight as to how the PCAOB both con-
ducts inspections and reviews important control environment characteristics,
such as the tone at the top of the CPA firm. See, e.g., PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVER-
SIGHT BD., RELEASE No. 104-2004-003, 2003 LIMITED INSPECTION OF ERNST &
YOUNG, 4-6 (2004).
259. Linda Friedman, What To Do When the PCAOB Comes Calling, 2005 FIN. RE-
PORTING WATCH 230-1.
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In 2004, the PCAOB created a new audit documentation standard
in order to assist with reviews of audit work.26 0 This documentation
standard requires sufficient information to enable an experienced au-
ditor having no previous connection with the engagement to under-
stand the work performed, who performed the audit, relevant dates in
the audit work, and the audit conclusions reached. 261
Full scale PCAOB inspections commenced in 2004.262 In an in-
spection, the PCAOB staff carefully reviews a limited number of is-
sues pertaining to a small portion of the total audits performed by a
particular accounting firm.26 3 The CPA audits selected for PCAOB
inspections are often of public companies deemed to have higher risk
profiles. 26 4 Each PCAOB inspection includes three general parts: (1)
a review of selected audit engagements of the CPA firm performed at
various offices, (2) an evaluation of the sufficiency of the CPA firm's
quality control system, and (3) performance of other tests of the CPA
firm's audit, supervision, and quality control procedures.265 More re-
cent full-scale PCAOB inspections also focused on whether the auditor
did an efficient job or whether the auditor performed excessive
work.26 6 The PCAOB then prepares a full report on each inspection
that it conducts. 26 7
260. See AUDIT DOCUMENTATION, Auditing Standard No. 3 (Pub. Co. Accounting Over-
sight Bd. 2004).
261. Auditors of public companies must retain all documentation for seven years. Re-
tention of Audit and Review Records, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-06 (2006); See also Reten-
tion of Records Relevant to Audits and Reviews, Securities Act Release 8,130,
Exchange Act Release 47,241 [2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. Law Rep. (CCH)
86,819 (Jan. 24, 2003).
262. See PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE No. 104-2004-001, STATE-
MENT CONCERNING THE ISSUANCE OF INSPECTION REPORTS 2 (2004). The staff of
the PCAOB's Division of Registration and Inspections issued 173 reports on in-
spections conducted in 2004 and 2005. PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD.,
2005 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2005). In the previous year, the PCAOB conducted only
limited inspections on what were then the largest four public accounting firms:
Deloitte & Touche LLP (D&T), Ernst & Young LLP (E&Y), KPMG LLP (KPMG),
and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PWC). Id.
263. In 2005, the PCOAB reviewed parts of 365 audits performed by the largest nine
audit firms and 623 audits conducted by 273 smaller firms. PUB. Co. ACCOUNT-
ING OVERSIGHT BD., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2005).
264. The Impact of SOX, supra note 1, at 95 (questions of the Hon. Ruben Hinojosa to
be asked of SEC Chairman Donaldson).
265. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 104(d), 15 U.S.C. § 7214(d) (Supp. IV 2004).
266. See Sirena J. Scales, PCAOB Likely to Issue Three Standards Within Six Months,
2006 FIN. REPORTING WATCH 38-7 (2006); Alison Carpenter, PCAOB Gears Up for
2006 Inspections, Will Offer Guidance on Quality Controls, 8 CORP. COUNS. WKLY
57 (BNA) (Feb. 22, 2006) (statement attributed to PCAOB Chair Gradison).
267. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 104(g), 15 U.S.C. § 7214(g) (Supp. IV 2004). See
PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE No. 104-2004-001, supra note 262
at 4. The PCAOB's Inspection Reports are available at http://www.pcaobus.org.
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CPA firm processes for establishing and communicating audit poli-
cies, procedures, and methodologies within the firm were strength-
ened after PCAOB's initial series of inspections revealed significant
weaknesses. Particular concerns of the PCAOB included accounting
firm procedures for determining materiality,268 workpaper retention,
and documentation of internal consultations during the course of au-
dits.269 Other major concerns included the process of accepting or re-
taining audit clients and the supervision of foreign affiliates to ensure
technical compliance with U.S. financial accounting standards
(GAAP) and PCAOB audit standards.270
The structure of CPA firms has changed pursuant to concerns ex-
pressed in PCAOB inspections, particularly of the CPA firms' quality
control review process. As a consequence, the CPA firms began to sep-
arate audit quality monitoring from the responsibility for audit opera-
tions.271 The change is pursuant to the CPA firms' obligation to
observe ethical and independence standards firm-wide. CPA firm au-
dit processes now require more partner and senior manager time. A
new audit documentation standard from the PCAOB requires that
CPA firm engagement partners and managers review certain detailed
workpapers in an environment that must communicate strong, firm-
wide messages concerning the importance of audit documentation. 272
268. Changes in materiality include increasing internal requirements related to docu-
menting the reasons for using alternative bases for determining materiality mea-
sures used in the audit. Another change includes revising a policy manual to
include guidance on quantitative and qualitative factors to consider when ad-
dressing materiality. See PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE No.
104-2006-078, OBSERVATIONS ON THE INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROCESS
FOR ADDRESSING QUALITY CONTROL CRITICISMS WITHIN 12 MONTHS AFTER AN IN-
SPECTION REPORT 7 (2006).
269. See id. at 7.
270. See id. at 8.
271. The public version of a PCAOB inspection report "does not include any discussion
of criticisms or potential defects in a CPA firm's quality control systems" if the
PCAOB determines that the CPA firm has made a good faith progress toward
achieving the relevant quality control objectives. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 104(g)(2),
15 U.S.C. § 7214(g)(2) (Supp. IV 2004); PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RE-
LEASE No. 104-2004-001, supra note 262, at 5. However, quality control criti-
cisms are publicly disclosed if a CPA firm fails to address them to the PCAOB's
satisfaction within 12 months. See id.; FIRM RESPONSE TO QUALITY CONTROL DE-
FECTs, Rule 4009 (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2004); PUB. Co. ACCOUNT-
ING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE No. 104-2006-077, THE PROCESS FOR BOARD
DETERMINATIONS REGARDING FIRMs' EFFORTS TO ADDRESS QUALITY CONTROL CRIT-
ICISMS IN INSPECTION REPORTS 6 (2006).
272. Furthermore, large CPA firms have established internal networks to coordinate
second tax partner reviews of the income tax provision for financial reporting
purposes. See PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE No. 104-2006-078,
supra note 268, at 4 (2006).
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CPA firms are also devoting more time to enhanced "in-house audit
partner and manager training... -"273
Following the PCAOB's initial inspections, accounting firms com-
menced significant changes to improve their internal quality reviews.
Firms increased the number of engagements subject to internal qual-
ity reviews. They also modified the internal review process to provide
for the reviews to be conducted by individuals on a full-time basis with
no conflicting duties to dilute their effectiveness.274
PCAOB criticism of CPA firms' internal "quality control" led the
firms to alter the evaluation and compensation of firm partners. The
PCAOB's concern was that the CPA firms assigned disproportionate
weight to marketing efforts in comparison with audit quality and tech-
nical competence. The firms' disregard or undervaluation of technical
skills was evident "in admitting new partners, measuring partner per-
formance, establishing partner compensation, assigning responsibili-
ties to partners, and disciplining partners .... "275
To ensure greater independence by accounting firms from their
public company audit clients, the CPA firms made two major
changes. 2 76 These changes generally occurred following the PCAOB's
review of the firms' policies and procedures regarding independence.
One major change was formalizing processes to ensure auditor inde-
pendence before entering into certain kinds of business arrangements.
A second change was requiring audit engagement teams to submit
documentation to an independent group in the national office of the
CPA firm.2 7 7
Not surprisingly, PCAOB inspections have confirmed that high
quality audit services are not uniformly provided by CPA firms.2 78
The inspection reports describe the firms' apparent departures from
auditing standards and related professional standards. The PCAOB
inspection reports also describe general audit failures, including fail-
ures of the CPA firms to identify companies' improper applications of
273. See id.
274. The CPA firms also needed to make the "cycle of internal inspections less predict-
able...." Id. at 5. Two other changes to CPA firm internal inspections were (1)
making clear that internal review is not a distraction from other responsibilities
and (2) "creating a more specifically trained and experienced reviewer pool with
oversight from the national office ." Id. at 4-5.
275. Id. at 5.
276. See id. at 6.
277. Two other important changes within CPA firms were "establishing a new central-
ized database" for checking the CPA firm's independence and issuing a "resource
guide" to employees within the CPA firm with key internal policies, such as those
related to maintaining independence. Id. at 7.
278. Accounting academic research failed to detect fully the extent of typical audit
problems. See, e.g., Jere R. Francis, What Do We Know About Audit Quality, 36
BRITISH ACCT. REV. 345 (2004).
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GAAP.279 Most likely because the PCAOB recognizes auditors' liabil-
ity concerns, the inspection reports emphasize that the PCAOB's find-
ings are not final determinations. 28 0
2. PCAOB's Investigations, Disciplinary Processes, and
Sanctions
The PCAOB's enforcement process often begins with unofficial in-
quiries. 28 In an informal inquiry, the PCAOB requests documents,
information, interviews, or testimony.28 2 An informal inquiry can
arise from the appearance that an accounting firm or any associated
person of that firm has violated SOX or other securities laws, PCAOB
Rules, 2 8 3 or relevant professional standards. 28 4
The PCAOB may issue an order of formal investigation of a CPA
firm when it appears that a violation has occurred. 28 5 Both informal
279. For example, in the investigation of KPMG, the inspection report revealed vari-
ous problems in the audits of four unspecified companies. Specifically, KPMG
had not "obtained sufficient competent evidential matter," the documentation
"did not reference the contractual terms preventing normal sale-leaseback ac-
counting," various disclosure problems existed, and "operating leases should in-
stead have been accounted for as capital leases . . . ." Furthermore, GAAP
departures existed for derivative instruments and securities were misclassified
as cash equivalents. Also, the KPMG auditors used a high percentage for plan-
ning materiality so as to treat an error as inconsequential, the firm did not thor-
oughly evaluate other known or likely errors, and KPMG inappropriately relied
on information technology general controls at a service organization that central-
ized the general ledger. See Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Release No. 104-
2005-088, 2004 REPORT ON 2004 INSPECTION Of KPMG LLC 4-8 (2005). PCAOB
Chair Dennis Gradison noted that common accounting problems include fair
value concerns, inventory, going concern issues, and internal control. Gradison,
Speech at PwC University for Faculty (July 20, 2006).
280. The "descriptions of departures from [auditing and accounting] professional stan-
dards are not a result of adversarial adjudicative process and do not constitute
conclusive findings of fact or of violations for purposes of imposing legal liability."
PuB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE No. 104-2004-001, supra note
262, at 7. Also, the preface to each PCAOB Inspection Report notes that the re-
port does not necessarily represent the frequency of deficiencies throughout the
CPA firm's practice. See, e.g., PuB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE No.
104-2005-120, REPORT ON 2004 INSPECTION OF PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLP
(2005).
281. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 105(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7215 (Supp. IV 2004).
282. INFORMAL INQUIRY ACTIVITIES, Rule 5100(b) (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.
2004).
283. PCAOB rules are not effective until approved by the SEC. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 § 107(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7217(b)(2) (Supp. IV 2004).
284. COMMENCEMENT OF AN INFORMAL INQUIRY, Rule 5100(a) (Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd. 2004).
285. ORDER OF FORMAL INVESTIGATION, Rule 5101(a)(1) (Pub. Co. Accounting Over-
sight Bd. 2004).
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inquiries and formal investigations are confidential, 28 6 "unless
presented in connection with a public proceeding ...."287
The PCAOB's disciplinary process is adversarial in nature.
28 8
However, by 2006, the PCAOB had taken little disciplinary action.
28 9
The enforcement process encompasses a range of possible sanc-
tions, 2 90 including significant monetary penalties and suspension or
revocation of registration. 2 91 The PCAOB may compel a registered
CPA firm to provide testimony and documents. 2 92 The PCAOB may
also request that the SEC issue a subpoena to require a third party,
such as an audited company, to provide the PCAOB with testimony or
documents that it considers relevant.29 3
286. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 105(d), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(d) (Supp. IV 2004).
287. CONFIDENTIALITY OF INVESTIGATORY RECORDS, Rule 5108(a) (Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd. 2004).
288. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 105(c), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c) (Supp. IV 2004).
289. The PCAOB had concluded only seven disciplinary proceedings as of January 20,
2007. See PCAOB Disciplinary Hearings, http://www.pcaobus.org/Enforcementl
Disciplinary-Proceedings/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
290. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 105(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(4) (Supp. IV 2004).
291. See PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE No. 104-2006-077, supra note
271, at 8.
292. Legal counsel may accompany or represent any person compelled to testify.
RIGHTS OF WITNESSES IN INQUIRIES AND INVESTIGATIONS, Rule 5109 (Pub. Co. Ac-
counting Oversight Bd. 2004). See also COMMISSION SUBPOENA, Rule 5424(b)
(Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2004) ("[Tjhe Board may seek issuance by the
Commission of a subpoena to any person, including any client of a registered pub-
lic accounting firm, requiring the person to provide any testimony or produce any
documents that the Board considers relevant or material to a Board proceed-
ing."); PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE No. 2004-013, PROPOSED
RULE ON PROCEDURES RELATING TO SUBPOENA REQUESTS IN DISCIPLINARY PRO-
CEEDINGS (2004) (setting out the procedures for the Board to seek a subpoena of
any party). The PCAOB does not permit a CPA firm's lawyer to sit in on the
testimony of all of the CPA firm's personnel. PCAOB Rel. 2003-015, Rules on
Investigations and Adjudications (Sept. 29, 2003), at A2-19 n.1 (Appendix 2: sec-
tion by section analysis). The PCAOB notes the contrast to an SEC investigation,
which is subject to the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).
However, one of the authors has concluded that a court might reasonably disa-
gree with the PCAOB's conclusion that the APA does not apply to the PCAOB.
See Thomas C. Pearson, Creating Accountability: Increased Legal Status of Ac-
counting and Auditing Authorities in the Global Capital Markets (U.S. and EU),
31 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 65, 113-16 (2005). Cf Donna M. Nagy, Playing
Peekabo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975 (2005).
293. The PCAOB Hearing Officer may seek a subpoena by the SEC. Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 § 105(b)(2)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(2)(D) (Supp. IV 2004). Ernst &
Young has asserted that the PCAOB's subpoena requests in disciplinary proceed-
ings impose considerably greater burdens than subpoenas issued pursuant to
SEC Rules of Practice, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the rules of
other self-regulatory organizations. See Letter from Ernst & Young LLP, to Of-
fice of the Secretary, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. (Nov. 29, 2004), availa-
ble at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Docket_015/Comments/All.pdf.
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If a registered CPA firm does not cooperate with an investigation,
the PCAOB may institute a disciplinary proceeding. Non-cooperation
is evident if the CPA firm "failed to comply with [a PCAOB] demand,
• . . knowingly made any false material declaration," or "abused the
[PCAOB's] processes for purposes of obstructing an investigation
. ... "294 If it appears to the PCAOB that disciplinary proceedings are
appropriate, 29 5 the PCAOB must conduct a non-public hearing.2 96
Disciplinary cases from the PCAOB become public if the PCAOB
makes a final determination, such as the imposition of sanctions. 2 97
Permissible sanctions include temporarily suspending or permanently
revoking registration, barring an individual from further association
with a registered CPA firm, prohibiting a firm from accepting new au-
dit clients for a period of time,2 98 or imposing significant civil mone-
tary penalties.2 99
SOX' creation of the PCAOB was a major step toward assuring
more reliable financial information. PCAOB inspections help to edu-
cate and motivate auditors to improve their professionalism. But the
inspections also demonstrate the need for more effective education of
auditors. Inspections in 2006 and later years will help address corpo-
rate concerns about auditors' efficiency, particularly with regard to in-
ternal control work under SOX § 404. Additional steps are required, in
the form of a revised PCAOB interpretation of the necessary work
under § 404.
294. NONCOOPERATION WITH AN INVESTIGATION, Rule 5110 (Pub. Co. Accounting Over-
sight Bd. 2004).
295. GROUNDS FOR COMMENCEMENT OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, Rule 5200(a) (Pub.
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2004). The hearing officer is not an employee of the
PCAOB's Division of Enforcement and Investigations. SEPARATION OF FUNC-
TIONS, Rule 5200(c) (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2004).
296. After a hearing, either party may propose in writing an offer of settlement. SET-
TLEMENT OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT A DETERMINATION HEARING,
Rule 5205 (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2004).
297. The PCAOB enforcement division has the burden of proving an alleged violation
or failure to supervise by a preponderance of the evidence. DETERMINATIONS IN
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, Rule 5204 (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2004).
298. Ernst & Young (E&Y) earned hundreds of million dollars in consulting revenues
from implementing People-Soft software for third parties, while also auditing
People-Soft. The SEC administrative law judge found that E&Y could not have
remained independent. E&Y was required to disgorge its audit fee for People-
Soft and it was barred from accepting new SEC registered audit clients for six
months. See Michael Bologna, Accounting: SEC's Beller Cites E&Y Ruling as
Wake-Up Call, 19 CORP. CoUs. WKLV 149 (BNA) (May 12, 2004).
299. The monetary penalty is a maximum of $100,000 for a natural person or
$2,000,000 for a CPA firm. SANCTIONS, Rule 5300(a)(1)-(4) (Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd. 2004). There are also less severe remedies, such as censure, re-
quiring additional professional education, engaging an independent monitor, or
requiring that the CPA firm engage counsel. See SANCTIONS, Rule 5300(a)(5)-(10)
(Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2004).
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D. Parallel Investigations: IRS Audits, DOJ Investigations,
and Others
If the SEC discovers material errors in a corporation's financial
statements, then parallel investigations 30 0 are often initiated by other
government agencies or self-regulatory organizations ("SROs"), such
as stock exchanges. Most commonly, SEC investigations have their
counterparts in tax audits by the IRS or investigations by the DOJ.3o1
Parallel investigations are often initiated when one government
agency provides information to another agency. Coordination and in-
teragency cooperation in parallel investigations help to ensure consis-
tency and clarity in law enforcement and reduce uncertainty in capital
markets. 30 2
Agencies share investigative techniques for analyzing financial
statement problems. 3 03 They also share some specific information
about a public company's financial statement problems. 3 04 The
PCAOB may refer an investigation to the SEC or other federal regula-
tor.3 05 Both the SEC and the IRS306 may refer an investigation to the
DOJ for possible criminal prosecution 3 07 or share the information
300. See generally Dan K. Webb, Robert W. Tarun & Steven F. Molo, Reports of Inves-
tigations: Their Contents and Their Confidentiality, in CORPORATE INTERNAL IN-
VESTIGATIONS, at Ch. 14, Parallel Proceedings.
301. See generally MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 199, at A-51-A-58 (parallel
proceedings).
302. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the Joint
News Conference with OFHEO (May 23, 2006) (transcript available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch052306cc.htm).
303. For example, to identify and resolve major issues more quickly, the IRS is confer-
ring with the SEC to learn about its techniques for analyzing financial state-
ments. Sheryl Stratton, IRS to Build on Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance for Tax
Purposes, 2005 FIN. REPORTING WATCH 30-2 (2005).
304. Examples of specific information shared by the IRS with states include audit ex-
amination reports, abusive tax scheme data, and licensing verification.
305. BOARD REFERRALS OF INVESTIGATIONS, Rule 5112(b) (Pub. Co. Accounting Over-
sight Bd. 2004). At the direction of the SEC, the PCAOB may also refer an inves-
tigation to the Attorney General or state authorities. COMMISSION DIRECTED
REFERRALS OF INVESTIGATIONS, Rule 5112(c) (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.
2004).
306. The IRS' Criminal Investigation division has "special agents." Special agents in-
vestigate hundreds of corporations for such problems as tax fraud, securities
fraud, manipulating corporate records, and falsifying financial statements by
manipulating revenue or expenses. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson,
Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of Department Components United States
Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-
guidelines.htm.
307. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). Case law has also blessed the
transfer of information between agencies, absent evidence of agency bad faith or
malicious government tactics. See, e.g., SEC v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F.2d
1368 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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with relevant state authorities. 30 8 The IRS indirectly provides the
SEC with information 30 9 by fining public companies that fail to report
certain tax penalties to the SEC in their annual reports (Form 10-
K).310 SROs also investigate certain financial cases, especially if
fraud is involved. SROs must report their findings to the SEC.
1. IRS Audits of Corporate Financial Information
In an audit of a public company's tax return,3 1 1 the IRS' Large and
Mid-Size Business ("LMSB") division reviews corporate financial
statements and disclosures. 3 12 The IRS examination team
3 13 will
prepare for the audit by gathering publicly available information on
the company, such as in SEC filings and on the company's website. 3 14
Usually, the IRS also identifies some relevant industry issues for au-
dit.315 After the examiner team's initial review of the company's tax
308. When information is shared, the IRS' disclosure program provides oversight and
education to all employees and external partners to ensure the protection of tax-
payer confidentiality rights regarding federal and state exchanges. IRS, Fed!
State Information Sharing, http://www.irs.gov/govt/liaisons/article/O,,id=13308 7 ,
00.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
309. The GAO has recommended that other government agencies routinely provide
the IRS with information on civil settlements. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
No. 05-747, TAx ADMINISTRATION: SYSTEMATIC INFORMATION SHARING WOULD
HELP IRS DETERMINE THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF CIL SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS 18-22
(2005).
310. See IRC § 6707A(e) (Supp. IV 2004); Rev. Proc. 2005-51, 2005-33 I.R.B. 296
(2005). "Reportable transactions" include tax avoidance transactions. See Re-
quirement of Statement Disclosing Participation in Certain Transactions by Tax-
payers, 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-4(b) (2006).
311. The complex tax returns filed by large companies often encompass extensive sub-
sidiaries, diversified activities, multiple business partners, and international op-
erations. IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, 4.46.4, LMSB Guide for Quality
Examinations: Inspection and Fact Finding (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http://
www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ch4ls06.html.
312. The IRS' Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) provides a glimpse into the audit activ-
ities of the LMSB. Common audit techniques include visiting the taxpayer's
place of business, testing gross receipts or sales, cost of goods sold, operating ex-
penses; and acquiring assistance from a "Computer Audit Specialist" to use either
judgment sampling or statistical sampling. IRM, 4.46.4.2.10, LMSB Guide for
Quality Examinations: Sampling Techniques (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http:/!
irs.gov/irni/part4/ch4lsO6.htm.
313. MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE $ 8.15 (revised 2d ed. 2003
& Cumm. Supp. III 2006).
314. IRM 4.46.3, Planning the Examination, at Exhibit 4.46.3-1 (Joint Audit Planning
and Monitoring Tool) (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http://irs.gov/irm/part4/ch4ls
05.html.
315. "The IRS initiated the Industry Specialization Program [ISP] to promote better
identification and development of issues .... The Industry Specialization Pro-
gram involves ISP Coordinated Issue Papers .... Settlement Guidelines, . . . In-




returns and risk analysis, the IRS will meet with the taxpayer to dis-
cuss the audit schedule and, sometimes, requested documents. 3 16
Information Document Requests ("IDRs") issued by the IRS are
usually preceded by a discussion between the IRS and the taxpayer.
The IRS examination team members discuss the types of information
needed with the company in order to determine what business records
are available. 3 17 In response to a company's request for an exception
to the IDR, the IRS considers such factors as the company's history of
cooperation and its IDR responses, the company's attitude, the exami-
nation team's experience, and the availability of company re-
sources. 3 18 If a company fails to comply with an IDR, the IRS
examiner considers issuing a "Formal Document Request."3 19
Various examination techniques are used by the IRS to gather evi-
dence. For example, an evaluation of a company's internal controls
assists in determining the accuracy and reliability of its financial in-
formation. 32 0 The IRS' analysis of tax return schedules is critical to
performing a reconciliation of the company's worldwide net accounting
income (or loss) with "taxable income."3 21 Interviews are used to "pro-
vide information about the [company's] financial history, business op-
erations, and books and records."3 22
IRS audits of corporate financial information, particularly when a
tax shelter is involved, became more focused after SOX.323 The IRS
tightened its policy on requesting audit or tax accrual workpapers. 3 24
316. IRM 4.46.3.1, Overview of the Planning Process; IRM 4.46.3.3.3.3, Conference Pro-
cess. The IRM provides a detailed list of items that the IRS considers in a meet-
ing with the taxpayer. IRM 4.46.3, Planning the Examination, at Exhibit 4.46.3-
2 (Agenda for Planning Meeting); IRM 4.46.3, Planning the Examination, at Ex-
hibit 4.46.3-3 (Agenda for Opening Conference).
317. IRM 4.46.4.4.1, General Procedures.
318. IRM 4.46.4.4.3, Exception Guidelines for the Delinquent Procedures.
319. IRM 4.46.4.4.2, Delinquent Procedures.
320. IRM 4.46.4.2.3, Evaluation of the Taxpayer's Internal Control. The analysis of
internal control is also used to determine the scope and depth of the IRS' exami-
nation. Id.
321. IRM 4.46.4.2.5, Analyzing Schedules M-1, M-2, M-3 (3-1-2006).
322. IRM 4.46.4.2.1, Interviews. Interviews help the IRS "obtain leads, develop facts,
and establish evidence." Id. "Interviews and IDRs ...become more important
when [examining] privately held companies." IRM 4.37.1.7.2.5, Privately Held
CIC Cases.
323. See IRS Announcement 2002-63, 2002-2 C.B. 72; IRM 4.10.20.3.2, Requests for
Tax Accrual Workpapers Involving Listed Transactions; IRM 4.10.20.3.2.3, Re-
turns filed on or after July 1, 2002; Memorandum for Large and Mid-Size Busi-
ness Division Executives, Managers, and Examiners (July 9, 2004), from Deborah
Nolan, IRS.
324. Accountants in a company prepare workpapers for the tax return (tax accrual
workpapers). External auditors create "audit workpapers" which provide written
evidence of the audit engagement's planning, supervision, and documentation
supporting the CPA firm's audit opinion. Prior to SOX, the IRS' internal policy
generally restricted using a summons to acquire audit or tax accrual workpapers,
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After SOX, a request for tax accrual workpapers has become
mandatory when a taxpayer claims the benefit of a tax shelter qualify-
ing as a "listed transaction"3 2 5 or when a financial statement irregu-
larity exists, such as a restatement.3 26
The IRS' penalty policy seeks to "[e]nsure consistency[,] ... accu-
racy of results in the light of the facts and the law[,] provide methods
for taxpayers to have their interests heard and considered," with im-
partiality by the IRS in achieving the "correct decisions."32 7 IRS
agents are instructed to consider, assert, and compute all applicable
penalties 32 8 and to impose penalties for their proper purpose and not
to gain bargaining leverage with the company. If fraud is sus-
pected, 3 29 a timely referral to the IRS' Criminal Investigation division
is necessary. 330
2. Other Parallel Investigations
When criminal activity is involved, the DOJ investigates. 3 3 1
Where corporate executives were not candid with the government, the
DOJ has brought obstruction of justice charges. 33 2 Two recent cases
may have modified the rules governing "parallel proceedings" when a
criminal investigation by the DOJ is involved: U.S. v. Scrushy3 3 3 and
U.S. v. Stringer.334 Joint coordination of an investigation may require
even though the U.S. Supreme Court held that tax accrual papers were not pro-
tected from disclosure in U.S. v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 819 (1984).
See I.R.C. § 7602 (2002). See generally MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 8.07 [3] (2d ed. 2002) (discussing restrictions that the IRS places on
issuing subpoenas for workpapers above that which I.R.C. § 7602 requires).
325. A "listed transaction" is defined in 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-4 (2006).
326. See IRM 4.10.20.3.2.3, Returns Filed on or After July 1, 2002; IRS, Tax Accrual
Workpapers Frequently Asked Questions-July 28, 2005, http://www.irs.gov/busi-
nesses/corporations/article/0,,id=146242,00.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
327. IRM 4.46.4.5, Penalty Consideration.
328. IRM 4.46.5.6, Workpaper Documentation on Penalties.
329. See generally MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE % 8.08[4) (2d
ed. 2002) (discussing the procedures IRS agents are to follow when they suspect
fraud).
330. IRM 4.46.4.5.4, Fraud.
331. Simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings are constitutional. See U.S. v. Kor-
del, 397 U.S. 1, 6 (1970).
332. Complaint at 15, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Silverstein, No. CV 04 255 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 22, 2004).
333. U.S. v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1136 (N.D. Ala. 2005). In Scrushy, an
Assistant U.S. Attorney asked the SEC staff not to question CEO Scrushy about
his company's income statements or earnings per share. Id.; David Z. Seide, The
Risks of Getting Together: Improper SEC and DOJ Cooperation Can Get Charges
Dismissed, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at 26. See generally Jay Reeves, Scrushy
Faces More Legal Woes, Hous. CHRON., July 2, 2006, at 4 (discussing Scrushy's
criminal and civil trials).
334. U.S. v. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (D. Or. 2005). Accounting fraud at a public
company also occurred in Stringer. The district court dismissed the entire indict-
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detailed disclosures to potential targets. However, agencies often are
reluctant to make such disclosures, as they want to avoid tipping off
actual or potential targets. This reluctance may constrain interagency
cooperation.
Still, parallel investigations became more common after SOX. For
example, the SEC conducts industry "sweeps" 33 5 in order to generate
information on industry practices. 33 6 Joint examination sweeps have
occurred in tandem with such organizations as state securities regula-
tors, state insurance regulators, and SROs.337 Furthermore, the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") has become involved in
investigating ninety percent of- corporate fraud cases.3 38
Eliot Spitzer, current New York Governor and former New York
Attorney General,33 9 has out-shined the SEC in many financial inves-
tigations.3 40 Spitzer's investigations have resulted in indictments for
fraud or corporate corruption against numerous corporate executives,
Wall Street firms, and securities market professionals. These indict-
ment and suppressed statements that the defendants made to the SEC because
the SEC and the U.S. Attorney's office had engaged in improper collusion. The
court stated that a "government agency may not develop a criminal investigation
under the auspices of a civil investigation." Id. at 1089, citing U.S. v. Greewald,
987 F.2d 531, 534 (8th Cir. 1993).
335. "Sweeps" help shape regulatory policy. Paul A. Atkins, Speech by Sec. & Exch.
Commissioner: Remarks Before the Compliance Best Procedures Summit 2006
(Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://ftp.sec.gov/news/speech/spch022806psa.htm.
336. For example, the SEC has investigated pension fund accounting to determine
whether pension funds are used to manipulate corporate earnings. See Macy
Gordon, New Targets Beyond Enron, HONOLULU ADVERTISER May 27, 2006, avail-
able at http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2006/May/27/bz/FP605270316.
html.
337. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, at 69, available at http://www.sec.
gov/about/annrep02.shtml.
338. See Rick Telberg, A Joint Effort to Fight Corporate Fraud, 197 J. OF ACCT. 53, 54
(Apr. 2004). Other agencies investigating corporate fraud include the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, the Department of Labor, the Federal Energy Reg-
ulation Commission, the Defense Criminal Investigation Service, and the Postal
Inspection Service. Id.
339. "Some conservatives and business interests have complained that he [Spitzer]
has invaded the legitimate turf of the Justice Department and the SEC, while
Spitzer and his defenders respond that he was driven to act by the passivity and
failure of the SEC under Chairman Harvey Pitt to act in a timely manner." John
M. Holcomb, Corporate Governance: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Related Legal Issues,
and Global Comparisons, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 175, 191-92 (2004).
340. "In early September 2003, the Attorney General of the State of New York filed
charges against a hedge fund manager for arranging with several mutual fund
companies to improperly trade in [mutual] fund shares and profiting at the ex-
pense of other fund shareholders. Since then federal and state authorities'
widening investigation of illegal late trading and improper timing of fund trades
has involved a growing number of prominent mutual fund companies and broker-
age firms." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MUTUAL FUNDS: ADDITIONAL DISCLO-
SURES COULD INCREASE TRANSPARENCY OF FEES AND OTHER PRACTICES 17 (2004).
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ments led to a series of settlements and convictions341 and confirm
that parallel investigations often motivate global settlements that re-
solve all related criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings.3 42
SROs, like the National Association of Securities Dealers, also en-
gage in parallel investigations. These investigations may have a
somewhat different focus, in light of differences in SRO rules, collat-
eral consequences, or issues arising from such investigations. 34 3 In
general, SRO investigations and SRO penalties are fairly limited,3 44
but SROs can sanction a range of offenses.3 45
Legal and administrative reform is needed to enhance parallel in-
vestigations. Further sharing of information and coordination among
investigative agencies is needed, particularly regarding financial in-
formation. Increased sharing of information would optimize the use of
scarce government resources. New legislation could minimize the
compliance burden that multiple investigations impose on companies.
Similarly, government agencies should work to harmonize their regu-
lations so that executives are more likely to know and understand
them. Supporting a return to greater simplicity in conducting finan-
cial reporting is more important than the proliferation of complex ad-
ministrative regulations by the SEC or other regulatory entity.
E. Pressures for Corporate Cooperation in Investigations
The extent of cooperation varies by companies subject to govern-
ment investigations of their financial information, depending in part
on the investigative agency. 34 6 Many companies are reluctant to pro-
341. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Conse-
quences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 429 (2003).
342. An example of a "global settlement" occurred in December 2002, when ten securi-
ties firms agreed to pay a total of $875 million for the practices that created inap-
propriate influences for their research analysts. See CORPORATE FRAUD TASK
FORCE, FIRST YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, 3.30, available at httpJ/www.us-
doj.gov/dagtcftf/first-year-report.pdf.
343. Tougher investigations may occur in the future, as NASD enforcement focuses on
internal controls and top management. See Kip Betz, New York Stock Exchange:
NYSE Regulation Part of Enforcement Action Yielded $35 million in Fines During
2005, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (Dec. 15, 2005).
344. NASD investigations yielded only $35 million in fines in 2005, but that repre-
sents about a fifty percent increase from 2004. Id.
345. See Ralph C. Ferrara & J. Triplett Mackintosh, Legal Representation in the Inter-
national Securities Market: Representing a Party or Witness in an SEC or SRO
Proceeding, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 893, 896-98 (1989). NASD collected a record
$125.4 million in fines in 2005, for a range of violations. NASD, Inc.: NASD
Releases 2005 Statistics Showing Record Level of Fines, $125.4M, SEC. L. DAILY
(BNA) (Dec. 28, 2005).
346. For example, cooperation with the IRS is critical for handling an IRS audit, if the
company wants the burden of proof shifted to the IRS. See IRC § 7491(a)(2)
(2000); Tanya M. Marcum, Shifting the Burden-of-Proof Rules in Federal Tax
Cases, 75 CPA J. 51 (Aug. 2005).
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duce their internal investigative reports to the SEC because they
properly fear that disclosure to the SEC may waive 34 7 the attorney-
client privilege or work product protection 3 48 with respect to private
parties commencing subsequent civil litigation. 349 Federal and state
courts have reached conflicting results on this issue.350 Similarly, cor-
porations are concerned about providing their external auditors with a
copy of the company's internal investigative report.3 5 1 For example,
Wells Submissions to the SEC are generally discoverable in private
litigation.3 52
In 2001, the SEC issued a report on cooperation 3 53 that is now
commonly known as the "Seaboard Report."3 5 4 The Seaboard Report
347. While the SEC generally seeks waiver of the privilege (explicitly or not), it does
not support the argument that such waivers also apply in subsequent private
litigation. Indeed, the "SEC has even intervened in a number of private securi-
ties [actions to argue in] opposition to plaintiffs' waiver arguments." Elkan
Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client and Work
Product Protection, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1, 2005, at 3. The SEC also has sought to con-
vince Congress to enact legislation that would permit selective waiver. Id.
348. The work product doctrine protects against the disclosure of written documents
and electronic data that includes the attorneys' mental impressions prepared in
anticipation of litigation. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). The
doctrine was partially codified in Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(3).
349. Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, In Support of
McKesson Corp. and Supporting Reversal, United States v. Bergonzi, 403 F.3d
1048 (9th Cir. 2005), 2004 WL 1394246.
350. Most courts have rejected the idea of a "limited waiver" that would preclude dis-
closure to third parties in private litigation. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d
793, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
351. External auditors have become increasingly aggressive in their collection of infor-
mation during their financial audits of their corporate clients. Auditors are in-
creasingly insisting that corporations provide the auditor with documents
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or attorney work product doctrine.
Disclosure of protected materials to an external auditor raises the issue of
whether it also operates as a waiver with respect to third parties who seek to
obtain the materials in subsequent private litigation. Such disclosures by corpo-
rations occur because they seek to avoid the prospect of receiving a qualified au-
dit opinion or no audit opinion at all. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny
Energy Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). In that case, the court held that
because the auditor was not an adversary of Merrill Lynch, the work product
doctrine was not waived when the firm provided its auditor with protected docu-
ments. Id. at 449
352. Mitchell E. Herr, SEC Enforcement: A Better Wells Process, 32 SEC. REG. L.J. 56,
62 (2004) (citing In re Public Offering Securities Litigation, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23102 (Dec. 24, 2003)).
353. Report of the Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to
Agency Enforcement Decisions Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, 76 SEC Docket
296 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Seaboard Report].
354. The Seaboard Report set forth thirteen recommendations that, if followed, may
earn companies credit for good behavior. Id. See also In re Gisela de Leon-Mere-
dith, Exchange Act Release No. 44,970, 76 SEC Docket 300 (Oct. 23, 2001) (dis-
cussing the SEC's action against a Seaboard affiliate company employee)
2007] INVESTIGATIONS, INSPECTIONS, AND AUDITS 95
identifies four broad factors that the SEC considers in determining
whether, and how much, to credit a corporation's cooperation: (1) self-
policing prior to discovery of misconduct; (2) self-reporting misconduct
upon discovery; (3) remediation; and (4) cooperation with law enforce-
ment agencies. 3 55
One of the Seaboard Report's recommendations for cooperation is
that corporations waive their work product, attorney-client, and other
privileges356 and share the results of the company's internal investi-
gation with the SEC.357 After the Seaboard Report was issued, there-
fore, "corporations have operated under the assumption that waiver of
such privileges is one of the key factors in assessing cooperation with
the SEC."3 5 s Many of the settlements that the SEC has entered into
with companies since 2001 have emphasized a willingness to waive
privileges as a sign of good behavior.359
355. Colleen P. Mahoney, et al, Current Developments in SEC Enforcement, in SECURI-
TIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2005 (chairs David Siegel & Colleen
P. Mahoney), 555, 581.
356. For example, seventeen states have a limited accountant-client privilege to pro-
tect accountant-client communications to varying degrees. David Greenwald,
Corporate Governance: Transparency in Financial Reporting Without Waiving A
Corporation's Privileges, 40 BLOOMBERG CORP. L.J. 39, 40-41 (2006), available at
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl-s20Publications%5CRelatedDocumentsPDFsl2
52%5C1253%5CBloombergCorporateLawJournal.pdf. However, the PCAOB
has expressly stated that it does not intend to recognize any such privilege in
conducting its investigations. Indeed, the PCAOB has made clear that a CPA
firm's failure to comply with the PCAOB's demand for testimony, documents, or
information on the basis of an asserted accountant-client privilege will be
grounds for a non-cooperation sanction. PUB. Co. ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD., Release
No. 2003-015, RULES ON INVESTIGATIONS AND ADJUDICATIONS app. at A2-33 to A2-
34 (2003).
357. The Seaboard Report notes: "In some cases, the desire to provide information to
the SEC staff may cause companies to consider choosing not to assert the attor-
ney-client privilege, the work product protection and other privileges, protec-
tions, and exemptions with respect to the Commission." Seaboard Report, supra
note 353, n.3.
358. William R. McLucas, et al., Symposium 2006: The Changing Face of White-Collar
Crime: The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting, 96 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 631 (2006).
359. The SEC's conduct is mirrored by that of other regulatory agencies. For example,
in August 2004, the Division of Enforcement of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC") issued an Enforcement Advisory specifying the cooperation
factors that the CFTC will consider when recommending enforcement sanctions
for violations of the Commodity Exchange Act. Press Release, CFTC, U.S. Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission's Division of Enforcement Issues Advisory
Identifying Cooperation Factors That May Reduce A Litigant's Sanctions (Aug.
11, 2004), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/enfD4/opa4968-04.htm. The CFTC
has indicated that credit for cooperation may depend on a willingness to waive
the attorney-client privilege and disclose the results of internal investigations.
Ronald C. Minkoff, A Leak in the Dike: Expanding the Doctrine of Waiver of the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 154 PLU/NY 165, 178 (Dec. 2005).
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The SEC's intent was to encourage corporations to self-report
problems 36 0 and self-correct, 3 6 1 while allowing the SEC enforcement
staff to conserve limited SEC resources. 36 2 If a company is guilty of a
federal crime and elects to report the problem on a timely basis and
fully cooperate with the government, the SEC may reduce potential
fines on the company by about ninety percent.3 63 Full cooperation has
led the SEC to refrain from taking action against specific compa-
nies 36 4 and their employees. 36 5
The SEC expects a high level of cooperation from public compa-
nies.3 6 6 Companies are motivated to cooperate with the SEC mostly
360. There is evidence that companies not following the Seaboard Report recommen-
dations are automatically considered uncooperative by the SEC. See Tim Reason,
The Limits of Mercy, CFO MAGAZINE, Apr. 1, 2005, at 61.
361. Besides cooperation, remedial action is required from any company seeking leni-
ency from the SEC. "Remedial action may take several forms, including restating
corporate financial statements, compensating investors, instituting new and im-
proved internal control procedures, and disposing of members of management
present during the wrongdoing, regardless if they are culpable." Derek M. Meis-
ner, Internal Investigations: An Essential Component to Cooperation in an SEC
Inquiry, 32 SEC. REG. L.J. 310, 313 (2004). The SEC has made it clear that
remediation, including dismissing or appropriately disciplining wrongdoers, is a
crucial step toward receiving credit for cooperation. Derek M. Meisner, The ABCs
of an SEC Investigation: 20 Essential Questions and Answers, CORPORATE COUN-
SEL FoRuM 2005, at 986.
362. Colleen P. Mahoney, et al, Current Developments in SEC Enforcement, in SECURI-
TIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2005 (chairs David Siegel & Colleen
P. Mahoney), 555, 561.
363. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8C2, 5(g)(i), cited in Dan K. Webb, Robert W.
Tarun, and Steven F. Molo, Reports of Investigations: Their Contents and Their
Confidentiality, in CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS, 11.02. In January
2006, the SEC reinforced the importance of cooperation when it adopted a new
policy determining the appropriateness of civil penalties imposed on corporations
that violate securities laws. See Press Release, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, State-
ment of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penal-
ties (Jan. 4, 2006) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm; David
L. Hudson, Big Firm, Big Fine: SEC Sets Policy That Lets Shareholder Harm
Affect Penalties, 5 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 6 (Jan. 13, 2006).
364. Cooperation with the SEC was especially important for AIG, after falsely inflat-
ing insurance loss reserves. See Sirena J. Scales, When Facing Penalties, Corpo-
rations Should Not Focus Solely on Cooperation, Says SEC Official, Fin.
Reporting Watch (Feb. 15, 2006) (Tax Analysts Doc 2006-3119).
365. For example, the SEC decided not to charge Putnam Fiduciary Trust Co. after six
former officers were accused of engaging in a scheme to defraud a pension plan of
$4 million. See SEC Enforcement: Enforcement Division 'Tough But Fair' In Pur-
suing Wrongdoers, Thomsen Says, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (Mar. 8, 2006). See also
SEC Files Financial Fraud Case Charging Three Former Homestore Executives;
Defendants Agree to Repay $4.6 Million in Illegal Trading Profits, Litigation Re-
lease No. 17,745, 78 SEC Docket 1779 (Sept. 25, 2002).
366. The SEC may not always ask for a privilege waiver, but voluntary waiver helps to
create goodwill. SEC Enforcement: Enforcement Division 'Tough But Fair' In
Pursuing Wrongdoers, Thomsen Says, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (Mar. 8, 2006) (state-
ment of Walter Ricciardi, District Director, SEC Boston office).
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because the potential consequences of not cooperating can be fatal to
their corporate existence. 3 6 7 However, a few companies (and their
employees) have chosen to litigate, rather than fully cooperate with
the SEC, despite the clear risks.368
The PCAOB also emphasizes cooperation. Failure to cooperate
with a PCAOB investigation can result in revocation of a firm's regis-
tration. The PCAOB can suspend a CPA from practice or bar the indi-
vidual's association with a registered public accounting firm.3 69
While an individual may assert privileges, the PCAOB has made clear
that such assertions may be used as evidence in PCAOB disciplinary
proceedings and will be the basis for evidentiary inferences against
the person asserting the privilege. In addition, the PCAOB may re-
port assertions of a privilege to other authorities consistent with its
authority to share information. 37 0
Corporate cooperation is also critical in DOJ investigations. The
DOJ's policy on cooperation is set forth primarily in the 2006 McNulty
Memorandum.3 7 1 This document guides prosecutors in deciding
whether to charge a business organization with a crime. 3 72 Funda-
mentally, DOJ's McNulty Memorandum places great emphasis on the
authenticity of a corporation's cooperation. 37 3 Federal prosecutors
must consider "whether [a] corporation, while purporting to cooperate
[with a DOJ investigation], has engaged in conduct intended to im-
pede the investigation . . .374
367. As indicated, while the SEC generally seeks waiver of the privilege (explicitly or
not), it does not support the argument that such waivers also apply in subsequent
private litigation.
368. Meisner, supra note 222, at 987.
369. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 105(b)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 7215 (Supp. IV 2004).
370. PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE No. 2003-015, RULES ON INVESTI-
GATIONS AND ADJUDICATIONS app. at Al-14 (2003).
371. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, on Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations to Heads of Department Compo-
nents, United States Attorneys (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
speechl2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memo]. See generally Car-
men Couden, Note, The Thompson Memorandum: A Revised Solution or Just A
Problem?, 30 J. CORP. L. 405 (2005) (discussing the Thompson Memorandum,
which was superseded by the McNulty Memorandum and preceded by the DOJ's
Holder Memorandum); Gideon Mark & Thomas C. Pearson, Corporate Coopera-
tion During Investigations and Audits, 13 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. _ (forthcoming
2007).
372. The factors the DOJ considers in whether to charge a corporation with a crime
also includes all of the factors normally considered in the sound exercise of
prosecutorial judgment. McNulty Memo, supra note 371, at 4.
373. Id. at 7.
374. Id. at 12.
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Company cooperation is also encouraged by the DOJ through "de-
ferred prosecution agreements" ("DPAs")375 and "non-prosecution
agreements" ("NPAs"). DPAs are agreements in which the govern-
ment indicts a corporation for misconduct by corporate employees, but
agrees not to actively pursue the prosecution and to ultimately drop
the charges if the corporation satisfies the terms of the DPA.376 DPAs
usually require a company to admit guilt, pay a large fine and restitu-
tion to victims, accept an external monitor, and agree to cooperate in
prosecuting responsible individuals.37 7
Legal reform is needed to encourage corporations to cooperate with
government investigations, particularly when the investigation con-
cerns the accuracy of financial information provided to the SEC.378
The next part of the Article discusses in more detail the legal and ad-
ministrative reforms that are critically needed.
IV. REFORMS NEEDED FOR EFFECTIVE AND FAIR
INVESTIGATIONS OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
Investor faith in the financial markets was restored after SOX in
large part by reforms stemming from SOX. 3 7 9 SOX substantially im-
proved corporate governance and the "tone at the top" of public compa-
nies. SOX has also produced some improvements in financial
reporting and disclosure, the performance of auditors, and enhanced
375. Richard S. Gruner, Three Painful Lessons: Corporate Experience with Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, 1536 PLICORP 61, 66 (June 2006) (prosecutors have in-
creasingly used DPAs as a means to ensure corporate cooperation with govern-
ment investigations). DPAs, which did not exist on the corporate level prior to
1994, are increasingly common tools for resolving the organizational aspects of
corporate misconduct. Id. at 65.
376. DPAs offer several advantages to a participating corporation, such as the oppor-
tunity to avoid conviction and fines; the opportunity to minimize adverse collat-
eral consequences of conviction; and improved public relations. Mary Kreiner
Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing the Ma-
chine Through The Corporate Death Penalty, 47 ARIz. L. REV. 933, 953 (2005)
("The DPAs are a step toward balancing the collateral consequences of convicting
a major business entity with the need to stop corporate criminality."). But the
disadvantages of DPAs are also significant. For example, the requirement of ex-
tensive cooperation often entails a waiver of the attorney work product protection
and the attorney-client privilege. Eugene Illovsky, Corporate Deferred Prosecu-
tion Agreements: The Brewing Debate, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Summer 2006, at 37,
available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/cjmag/21-2/corporatedeferred.pdf.
377. Colleen Cunningham, Deferred Prosecution Agreements Raise Concern, 21 FINAN-
cIAL ExEcuTwE, Oct. 2005, at 1. KPMG benefited from a DPA entered into fol-
lowing its promotion of illegal tax shelters. See Jonathan Weil, KPMG Settlement
Provides for New Start, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2005.
378. See MAHONEY, ET AL., supra note 199, at A-97-A-102.
379. The U.S. stock markets returned in 2006 to levels approximating the highs
reached in 2001.
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government enforcement.380 However, as the stock option backdating
scandal has illustrated,3S1 the SEC continues "to discover both indus-
try-wide and company specific failures of business ethics and of disclo-
sures to shareholders . . . . Such failures are offensive and
unacceptable." 3 s2
Legislative and regulatory refinements of SOX are needed to
strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of investigations of finan-
cial information.38 3 Part A discusses ways to improve corporate gov-
ernance and the "tone at the top" of both public companies and other
sizeable organizations. Part B examines the importance of improving
financial reporting and disclosure. Part C discusses ways to improve
auditor effectiveness and efficiency, particularly by reducing burden-
some and unduly complex requirements for the reporting and attesta-
tion of internal controls. Part D discusses the creation of an improved
enforcement environment, with greater efficiency and predictability in
government investigations. This Part also examines accountant edu-
cation and training as a preventative measure.
A. Strengthening Corporate Governance and the "Tone at
the Top"
The "tone at the top" is established by formal policies that send
clear messages about the importance of compliance and strong busi-
ness ethics, as well as by actions that implement those messages.38 4
It is essential to create a business culture that is sensitive to legal and
380. See Cynthia A. Glassman, Sec. & Exch. Commissioner, Remarks Before the Euro-
pean Corporate Governance Summit: An SEC Commissioner's View: The Post-
Sarbanes-Oxley Environment for Foreign Issuers (Mar. 2, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch030205cag.htm.
381. The stock-option backdating scandal has affected more than 180 companies.
Francisco Guerrera, Once Mighty U.S. Chiefs Feel Heat on Corporate Governance,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2007. However, "[bly some estimates as many as 2,000 public
companies are suspected to have backdated their top executives' pay package
[stock options]." See WHITE & CASE, STOCK OPTION TASK FORCE: OVERVIEW, at 2,
available at http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/54f4c333-34d6-4c8a-
b6a7-9796a439bl4a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ef96fol-9690-47dd-
80e9-97fd7608d426/StockOptionsTaskForceBrochure_2.pdf (last visited Mar.
21, 2007), at 2.
382. See How to Handle Restatements for Material Errors & Trouble During PCAOB
Inspections, supra note 195, at 3 (statement of SEC Chief Accountant).
383. SEC Chairman Cox stated that "[ilt would be a mistake to roll back any major
provision of SOX." See Stephen Labaton, Four Year's Later, Enron's Shadow Lin-
gers as Change Comes Slowly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2006, at C1.
384. An example of an action that raises questions about the tone at the top of the
organization is when no corporate board member, except for the CEO, attends the
company's annual meeting. This set of facts has provoked shareholder lawsuits.
See Greg Land, Shareholder Suits Follow on Heels of Home Depot Meeting,
LAW.COM, June 6, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id=11495
10920815.
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ethical issues.385 The goal of the tone at the top is to establish the
importance of maintaining high ethical and legal standards as part of
the DNA of any participant in the financial markets. 38 6
Ultimately, the tone at the top is established by employing "the
'right people' who possess an 'independent spirit' and are 'knowledgea-
ble of the company and industry.'" 38 7 However, legal requirements
help guide the proper tone at the top by prohibiting conduct that is
likely to create an unacceptable absence of independence. For exam-
ple, the SEC has proposed to require registered Investment Compa-
nies to have at least seventy-five percent independent directors. 38 8
That requirement should also apply to public companies. Requiring a
substantially large majority of independent directors is likely to im-
prove the integrity of decisions by boards of directors.
Congress could enhance the tone at the top in public companies by
requiring public companies to separate the positions of CEO and
Chairman of the board of directors, top positions that some corpora-
tions currently give to the same individual. 38 9 The Breeden Report on
Worldcom also sensibly suggested term limits for board members and
limits on participation on multiple boards.39 0 Additional reforms to
establish the tone at the top include mandatory majority voting, as
urged by activist shareholders. 3 91 An enhanced tone at the top is pos-
sible, even if accounting firms are permitted to provide some business
advice to their clients. 39 2
385. Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Elevated Risk Complex
Structured Finance Activities, Exchange Act Release No. 53,773, 71 Fed. Reg.
28,326 (May 16, 2006).
386. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, at 71 (2003), available at http://
www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep03/arO3full.pdf.
387. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-030419sp, GAO FORUM ON GOVERNANCE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY: CHALLENGE TO RESTORE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN U.S. CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS 3 (2003).
388. Investment Company Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 27395, 71 Fed. Reg.
35,366 (July 27, 2004). A federal court invalidated the rule after challenge by the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Robert Schroeder, Marketwatch, SEC to Mull
Hedge Fund, Sarbanes Oxley Rules, http'//www.marketwatch.com (search "SEC
to Mull Hedge Fund"; then follow hyperlink to article) (last visited Mar. 31,
2007).
389. See Breeden Report, supra note 160, at 50-51. See also Annette L. Nazareth, Sec.
& Exch. Commissioner, Remarks Before PLI's 38th Annual Institute on Securi-
ties Regulation (Nov. 9, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/
spchll0906aln.htm.
390. Breeden Report, supra note 160, at 55, 63.
391. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n General Counsel, Discussing Impact of Shift in Corpo-
rate Governance, SEC TODAY (Walters Kluwer) (June 26, 2006).
392. Some observers advocate returning "the role of external auditors" to a trusted
business advisor. SOX increased "the tension between an auditor's role as both
an advisor and independent examiner." However, "the role of external auditors
may have shifted too far with respect to independence from [the company's] man-
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Non-corporate entities could benefit by voluntarily adopting more
corporate governance reforms.3 93 These other entities include quasi-
governmental organizations, 39 4 private companies, 3 95 hedge funds,396
mutual funds,3 9 7 SROs,398 and non-profit organizations. 3 9 9 The ratio-
agement." Auditors should continue to discuss with management recommenda-
tions for improvements. Letter from Donna J. Fisher, supra note 94, at 10.
393. Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things From Happening to Good
Charities; Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. 89 (June 22,
2004) (statement of Diana Aviv, President and CEO, Independent Sector). Incon-
sistent enforcement of the laws is a major problem, particularly for the nonprofit
and philanthropic sectors. Id. at 6.
394. "Freddie Mac" is a quasi-governmental organization. Its accounting for over one
trillion dollars of derivatives was highly problematic. See Freddie Mac; Account-
ing Standards Issues Raised in the Doty Report: Hearing Before the Subcom. On
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Com. On Energy and Com-
merce, 108th Cong. 11 (2003) (statement of James Doty, Partner in Charge,
Baker Botts, LLP). The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight's report
on Fannie Mae's accounting alleged the quasi-governmental organization's "ac-
counting practices have been designed to skirt rules, smooth out earnings, and
apparently, in one case, fatten executive bonuses." James R. Hagerty and John
D. McKinnon, In Fannie Mae Probe, Watchdog Has Started to Show Teeth, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 27, 2004.
395. See Richard S. Savich, Cherry Picking Sarbanes Oxley: Provisions That Deserve a
Second Look, 201 J. OF ACcT. 71 (June 2006).
396. A "hedge fund" is a pooled investment vehicle owned by a limited number of indi-
viduals that often uses leverage and risk to achieve greater investment returns.
Hedge funds are often managed by an investment adviser often exempted from
SEC regulation. See generally SHARTIS FRIESE, U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE
FUNDS § 4.1-4.2 (2005). Hedge funds are estimated to have assets approximating
$2.1 trillion. Alistar Barr, Hedge Funds' Assets Top $2 Trillion Survey Finds,
MARKETWATCH, Mar. 29, 2007. Hedge funds have grown dramatically worldwide
in the past decade. Since 2000, hedge fund assets have grown at least 260%,
growing faster than mutual fund assets, and represent about one-fifth of the as-
sets of mutual funds in equity securities. Registration Under the Advisers Act of
Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Register 72,054, 72,055-56 (was to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279, but now withdrawn). See generally Thomas C.
Pearson & Julia Lin Pearson, Protecting Global Financial Market Stability and
Integrity: SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds, 33 N.C. J. IN'L L. & COM. REG.
(forthcoming 2007).
397. Since 1990, stock purchases by U.S. households have been primarily through mu-
tual funds. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE AND THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY AsSO-
CIATION, supra note 12, at 10. Congress became concerned about the mutual fund
industry in 2003. The Mutual Fund Reform Act, § 2059, 108th Cong. 2d Sess.
(2004) and the Mutual Fund Integrity and Fee Transparency Act, H.R. REP. No.
108-35 1, at 1 (2003) sought to improve the transparency of mutual fund fees and
costs, as well as improve the governance and management integrity of mutual
funds. See Mutual Funds: Additional Disclosures Could Increase Transparency
of Fees and Other Practices: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Manage-
ment, the Budget and International Security, Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
108th Cong. 2d Sess. 81, 99 (2004) (statement of Richard J. Hillman, Director,
Financial Markets and Community Investment, U.S. General Accounting Office).
The SEC reacted by adopting rules requiring mutual funds to have a "Chief Com-
pliance Officer" who must report to the board of directors. See Rachel McTague,
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nale for extending federal corporate governance law to such organiza-
tions is that their financial losses have significant adverse
consequences for the public,40 0 and some of them have participated in
financial abuses.4 0 Congress should extend the application of some
of SOX's basic governance requirements to these large organizations.
Especially useful requirements include the establishment of an audit
committee and certification of financial statements by the CEO and
CFO or their equivalents. Finally, the government should collect ba-
sic business and financial information from all organizations in order
to reduce the incidence of serious financial crimes. 40 2
B. Improving Comprehension of Financial Reporting and
Disclosure Rules
Financial reporting is complex and challenging.403 The myriad
professional standards that CPAs must apply are often difficult to
learn and fully grasp.40 4 Lack of knowledge by CPAs reveals both an
educational problem and a problem with the increasing volume and
Investment Companies: Fidelity Official Describes Overlap In 'Reporting Up'
Rules and CCO Rule, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (June 20, 2005).
398. See Fair Administration and Governance of SROs, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126 (Dec. 8,
2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249).
399. Some tax exempt organizations have supported revising IRS Form 990 filed by
tax exempt organizations. See Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad
Things from Happening to Good Charities: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fi-
nance, 108th Cong. 2d Sess. at 9 (2004) (statement of Mark Pacella, President,
National Association of State Charity Officials). The revisions would make Form
990 conform to financial statements, to promote consistency and transparency of
financial information. No federal regulation exists for financial audits of charita-
ble organizations, except for those receiving more than half a million dollars of
federal grants. See INDEPENDENT SECTOR, PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR:
STRENGTHENING, TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATION 35 (2006).
400. See, e.g., Antifraud: SEC Sues NCFE Executives Alleging Participation in $2.6B
Fraud, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (Dec. 22, 2005).
401. For example, non-profits have played a role in abusive tax shelter cases. See IN-
DEPENDENT SECTOR, supra note 399, at 49. See also Editorial, Congress and
KPMG, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2005, at A10 (mentioning that KPMG's nonprofit of
choice for its abusive tax shelters was the Los Angeles Fire and Police Pension
System). The Pension Protection Act of 2006 sought to prevent further abuse by
tax-exempt organizations.
402. For example, "federal law enforcement officials are concerned that criminals are
increasingly using U.S. shell companies to conceal their identity and illicit activi-
ties." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPANY FORMATIONS: MINIMAL OWNER-
SHIP INFORMATION IS COLLECTED AND AVAILABLE 2 (2006).
403. See, e.g., Ellen M. Heffes, Financial Reporting: FEI CEO's 2007 Top 10 Financial
Reporting Challenges, FIN. ExEcUTIvE, JanJFeb. 2007, available at http://www.
fei.org/eweb/upload/FEI/Top1O.pdf.
404. A conversation with a CFO and controller revealed that both lacked an under-
standing of GAAP on the issue, even though professional authority was directly
on point. See Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC, supra note 6, at 9.
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complexity of professional standards.4o5 The education problem is
discussed below in connection with recommendations for better
enforcement.
Complex accounting rules make it easier to commit and hide finan-
cial fraud. 40 6 Complexity in accounting standards is the "result of (1) a
desire to reduce volatility in the income statement, (2) the develop-
ment of numerous exceptions to basic [accounting] principles[, and] (3)
the application of detailed rules."407 "Accounting standards have be-
come so complex that they dwarf the capacity of professional[s] who
prepare[ I the [financial] statements," those that audit them, and the
sophisticated analysts who interpret them.40 s Reducing complexity is
designed to increase GAAP's transparency and integrity.40 9 However
part of the problem is that business assets and transactions have be-
come considerably more complex.410 Prime examples include in-
tangibles 4 11 and derivatives. Accounting standards and authorities
should "be easy to learn, easy to apply, easy to check, [and] easy to
enforce,"4 12 but they frequently are just the opposite.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") and the SEC
Office of the Chief Accountant 413 have created numerous verbose ac-
405. The FASB has noted the common criticism "that complexity has engendered a
form-over-substance approach to accounting auditing, and reporting by
preparers, auditors and regulators, sapping professionalism and increasingly ne-
cessitating the involvement of technical experts to ensure compliance." Steven
Marcy, Accounting: FASB Says It Needs SEC, PCAOB Help in Meeting Reform
Goals in SEC Report, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (Feb. 17, 2006).
406. According to the FASB, '[Tihe volume and detail of accounting, auditing and re-
porting standards, rules, and regulations now pose a major challenge to main-
taining and enhancing the quality and transparency of financial reporting to
investors and the capital markets." FASB, FASB RESPONSE TO SEC STUDY ON
ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTI-
TIES, AND TRANSPARENCY OF FILINGS BY ISSUERS 6 (2006).
407. Donald T. Nicolaisen, Chief Accountant, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC
Staff: Remarks Before the USC Leventhal School of Accounting: SEC Financial
Reporting Institute Conference (2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch06O2O5dtn.htm.
408. James D. Cox, Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and the
Metrics for Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301, 304 (2003).
409. See Sirena Scales, SOX 404 Compliance Has Shifted from Risk-Based Approach,
Says SEC Commissioner, FINANCIAL REPORTING WATCH, Mar. 3, 2006, http:l
www.taxanalysts.com (citing SEC Acting Chief Accountant Scott Taub) (on file
with author).
410. See generally PricewaterhouseCoopers, Highlights of the AICPA National Confer-
ence on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments, CFODIRECT.COM, Dec. 2006.
411. Kenan Patrick Jarboe, Reporting Intangibles: A Hard Look at Improving Busi-
ness Information in the U.S. (Athena Alliance, Working Paper No. 1, 2005).
412. See Stavros Thomadakis, Chairman, Public Interest Oversight Board, Presenta-
tion at the GPPS Symposium: The Quality of International Audits 2 (Oct. 19-20,
2005), available at http://www.ipiob.org.
413. "The Office of the Chief Accountant is responsible for establishing and enforcing
accounting and auditing policy to enhance the transparency and relevancy of fi-
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counting standards 4 14 that set forth bright-line rules, arguably to help
accountants minimize potential legal liability.415 Some of the FASB's
objectives in 2006 were to improve and simplify GAAP416 and to pro-
mote international convergence of accounting standards.417 For its
part, the SEC has recommended the adoption of "Objectives-Oriented
Standards" that clearly state the accounting objective of such
standards. 4 18
nancial reporting .... Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Office of the Chief Accountant,
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oca.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2007). See gener-
ally Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Guidance for Consulting on Accounting Matters with
the Office of the Chief Accountant, http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/ocasub
guidance.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
414. The SEC can create accounting standards for public companies. Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 § 108, 15 U.S.C. § 7218 (Supp. IV 2004). For example, the SEC has
commented on options, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Staff Accounting Bulletin (SEC
SAB) No. 107, 17 C.F.R. pt. 211 (2005); retirement obligations, SEC SAB No. 106,
17 C.F.R. pt. 211 (2004); revenue recognition, SEC SABs, available at http://www.
sec.gov/interps/account.shtml (last visited Mar. 21, 2007). The AICPA still cre-
ates accounting standards for specific industries. See Jay S. Heflin, FASB Re-
solves Issues With GAAP Hierarchy Exposure Draft, FIN. REPORTING WATCH, Aug.
26, 2005 (on file with author).
415. [CPA] firms... turn[ed] increasingly to the [FASBI in search of 'bright
line' rules that would help them minimize the degree to which they had
to rely on their judgment-and make them vulnerable to trial lawyers.
Some... believe that [the] FASB and other rule-makers became increas-
ingly prescriptive. As a result, a maze of increasingly complex and pre-
scriptive rules and interpretations of the rules emerged .... This web of
rules . . . spawned intricate corporate structures, conceived by the inno-
vative minds of lawyers and investment bankers and aimed at satisfying
the letter of the rules . . . but not their spirit.
THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, THE FUTURE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 7 (2003),
available at http://www.americanassembly.org/ (follow "Programs" hyperlink; fol-
low "The Future of the Accounting Profession 11/13/2003" hyperlink; then follow
report" hyperlink).
416. See FASB, Project Updates: GAAP Hierarchy, http://www.fasb.org/project/gaap-
hierarchy.shtml (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
417. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADVISORY COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL CONVER-
GENCE-STATUS AND PLANS 1 (June 2005), available at http://www.fasb.org/fasacd
06-21-05 intl.pdf; see also FASB, PROJECT UPDATE: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEwORK-
JOINT PROJECT OF THE IASB AND FASB, available at http://www.fasb.org/projectl
conceptual framework.shtml (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
418. Accounting standards should "[p]rovide sufficient detail and structure so that the
standard can be operationalized and applied on a consistent basis .... [However,
the SEC believes accounting standards should] avoid use of percentage tests [or
bright-lines] that allow financial engineers to achieve technical compliance with
the standard, while evading [its] intent .. .. " SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (OFFICE OF
THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT AND OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS), STUDY PURSUANT TO
SECTION 108(D) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON THE ADOPTION BY
UNITED STATES FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM OF A PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNT-
ING SYSTEM, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.
htm. Cf. CAP. MKT. REG, REP., supra note 47 (calling for more emphasis on princi-
ples, rather than rules).
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Unduly narrow accounting standards can encourage abuse.
4 19
"[Flor an accounting standard to facilitate investor protection[,] it
must [broadly] contemplate all related [party] transactions and [pro-
vide] specific [guidance] to mitigate opportunities for manipulation
without providing bright-line cutoffs."4 2 0 Thus, "[t]he challenge is
how to develop high quality [professional] standards that are relevant
to [the range] of [end-users] of financial statement[s] .. ". ."421 The
SEC must require that financial information become more rele-
vant,4 2 2 readable, 4 23 and affordable. 4 24 This is especially important
as more companies start to generate financial statements using
tagged data for the Web, known as "XBRL."425 A tiered system of fi-
nancial reporting is possible if corporations use the Internet to furnish
more detailed information. 4 26 Thus, the SEC, with input from the pri-
vate sector, should act to reduce the MD&A and other disclosure bur-
419. An example of the problem is Enron's misuse of "Special Purpose Entities." See
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 401
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-BALANCE
SHEET IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES, AND TRANSPARENCY OF FILINGS
BY ISSUERS 15-19 (2005). See also Are Current Financial Accounting Standards
Protecting Investors, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and
Consumer Protection, 107th Cong. 2d Sess. 62-71 (Feb. 14, 2002) (statement of
Mr. Thomas J. Linsmeier, Associate Professor of Accounting and Information
Systems, Mich. St. Univ.). In 2006, Professor Linsmeier joined the FASB as one
of its seven board members. FASB, http://www.fasb.org [follow "Facts About
FASB" hyperlink; then follow "FASB Board Members" hyperlink).
420. Linsmeier, supra note 419, at 66.
421. Antoine Bracchi, Member of the Public Interest Oversight Board, Presentation to
FSF-IASB-IFAC Roundtable on Financial Reporting and Auditing: Regulatory
and Practical Challenges in Quality Implementation of IFRS and IFAC Stan-
dards (Feb. 16, 2006), available at http://www.ifac.org/MediaCenter/?q=node/
view/305.
422. Because fair market values of businesses depend only about 25% on accounting
book values, accountants have begun to explore "Enhanced Business Reporting."
See Enhanced Business Reporting, available at http://www.ebr360.org/Content
Page.aspx?ContentPagelD=18 (last visited May 27, 2007).
423. The SEC began to recognize this readability problem in 1998, when it issued the
"plain English" reporting requirements to mandate more understandable disclo-
sures. See Plain English Disclosure, 63 Fed. Reg. 6,369, 6,370 (Feb. 6, 1998) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 230, 239, 274).
424. The SEC can also help companies minimize costs of delivering financial informa-
tion through a notice and access procedure. See, e.g., Internet Availability of
Proxy Materials, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,597, 74,598 (proposed Dec. 15, 2005) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274).
425. XBRL is "extensible business reporting language." The SEC is currently experi-
menting with allowing companies to file their financial statements in XBRL. See
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Spotlight On: Interactive Data and XBRL Initiatives,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/xbrl.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
426. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Conse-
quences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 478-79 (2003).
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dens, consistent with a conceptual framework for necessary
disclosure. 4 2 7
C. Implementing Internal Controls and Auditor "404" Work
More Affordably
The essential purpose of SOX § 404 is "to establish and maintain
effective and efficient internal controls 4 28 that enable reliable finan-
cial statements."4 29 Poor internal controls often predict current or fu-
ture financial reporting problems.430 Prior to SOX, CPAs merely
reviewed a company's internal controls for purposes of determining
appropriate reliance on the company's financial statement representa-
tions and auditing procedures in forming an opinion on the financial
statements. After implementation of SOX § 404, corporate manage-
ment must assess the effectiveness of a company's internal controls
over year-end financial reporting.4 3 1 The CEO/CFO must certify the
427. See generally Enhanced Business Reporting Framework (Oct. 2005) and Report-
ing Simplified (on file with author).
428. The SEC first required corporations to establish internal controls in 1976. The
SEC's action was in response to the discovery that hundreds of U.S. companies
had secret overseas bank accounts from which bribes were made to foreign offi-
cials. Sarbanes-Oxlev: Two Years of Market and Investor Recovery: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 2d Sess. 6 (2004), (state-
ment of Roderick M. Hills, former SEC Chairman and White House Counsel).
Congress codified this requirement to maintain internal control to provide "rea-
sonable assurance" in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 § 103, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). It is not possible to make internal controls
completely effective, regardless of the professional care used in their design and
implementation. See ARENS, supra note 57, at 270.
429. Cynthia A. Glassman, Sec. & Exch. Commissioner: Remarks Before the ALI-ABA
Financial Services Institute (Feb. 3, 2006). "[R]esearch shows that effective in-
ternal control is positively correlated with accurate financial reporting." PUB. Co.
ACcOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE No. 2006-007, PROPOSED AUDITING STAN-
DARD AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING THAT IS INTE-
GRATED WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 3 (2006).
430. Information technology (IT) controls represent between twenty to forty percent of
the section 404 internal controls. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 93, at 34. IT con-
trols are often categorized for purposes that are preventive, detective, or correc-
tive. After SOX, CPAs have been required to conduct more testing of
preventative controls in order to attest to the effectiveness of management's in-
ternal controls. See Donald K. McConnell, Jr. & George Y. Banks, How
Sarbanes-Oxley Will Change the Audit Process, 196 J. OF ACCT. 49, 51-52 (Sept.
2003). IT controls comprised the most significant internal control deficiencies.
See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 93, at 8.
431. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.308 (2006).
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company's internal control report.4 32 Then, auditors must attest to
management's report on internal controls.433
Interpreting § 404, the SEC has mandated that companies must
use an "internal control framework" developed through a due pro-
cess. 4 34 The auditor must identify the control criteria in the audit
opinion.4 35 The most widely used internal control framework is the
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
("COSO") framework. 43 6 This internal control framework consists of
five key interrelated components of internal control:437 (1) the control
environment, 438 (2) risk assessment, 43 9 (3) control activities,4 40 (4) in-
432. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. IV 2004). The
CEO/CFO certification covers at least four areas. Id. First, the CEOs/CFOs cer-
tify based on their knowledge that "the report does not contain any untrue state-
ment of material fact or omit to state a material fact." Id. Second, the CEOs/
CFOs certify that they "are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal
controls." Id. Third, they certify that they have disclosed to the auditors and
audit committee all "significant deficiencies" (explained infra note 449) in the
company's internal control and any fraud involving senior management. Id.
Fourth, the CEOs/CFOs have indicated in the report any significant changes in
internal control made after its evaluation. Id. See Ernst & Young, supra note 93,
at 50.
433. "Attestation" is a service providing assurance for a third party as to the reliability
of an assertion that is the responsibility of another party. To attest is to commu-
nicate an opinion or judgment based on persuasive evidence by an independent
competent authoritative person. Attestation includes audits, reviews, and other
attestation services. See generally ARENS, supra note 57, at 4-5.
434. 17 C.F.R. § 240.130-15(f) and 15d-15(b) (2006).
435. See generally PuB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE No. 2006-007, PRO-
POSED AUDITING STANDARD AN AUDITY OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL RE-
PORTING THAT IS INTEGRATED WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 96
(2006) (providing an example of a report that illustrates the report elements).
436. COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, INTER-
NAL CONTROL-INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK, Executive Summary, available at http://
www.coso.org/publications.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2007). COSO was created
in 1985 to sponsor the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting,
more commonly known as the Treadway Commission. COSO, http://cosco.org
(last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
437. Some experts believe the definition of internal control also includes a sixth
theme: "roles and responsibilities." See Letter from Auditing Standards Comm. of
the Am. Accounting Ass'n to Comm. of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Comm. (Dec. 27, 2005) (on file with author).
438. "The control environment sets the tone of an organization [and] influence[s] the
control consciousness of its people. It is the foundation for [the] other compo-
nents of internal control . . . ." COSO, supra note 436.
439. "Risk assessment" identifies and analyzes "relevant risks to achievement of the
objectives, forming a basis for determining how the risks should be managed."
Id. at 2.
440. "Control activities are the policies and procedures that help ensure management
directives are carried out." Id.
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formation and communication, 441 and (5) monitoring.4 4 2 COSOaa3
has outlined twenty-six fundamental processes associated with these
five key components of internal control.44 4
The PCAOB's original interpretation of SOX § 404 and the related
SEC guidance led the PCAOB to create Auditing Standard No. 2
(AS2).445 The standard refers to conducting a joint audit of financial
statements and internal controls.4 4 6 Auditors have relied on AS2 to
implement their responsibilities to attest to corporate management's
internal control assessment.4 4 7 AS2 expanded the 26 COSO funda-
mental processes into 105 attributes to achieve internal control. AS2
required auditors to go beyond searching for "material weakness" 448
and also search for "significant deficiencies." 4 4 9 Stanford Law Profes-
sor Joseph Grundfest identified the real § 404 problem as the
441. Information and communication consists of identifying, capturing, and communi-
cating information "in a form and timeframe that enable[s] people to carry out
their responsibilities." Id.
442. "Monitoring" consists of the processes that assess the quality of information over
time. Id.
443. In 1992, COSO published Internal Control-Integrated Framework, which it up-
dated in 1994. COSO, http://cosco.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2007). In 2004, in
order to help companies focus on Risk Management, COSO published Enterprise
Risk Management-Integrated Framework. Id.
444. To oversee internal control processes, some companies have created a Chief Inter-
nal Control Officer ("CICO"). See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2006 CURRENT DE-
VELOPMENTS FOR AUDIT COMMITTrEES, at 14, http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwc
publications.nsf/5872ef7fe6d3da8385256fa9006bd6b 1$FILE/CDFAC06v6.pdf.
445. AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED IN CON-
JUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, Auditing Standard No. 2
(AS2) (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2004).
446. AS2 established the principles for determining the confidence interval for the de-
tection of internal control weaknesses. See CAP. MKT. REG. REP., supra note 47,
at 117.
447. PCAOB, Staff Questions and Answers: Auditing Internal Controls Over Financial
Reporting (May 16, 2005) (Tax Analyst Doc. 2005-10701) (on file with author).
448. "A material weakness is a significant deficiency, or combination of significant de-
ficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood that a material misstate-
ment of the financial statements will not be prevented or detected." AN AUDIT OF
INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION
WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, AS2 at 1 10 (Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd. 2004). For a definition of "significant deficiency," see infra note
449.
449. "A significant deficiency is a control deficiency, or combination of control deficien-
cies, that adversely affects a company's ability to initiate, authorize, record, pro-
cess, or report external financial data reliably [using GAAPI." AN AUDIT OF
INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION
WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, Auditing Standard No. 2 9 (Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd. 2004).
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PCAOB's expansion of auditor responsibilities in AS2450 to encompass
significant deficiencies. 45 1
Because many aspects of AS2 were unclear, the PCAOB issued ad-
ditional interpretive guidance.4 52 In December 2006, the PCAOB pro-
posed new principles-based auditing standards on internal control.453
The SEC also issued conceptual guidance to management on assessing
and reporting on internal controls. 45 4 Between 2004 and 2006, the
internal controls455 of many public companies were discovered 4 56 to
be deficient.4 5 7 More than half of the companies reporting material
weaknesses in internal control4 58 are smaller public companies with
market capitalization under $200 million. 45 9
450. See Grundfest, supra note 45, at 7-8.
451. Professor Grundfest's solution properly raised "the probability threshold above
the level of remoteness and the materiality level above the level of inconsequenti-
ality that now triggers the search for significant deficienc[ies] while ... pursuing
inquiries that would catch reasonably possible material failures." Id. at 11.
452. The PCAOB's additional guidance on internal control work includes five sets of
staff questions and answers. See PCAOB Standards and Related Rules, http:l
www.pcaobus/orgStandards/Standards-andRelatedRules/AuditingStandard_
No.2.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
453. PuB. Co. AcCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 435, at 30-31.
454. The Financial Executives International Survey of CFOs in 2005 found that 82%
of CFOs wanted further guidance about SOX § 404 for more effectiveness and
cost-efficiency in assessing internal controls. (Dec. 8, 2005). COSO, Summary of
Responses and Comments to Website Questions, at 24 (Statement of the Financial
Executives International ("FEI")) (Jan. 2006). Information technology (IT) pro-
fessionals want additional management guidance for IT control, testing, scoping
for risk assessment, and various definitions. Letter from Everett C. Johnson, In-
ternational President, ISACA, to SEC & PCAOB Board Members (Apr. 27, 2006),
available at http://www.isaca.org/Content/ContentGroups/other/SEC-PCAOB-
Comment-Letter-28apri106.pdf
455. The four most frequent and significant internal control material weaknesses
raised by CPAs were material year-end adjustments, accounting personnel com-
petency or sufficiency, segregation of duties, and information technology process-
ing. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 444, at 11.
456. Even though internal controls were required more than a generation ago and
SOX was passed in 2002, the management of various companies failed to disclose
their internal control problems to their CPA firms. Instead, the CPA firms found
the problems in the process of conducting the required attestation work of man-
agement's report on internal controls.
457. These weaknesses have arisen in many different accounting areas, but especially
in income taxes, revenue recognition, inventory, leases, and intangible assets.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 444, at 11.
458. The SEC believes that companies generally need better disclosure of reported
material weaknesses in internal control, including "the nature of [the] material
weakness, [its] impact on financial reporting and the control environment, and
management's plans for remediating [the weakness]." The Impact of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 109th
Cong. 1st Sess. 55 (2005) (statement of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
459. Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC, supra note 6, at 7.
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The SEC's additional guidance notes, "Internal controls over finan-
cial reporting should reflect the nature and size of the company to
which they relate."460 The issue is whether a company can perform
the twenty-six COSO fundamental processes for internal controls
without achieving all of the 105 attributes identified by AS2.461 The
PCAOB has expressed the view that auditors could integrate their au-
dits of internal controls, exercise judgment in tailoring the internal
control work, use a "top-down approach"46 2 to risk assessment, and
forego testing the accounts that may have only a "remote likeli-
hood"463 of containing a material misstatement. AS2 allows auditors
to use the work of others, such as a company's internal auditor, in
assessing the company's internal control.464
Although an audit is not the only type of attestation,46 5 the funda-
mental problem with AS2 is that the PCAOB requires an audit of in-
ternal controls, while SOX and the SEC rules require only
attestation. 46 6 An audit is generally more expensive and intensive
than other types of attestation work. Thus, AS2 was an "unduly ex-
pensive and inefficient auditing standard under Section 404. .... "467
460. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Commission Statement on Implementation of Internal
Control Reporting Requirements, SEC News Digest, May 16, 2005, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/dig051605.txt.
461. COSO, Summary of Responses and Comments to Website Questions, at 24 (State-
ment of the FEI (Jan. 2006).
462. A "top down approach" begins with the financial statements to identify signifi-
cant financial accounts. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Division of Corporation Fi-
nance and Office of the Chief Accountant, Staff Statement of Management's
Report and Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting (May 16, 2005), available
at http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/stafficreporting.htm. "This approach di-
rects the auditor's attention to accounts, disclosures, and assertions that present
a reasonable possibility of material misstatement to the financial statements and
related disclosures." PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 435, at A-
1-A-11. A top-down approach compares with a "nit-picking, 'bottom-up' compli-
ance approach that has been excessively costly." David Katz, SEC Says Material-
ity Should Drive 404, CFO.com, Dec. 15, 2006, available at http://www/cfo.coml
printable/article.cfm/8433879/c_8435594?f=options.
463. A "remote likelihood" means the chance of the event occurring is slight. Ameri-
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants, supra note 39, at § 325.06 n.5; cf
ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 5, 3 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1975).
464. William J. McDonough, Remarks delivered at Emory University, (May 18, 2005)
(Tax Analyst Doc. 2005-10928) (on file with author).
465. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text discussing reviews, attestation,
and audits.
466. Letter from Edward L. Yingling, Executive Vice President, Am. Bankers Ass'n, to
the Honorable Michael Oxley (Apr. 20, 2005) (on file with author).
467. Christopher Cox (Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Chairman) and Conrad Hewitt (Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n Chief Accountant), Statements of SEC Chairman Christopher Cox
and Chief Accountant Conrad Hewitt, Regarding PCAOB's Proposed Section 404
Auditing Standard, (Dec. 19, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2006/2006-213.htm.
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In December 2006, the PCAOB proposed amending AS2 on inter-
nal control (commonly referred to as Proposed AS5).468 Proposed AS5
focuses on the indicators of material weakness in order to allow for
more judgment by the auditors in determining whether a significant
deficiency exists. 469 The PCAOB under Proposed AS5 guides auditors
to increase their use of work of others, such as internal auditors,
where appropriate.4 70 Proposed AS5 focuses auditors on the most im-
portant internal controls and emphasizes risk assessment. 4 7 1 It also
revises the definitions of significant deficiency and material weakness,
clarifies the role of materiality, revises the requirements to evaluate
management's process, permits consideration of knowledge obtained
during "previous years' audits to focus and make most efficient the
work in subsequent years."4 72 It scales the audit for smaller compa-
nies,4 73 eliminates unnecessary procedures, and generally simplifies
the requirements. 47 4
The SEC's original cost estimates of implementing § 404 internal
control requirements were grossly understated. One SEC Commis-
sioner concluded that the SEC's estimates were one-twentieth of the
actual § 404 costs that resulted by 2006.475 Large companies have
spent on average more than $4 million to comply with SOX § 404.476
Some of these expenses relate to covering the effects of deferred main-
468. PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 435, at 30-31.
469. Id. at A-4-A-8.
470. Id. at A-2-A-5. In determining whether to rely on an internal auditor's work,
SEC examiners look at the risks, the audit plan, the company's top management,
and the internal auditors' competency, objectivity, and effectiveness of their
work. Mary Ann Gadzialia, Assoc. Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Ex-
aminations, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks before the Bond Market Associ-
ation's Annual Legal and Compliance Conference: The SEC Examination
Program: Coordination and Priorities (Feb. 7, 2006), available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/speech/spch02O7O6mag.htm.
471. PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 435, at 4.
472. Edith Orenstein, Director, Technical Policy Analysis, Financial Executives Inter-
national, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Steps by SEC, PCAOB (May 17, 2006),
http://www.2.fei.org/news/SOX404_nextsteps-15-17-2006.cfm.
473. PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 435, at 28-29.
474. See PCAOB, BOARD Proposes Revised Auditing Standard on Internal Control
Over Financial Reporting (Dec. 19, 2006), available at http://www.iasplus.coml
usa/0612pcaobas2pr.pdf; PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 435,
at 30-31.
475. See Paul S. Atkins, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Commissioner, Remarks Before the Securi-
ties Regulation Institute (Jan. 19, 2006).
476. CRA INTERNATIONAL, SARBANES-OXLEY SEC. 404 COSTS AND IMPLEMENTATION IS-
SUES: SPRING 2006 SURVEY UPDATE 10 (Apr. 17, 2006). The average cost for
smaller public companies has exceeded $1 million. See The Trial of Sarbanes-
Oxley, 379 ECONOMIST 59 (Apr. 22, 2006). Companies spent about a quarter of
the sum on documenting internal controls. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note
444, at 12.
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tenance.4 77 The costs depend in part on the extent to which the com-
pany needs external assistance to improve its internal controls,4 78 the
number of a company's "key controls,"4 79 and how often the key con-
trols are tested.48 0 However, public companies with complex organi-
zational structures must expect more detailed audits of internal
controls.48 1
The SEC and the PCAOB must learn to streamline their rules and
releases. They should implement a more concise "objectives-oriented
standard" approach in their guidance.48 2 Streamlining the authori-
ties relating to § 404 could eliminate auditor processes that are unnec-
essary or duplicative. 48 3 The regulators must help accounting firms
interpret the rules efficiently to "achieve a more meaningful and
targeted approach" to meeting § 404 internal control requirements. 48 4
While the PCAOB properly established stringent standards for ac-
477. See Daniel Goelzer, Remarks at 21st Annual Washington Economics Policy Con-
ference: Costs and Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley Sec. 404, at 7 (Mar. 21, 2005).
478. See INST. OF INTERNAL AuDIToRs, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404: A Guide for Man-
agement by Internal Control Practitioners 8, available at http://www.theiia.org/
download.cfm?file=31866.
479. One CPA audit firm concluded that a public company had over 20,000 key con-
trols. See Rachel McTague, Atkins: SEC Enforcement Should Not Be Based on
Enforcement, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (Dec. 6, 2005). One reason CPA firms identi-
fied so many controls was that a risk-based approach was not effectively used.
Instead, the auditor's assessment became a mechanistic, check the box exercise.
See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 32, at 5.
480. Some critics have advocated rotational testing of various aspects of internal con-
trols. See Letter from David Walker, Comptroller Gen. of the U.S., U.S. Gov.
Accountability Office, to John Fogarty, Chair, Auditing Standards Bd. (May 19,
2006).
481. In 2005, 16% of public companies reporting on the second year of SOX § 404 com-
pliance disclosed material weaknesses. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n, Speech at SEC Roundtable, May 10, 2006, www.pcaobus.org/
Standards/Standards_andRelatedRules/AS2/2006/05-10UneditedTranscript.
pdf, at 7.
482. "Objectives Oriented Standards" provide an overarching conceptual framework,
and avoid bight-line tests and exceptions. Such standards are somewhere be-
tween a principles-based approach, which offers little operational guidance, and a
rules-based approach, which has enabled clever professionals to circumvent the
intent of the accounting standards. See generally Matthew A. Melone, United
States Accounting Standards-Rules or Principles?, 58 U. MrAMI L. REV. 1161
(2004).
483. An adequate internal audit staff can reduce external audit costs by providing
direct assistance to the external auditor. See SAS 65 (AU § 322), supra note 39.
See also Letter from Donna J. Fisher, supra note 94, at 4.
484. Id.
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counting firms to follow,485 the PCAOB must consider the practical
effect of its standards on auditors.48 6
Arguably, external auditors are not sufficiently considering risk
management practices and internal audit testing. "If the quality of
the internal audit function within a company is deemed to be reliable,
there is little reason why the external auditor must duplicate as much
work."48 7 The PCAOB should evaluate its rules and provide public
guidance on how much testing the external auditors must perform.488
Auditors should be able to rely more on "analytics,"48 9 as opposed to
only relying on substantive testing of internal controls.490 Currently,
the PCAOB requires the auditor "to perform substantive procedures
for all relevant assertions related to all significant [financial] accounts
and disclosures in the financial statements."49 1 Instead, the PCAOB
should relax the standard to require such examination, at least once
every three years, but more often if warranted by the financial state-
ment risks of the particular company and industry.
Small companies were granted additional time to comply with the
SOX § 404 requirements4 9 2 and a § 404 Management Report assess-
ing the effectiveness of their internal controls and the attestation re-
485. Some skeptics believe that the PCAOB's criticism in the inspection reports of
CPA firms creates an environment that fundamentally encourages auditors to
perform more tests than necessary before forming an audit opinion. Author's in-
terview with Robert Bunting, Past Chairman of the AICPA, at Hawaii Society of
Certified Public Accountants (June 30, 2006).
486. Letter from Donna J. Fisher, supra note 94, at 9.
487. Id. at 7. An analogous situation is where an investment firm's internal controls
are strong, so the SEC staff in the Office of Compliance Inspections and Exami-
nations ("OCIE") will conduct little or no audit testing. Mr. Richards, Dir. of
OCIE, Remarks at the Securities Industry Association's Internal Auditors Divi-
sion 2005 Annual Conference. See SEC ACCOUNTING RULES, Compliance Director
Seeks Greater Reliance on Internal Auditors, Letter No. 435 (CCH), Nov. 30,
2005. The OCIE administers the SEC's examination and inspection program for
registered SROs, investment companies, and related entities. See generally Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n, Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, http://www.
sec.gov/about/offices/ocie.shtml (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
488. Letter from Donna J. Fisher, supra note 94, at 7.
489. Analytics are analytical procedures which are less expensive than substantive
testing. See generally AU § 329.9, reprinted in GAAS, supra note 250. Auditors
are concerned about second guessing by the SEC, PCAOB, or the courts. Impact
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services,
109th Cong. 109-121 (Apr. 21, 2005) (response to Questions for the Record by
Rep. Joseph Crowley regarding § 404).
490. Letter from Donna J. Fisher, supra note 94, at 9.
491. AU § 319.02, reprinted in GAAS, supra note 250.
492. Small companies were expected to comply with § 404 in their Form 10-K filed for
fiscal years ending on or after July 15, 2007. See Management's Report on Inter-
nal Control, Securities Act Release No. 33-8618, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
52492, [2005 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 87,437 (Sept. 5, 2005).
This deadline was later extended.
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port by their external auditors4 93 in their Form 10-K annual
reports. 49 4 Small companies would have encountered difficulty com-
plying with § 404 under the PCAOB's AS2's interpretation because of
its cost and burden.4 9 5 As a result, at the request of the SEC's Chief
Accountant, COSO initiated a report providing guidance for smaller
companies to more affordably and effectively implement appropriate
internal control.496
However, the concerns of smaller companies should not result in
fundamentally different rules for them.49 7 Complete and accurate fi-
nancial reporting is needed for all public companies, including smaller
public companies. Congress should consider amending § 404 to clarify
that auditors must attest to internal control, but need not audit inter-
nal controls. This reform should permit extensive internal control
testing to occur less frequently than annually and to reward compa-
nies that minimize financial risks. Regulatory reform, in the form of
modified definitions of key SOX terms, appears on the horizon with
Proposed AS5 replacing AS2. This will help significantly reduce costs
for business, enhancing the maintenance of internal controls and the
reliability of financial information for all public companies.
D. Assisting Enforcement Through Enhancements,
Efficiency, and Education
To address on-going enforcement problems, Congress should con-
tinue to expand the powers of the SEC and other agencies to combat
misleading financial statements. However, any expansion of enforce-
ment power should make clear that government enforcement should
not create policy.498 Rather, agencies should create policy through an
493. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02(f) (2006).
494. The 10-K is the annual report. 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2006).
495. Part of the § 404 costs are fixed costs that are disproportionately burdensome on
smaller companies. See Grundfest, supra note 45, at 13.
496. The COSO guidance suggests ways that smaller companies can design and imple-
ment "effective internal controls in a more cost-efficient and practical manner."
See Press Release, The Institute of Internal Auditors, COSO Releases Small Bus-
iness Guidance Exposure Draft: For Control Framework Implementation to Sup-
port SOX 404 Compliance Efforts (Oct. 26, 2005), available at http-J/theiia.org/
theiia/newsroom/news-releases/index.cfm?i=497.
497. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES, Fi-
NAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES TO THE
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, Apr. 23, 2006, available at http://www.sec.gov/info/small
bus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf (establishing a new system of securities regula-
tions for small cap and microcap companies is among the primary
recommendations).
498. Some observers believe that the SEC prefers to create policy through "opaque
enforcement proceedings," rather than the formal process of making proposals
and seeking comment letters thereto. Saul S. Cohen, Does the SEC Focus on the
Right Things?, 4 J. OF INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 62 (2003).
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open hearing process. Congress should also improve the transparency
of governmental investigative standards used for investigations. Con-
gress could act to encourage enhanced educational standards in ac-
counting, auditing, and law for CPAs to reduce enforcement problems
because prevention of financial fraud requires knowledge and vigi-
lance by all relevant actors, including accountants. 4 99
Various prior proposals in Congress and the SEC deserve further
consideration. In 2001, the House Judiciary Committee approved the
"Financial Services Antifraud Network Act" to create a network link-
ing financial fraud databases.SOO This is the type of intergovernmen-
tal cooperation that can best help assure reliable financial statements.
In 2003, Congress considered the "Securities Fraud Deterrence and
Investor Restitution Act." This Act would have expanded the maxi-
mum potential penalties for securities fraud, allowed the SEC access
to grand jury information, and increased the SEC's subpoena powers.
The Act also would have allowed companies to disclose information to
the SEC without waiving attorney-client privilege or work product
protection in subsequent private litigation.501 The SEC has recom-
mended legislation allowing companies to produce internal investiga-
tion reports and other documents to the SEC without waiving any
privileges. 50 2 Further, in 2005, the Senate's Tax Relief Act would
have targeted abusive transactions involving tax-exempt organiza-
499. The chairman of the International Organization of Securities Commissioners
(IOSCO) Task Force investigating recent financial fraud noted that "even with
the highest quality regulatory standards, fully implemented and enforced, it will
not be possible to totally eliminate financial fraud. It takes consistent vigilance
by all stakeholders-corporate issuers, investors, auditors, analysts, in-
termediaries, and regulators alike-to minimize market misconduct." IOSCO,
IOSCO ACTION PLAN TO STRENGTHEN CAPITAL MARKETS AGAINST FINANCIAL
FRAUD 2 (Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://www.bafin.de/internationales/iosco/
pm_050301_e.pdf, at 2.
500. See Financial Services Antifraud Network Act of 2001, H.R. 1408, 107th Cong.
(2001).
501. HURON CONSULTING, 2003 ANNUAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL REPORTING MATrERS 9,
http://www.iasplus.com/resource/huron2003.pdf (2003).
502. This recommendation to protect companies from waiving their privileges arose
from a SEC study mandated by SOX § 704 to investigate financial reporting ma-
nipulation and "inappropriate earnings management." See SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, SOX SECTION 704 REPORT, supra note 11. "Earnings management" can
occur in "a gray area where the accounting is being perverted; where managers
are cutting corners; and where earnings reports reflect the desires of manage-
ment rather than the underlying financial performance of the company." Arthur
Levitt, Remarks by SEC Chairman at New York Univ. Center for Law and Busi-
ness: The Numbers Game (Sept. 28, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/newsl
speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt.
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tions.503 More recently, the SEC has also recognized the need to per-
form "continuous surveillance" of large companies. 50 4
The United States Chamber of Commerce has proposed various re-
finements to SOX to reduce its burden on companies. 505 The Cham-
ber is particularly concerned with the SEC's imposition of penalties on
public companies, even though most of the penalties are paid into the
SEC's "Fair Funds," which help to assist injured parties. The Cham-
ber is also concerned with fines for lack of cooperation with SEC inves-
tigations, pressure on companies to waive attorney-client privilege
and work product protection, and the SEC's marginalization of corpo-
rate reliance on attorneys and accountants. 5O6 These concerns are
worthy of further consideration.
The SEC lacks sufficient transparency of standards for its investi-
gations. The Chamber believes the SEC should consider the use of
formal reprimands.O7 Additionally, the Chamber believes that wider
use of Reports of Investigation under Securities Exchange Act section
21(a) (pursuant to which the Seaboard Report was issued) can provide
meaningful guidance on difficult accounting, reporting, and disclosure
issues.5 0 8 In judging cooperation, the Chamber wants the SEC and
other investigative agencies to carefully consider the burden associ-
ated with complying with demands for document production on com-
panies, especially where electronic documents or older documents at
other locations are involved. 5 09 These considerations also have merit.
CPAs need more of their education targeted in accounting, given
the growing volume of accounting and auditing standards and SEC
requirements. 5 1o PCAOB inspections and the controversy over SOX
503. See Tax Relief Act of 2005, S. 2020, 109th Cong. § 311 (2005), passed in the Sen-
ate but dropped in the enacted reconciliation bill, Katrina Emergency Tax Relief
Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-73.
504. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Office of Inspector General, Preliminary Review of
Findings, at 6 (June 22, 2006) (Report on SEC Division of Corporate Finance),
http://www.sec.gov/about/oig/audit2006/401fin.pdf.
505. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE CURRENT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 2006), available at http:l
www.uschamber.com/publications/reports/0603sec.htm.
506. Id. at 26-39.
507. Reprimands were previously suggested both by the Wells Committee and by
banking regulators as "Memoranda of Understanding." Id. at 7.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 8. The number of locations to examine key controls is a significant determi-
nant of § 404 costs. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 93, at 14.
510. The SEC realized that clearer and more detailed disclosure of executive compen-
sation was required in the MD&A. See SEC Executive Compensation and Re-
lated Party Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8732A, Securities Act
Release No. 34-54302A, [2006 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (Aug. 29,
2006); see generally Press Release 2006-123, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Votes to
Adopt Changes to Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executive Compensation
and Related Matters (July 26, 2006).
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§ 404 internal control work also demonstrate the need for further edu-
cation.5 -1 1 Congress should consider mandating basic licensing re-
quirements for CPAs, if the profession does not take responsibility for
enhancing its education and continuing education requirements. By
modifying continuing education requirements with periodic testing for
current licensees, Congress could encourage greater professionalism
from CPAs. CPAs should demonstrate maintenance of appropriate ac-
counting knowledge (especially of recent changes) and research skills
to find and apply all relevant professional standards. 5 12
Regarding the requirements for entering the profession, further re-
forms in the education of future CPAs are required. The National As-
sociation of State Boards of Accountancy ("NASBA")513 has proposed
to increase the number of required accounting and business courses
for becoming a CPA, but leave unchanged the total required 150 hours
of education. 5 14 The NASBA educational proposal is desirable, but it
does not go far enough to focus on an expanded auditing education.5 15
Future CPAs also need more accounting hours to learn how to conduct
professional accounting research to find and analyze relevant profes-
sional standards and authorities. The educational problem begins
with undergraduate accounting education that typically has not
taught students how to find and how to apply relevant professional
authorities, much less reinforce the necessary research mentality to
find the accurate answer.
As the accounting and auditing professional standards and related
legal requirements continue to multiply, it is essential to reform ac-
511. The NASDAQ survey found that seventy percent of responding companies said
that CPA firms "do not have sufficient adequately trained audit staff to work on
[SOX]." Letter from Donna J. Fisher, supra note 94, at 11. Substantial time was
wasted during the Section 404 process due to disjointed approaches by the audit
firms, lack of knowledge, and staff inability to make even minor decisions. Id.
512. Testing on the Web could overcome practical administrative concerns for further
testing of CPAs.
513. NASBA enhances consistency across its fifty-five jurisdictions by providing model
legislation known as the Uniform Accountancy Act ("UAA"). See UNIFORM Ac-
couNTANcY ACT (4th ed. 2005), available at http://www.aicpa.orgtdownload/
states/UAA_2005 FourthEdition.pdf. NASBA is comprised of the boards of ac-
countancy in the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
514. See NASBA, Framework for Revision-Rules 5-1 and 5-2, NASBA Education
Task Force (Jan. 16, 2006). The proposal increases the number of required up-
per-division (junior or senior level courses) accounting hours from 24 to 30 credit
hours and makes a similar increase in upper-division business courses.
515. The typical accounting program may require only three credit hours of auditing.
The authors advocate increasing required education in auditing to six credit
hours, a requirement previously used by a few state boards of accountancy. Simi-
larly, the knowledgeable accountant needs more than three hours of business
law. See generally Robert A. Prentice, The Case for Educating Legally-Aware Ac-
countants, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 597 (2001).
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counting education so that future professionals develop needed skills.
The accounting curriculum should emphasize professional research
and professionalism so that future accountants can remain current in
practice. 5 16 Accountants also need more business knowledge and
practice developing skills in information technology and finance to
master complex financial products, such as derivatives.
V. CONCLUSIONS
SOX successfully changed the oversight of the financial reporting
process and helped to ensure greater reliability of such reporting.
However, the problems revealed by the PCAOB inspection reports
have demonstrated that significant changes are still required. Too
many auditors are performing inadequately, bending to placate corpo-
rate management rather than upholding professional standards.
Many auditors also lack the knowledge or skills to implement the nu-
merous controlling professional standards.
Further refinements of SOX are needed. These reforms should
strengthen the effectiveness and fairness of the investigations of the
financial statements and the MD&A. To accomplish this, legislation
is needed to improve corporate governance and the "tone at the top,"
enhance comprehensive financial reporting and disclosure rules, im-
plement internal controls and more cost-effective auditor "404" work,
and upgrade enforcement efforts.
The legal and regulatory environment that businesses confront in
the future is often based on what is currently considered best prac-
tices. Accordingly, businesses and their auditors must anticipate in-
creased economic and legal risks if they fail to meet today's best
practices. There is no doubt that "[m]aking compliance part of the en-
terprise-wide management framework . . . is critical to an organiza-
tion's success and minimizing reputation[all risk" and to assuring
more reliable financial information. 5 17
516. See generally THOMAS WEIRICH, THOMAS PEARSON, & ALAN REINSTEIN, ACCOUNT-
ING AND AUDITING RESEARCH: TOOLS AND STRATEGIES (6th ed. 2005).
517. PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Compliance Gap, 4 J. INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 31,
38 (2003).
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